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Abstract  
In the US and other world markets, book building is a dominant mechanism for 
the issue of shares in initial public offerings (IPOs). A distinguishing feature of the book 
building mechanism is the discretionary power granted to underwriters to allocate 
shares to investors. We find that IPOs are generally underpriced in most countries. It is 
therefore of interest to financial economists and regulators to understand the role of 
underwriters as a financial intermediary in the allocation of IPO shares to IPO 
subscribers in this wealth transferring mechanism. Allocation discretion assists 
underwriters to develop and maintain information sharing relationships with 
institutional investors. This has a significant bearing on the richness of private 
information extracted from these investors that is used by the underwriters to price 
the IPO. This benefits the issuer through lower underpricing. However, granting 
allocation discretion to underwriters is also controversial as it can result in increased 
rent-seeking activity by underwriters, thereby leading to higher underpricing in the 
IPO.  
On the other hand, imposing constraints on underwriters by regulating 
allocation discretion and enabling proportionate allocation of shares to institutional 
investors can have adverse implications for underwriters because of the difficulty in 
maintaining information sharing relationships with informed institutional investors. 
Such restrictions, therefore, affect the degree of information extracted from 
institutional investors, resulting in an IPO being less fairly priced. Also, the participation 
of regular institutional investors becomes more unpredictable, and this can negatively 
affect IPO performance. Thus, regulating allocation discretion has the potential to 
increase the overall risk for underwriters managing IPOs. 
Against this background, in this doctoral thesis, I address the debate around 
regulating the discretionary allocation power of underwriters from the welfare 
perspective of market participants. Thereby, this thesis aims to contribute to an 
enhanced understanding of the IPO market mechanism.  
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In Study 1, I introduce an integrated conceptual framework of information 
sharing under two different allocation mechanisms to underwriters, namely with and 
without allocation discretion. Thus, I develop a theoretical understanding of 
information sharing and its effect on underwriters’ behaviour in the IPO market by 
linking information sharing theory with signaling and syndication theories. 
In Study 2 and Study 3, of this thesis, I empirically investigate the significance of 
information sharing on underwriters’ incentives and its effect on IPO pricing in the 
Indian IPO market. The IPO market in India has two distinct characteristics. First, the 
Indian IPO market has both discretionary and proportionate allocation regimes, and 
second, there is an active grey market for IPOs. Together these characteristics provide 
a fascinating context to examine underwriters’ behaviour in the IPO process. 
In Study 2, I apply the implications of signaling theory in the Indian IPO market 
setting to explain how underwriters can reduce the information asymmetry for 
uninformed retail investors. In addition, I investigate how allocation discretion affects 
underwriters’ intentions in the grey market and their choice in sharing information 
about IPO quality with market participants. This, in turn, can result in different 
outcomes for retail investor participation and IPO underpricing depending on the 
underwriters’ signaling behaviour in the grey market. 
In deciding their participation, retail investors are positively influenced by the 
price signal in the grey market. Hence, the finding supports the conclusion that a grey 
market price signal can become a dominant influence in attracting retail investors to 
actively participate in an IPO, thus contributing to the IPO’s success. Moreover, 
allocation discretion motivates underwriters to manipulate the grey market for higher 
benefits for themselves, while regulating the allocation power of underwriters reduces 
their incentive to remain active in the grey market. Additionally, the finding suggests a 
positive relationship between retail investor participation and underpricing in IPOs. 
When allocation discretion is regulated, however, the relationship is insignificant. 
Finally, I find no relationship between the grey market price and IPO underpricing. 
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In Study 3, I advance a conceptual and empirical understanding of underwriting 
syndication in the Indian IPO market by examining the determinants of an IPO 
syndicate. In addition, I contemplate the usefulness of syndication as a substitution 
mechanism for higher information and risk sharing when allocation discretion is 
regulated. Finally, I explore whether reputation-based syndication is motivated by 
information sharing or price manipulation and investigate the effect of the regulatory 
intervention on this relationship. 
The underwriting market in India is highly concentrated with continuing 
relationships among top underwriters to manage IPOs. I find that underwriters form a 
large syndicate when they do not have a reputation as a top performer, participation 
from investors is weak, and the issue size is large. Also, I do not find any evidence that 
the motivation for underwriters to form an IPO syndicate is due to market risk sharing 
or price manipulation. I do find that regulatory intervention results in reduced 
syndication amongst underwriters. In this regime, institutional investors share risk with 
reputed underwriters by acting as a mediating factor for them to syndicate. The 
evidence from the findings is that in the absence of allocation discretion, reputation-
based syndication can act as an indirect medium of discretion for underwriters by way 
of higher risk and information sharing. 
Overall, the evidence does not support the information sharing hypothesis that 
granting allocation discretion to underwriters results in improved price discovery. 
However, the results support the cronyism view that underwriters engage in rent-
seeking activity for higher incomes, which is made possible by the presence of a grey 
market for IPOs. The evidence does not support the risk sharing theory that proposes 
that underwriter syndication is aimed at sharing market risk. Rather, the results 
indicate that underwriters syndicate to share inventory risk for higher economic 
benefits, which in effect is indirect risk mitigation.  
The combination of findings supports the regulatory intervention that limits the 
allocation power of underwriters. It is possible that regulatory intervention will be 
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more effective when the grey market is regulated, as the price signal in the grey 
market positively influences retail investors’ participation. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Context  
Book building is a dominant mechanism for the issue of IPO shares 
(Jagannathan et al., 2010). A feature of the book building mechanism, as followed in 
the US and most other markets, is the discretion in allocation and pricing that is 
granted to underwriters who manage an IPO. The underwriter may either purchase 
securities from an issuer or offer to sell securities for the issuer. The pricing discretion 
allows the underwriter to set an initial price band and arrive at the final offer price in 
an IPO, while allocation discretion enables the underwriter to allocate shares to the 
IPO subscribers in a manner that they consider appropriate (Ritter and Welch, 2002). 
Allocation Discretion and Information Sharing 
Research studies on IPOs that support granting allocation discretion to 
underwriters argue that discretion in allocation has the potential to facilitate the 
extraction of private information from informed institutional investors and that 
increases price discovery in the IPO process (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste 
and Wilhelm, 1990; Sherman and Titman, 2002). This improves the pricing efficiency in 
the IPO mechanism and benefits the issuers with lower underpricing1 (Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, 2002).  
However, recent research has exposed a downside to the granting of allocation 
discretion to underwriters. The argument against allowing discretionary allocation 
power to underwriters is that they can use allocation discretion to further their self-
interest by way of rent-seeking activity (Jenkinson and Jones, 2009; Nimalendran et al., 
2007; Reuter, 2006).  
                                                     
1 Underpricing (Initial Return) is defined as the percentage change from the IPO offer price to 
the share price at the end of the first day of trading. 
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Rent-seeking activity is achieved by underwriters when they allocate a quantity 
of higher underpriced shares to regular institutional investors who are ready to share a 
percentage of higher profits earned. The evidence of Aggarwal et al. (2002) and 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) supports the view that when underpricing of an IPO is 
high; underwriters use their discretionary allocation power to favour regular 
institutional investors. The higher profits received by regular institutional investors are 
returned to the brokerage arm of the underwriter by way of higher trading 
commissions (Goldstein et al., 2011). This is evidenced in a study by Nimalendran et al. 
(2007) that finds that large commissions were given to underwriters by institutional 
investors in return for favourable IPO allocations.  
In the US, this profit sharing relationship has been criticised because large 
numbers of shares in underpriced offerings having been allocated to institutional 
investors at the expense of retail investors (Forbes, May 25, 1992)2. The rent-seeking 
activity that results in a profit sharing relationship between underwriters and regular 
institutional investors induces underwriters to price an IPO lower than the fair value, 
thereby increasing underpricing for an IPO. The cost of such self-interested behaviour 
by underwriters is borne by the issuing firm and small, uninformed retail investors. 
This, in turn, has a negative effect on the welfare of IPO market participants overall. 
Given the problem of potential exploitation in share allocation by underwriters, 
a regulator can control the discretionary allocation power of underwriters and impose 
proportionate allocation mechanisms. In such mechanisms, the allocation of shares to 
institutional investors is dictated on a pro rata basis. This prevents underwriters from 
favouring their regular institutional investors.  
It is possible, however, that when regulators enforce constraints on 
underwriters’ discretionary power to allocate shares, the efficiency of the IPO market 
                                                     
2 Schifrin, M & Coleman, L 1992, 'Members Only', Forbes, vol. 149, no. 11, pp. 42. 
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is reduced. This is because the regulation of allocation discretion makes it more  
difficult for underwriters to develop and maintain information sharing relationships 
with regular institutional investors (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). This can result in an 
IPO not being priced correctly, at the fair value such that the IPO is either more 
overpriced or underpriced than would have otherwise been the case. This can 
negatively affect both IPO performance and underwriter reputation. Also, as a result of 
the increased uncertainty associated with subscriptions in the IPO from regular 
institutional investors, the success of the IPO can be affected (Hanley and Wilhelm, 
1995). Underwriter income is thereby made more unpredictable. Thus, in this case, the 
outcome is increased overall risk for underwriters managing an IPO (Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, 2002). In effect, discretion in allocation is an incentive for underwriters to 
remain active in their industry, whereas regulating it can adversely affect their long-
term sustainability in the IPO market.  
Following such critiques, the question of whether to grant allocation discretion 
to underwriters or to regulate it more strictly has led to an active debate in the 
academic literature as to both the benefits and detriments of discretionary and 
proportionate allocation mechanisms, particularly from the welfare perspective of 
market participants.  
In this doctoral study, I examine a number of issues related to underwriters’ 
behaviour in the IPO market, depending on their incentive structure. To this end, I avail 
myself of data from Indian IPOs. India has a distinct market setting when compared to 
other markets, with two features. The Indian regulatory authority first granted 
discretionary allocation power to underwriters before regulating the previously held 
power of underwriters to allocate shares to institutional investors. Second, and more 
importantly, there is a presence of a grey market for IPOs in India. 
1.2 The Setting: Indian IPO Market 
The unique institutional features of the Indian IPO market are an important 
setting for my study. I present a detailed discussion of the institutional characteristics 
of the Indian IPO market setting in Chapter 2. I discuss them briefly below. 
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Allocation Discretion 
When bookbuilding was introduced into the Indian market in 1999, the initial 
guidelines issued by the regulatory authority, the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI)3, allowed for the allocation of shares to institutional investors on a 
discretionary basis. However, on September 19, 2005, SEBI enacted a new law that 
regulated the discretionary allocation power of underwriters to ensure that the 
discretion granted to underwriters was not misused. Following this regulatory 
intervention, the allocation of shares to institutional investors was conducted on a 
proportionate (pro rata) basis4. During both the regimes5, however, the underwriters 
were allowed to retain pricing flexibility at their discretion. This gave them the power 
to set the initial price band and the final offer price of an IPO.  
Grey Market 
The Indian IPO market displays the presence of an informal pre-IPO market, 
commonly known as the grey market, that allows investors to trade yet-to-be-issued, 
new equity shares. The grey market price can reflect the fundamental value of an IPO 
(Chang et al., 2016). For this reason, it can influence the investment decision of 
potential IPO investors. Grey market prices for shares are quoted when the offer price 
range for the IPO is announced and remains active until the share is listed on one of 
the major stock exchanges. 
1.3 Motivation and Aim for Thesis 
Internationally bookbuilding has become the most dominant mechanism for 
the issue of IPO shares (Jagannathan et al., 2010). However, as shown in Figure 1.1, 
over the period 1990-2015 IPOs in the US market have left $149.88 billion on the table 
                                                     
3 SEBI (DIP) guidelines 2000 Chapter XI clause 11.3.2(iv) 
 
4 SEBI Circular No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/DIP/16/2005/19/9 dated September 19, 2005. 
 http://www.sebi.gov.in/guide/DipGuidelines2009.pdf 
 
5 The period before September 2005 is identified as the pre-regulation period and October 2005 
onwards as the post regulation period. 
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by way of an average underpricing of 18%6. As shown in Figure 1.2, on average IPOs in 
European countries are underpriced in the range of 3% to 51%. 
 
Figure 1.1: IPO Underpricing and Money left on the table in the US. 
Source: Jay Ritter IPO website. 
When underwriters have allocation discretion and IPOs are highly underpriced, 
this gives them the power to distribute a significant amount of wealth to IPO investors. 
In the US market, this is dominated largely by institutional investors (Ritter and Welch, 
2002). But in developing countries, where the underpricing on average ranges from a 
low of 4% to a high of 149%, the market is dominated by small retail investors, see 
Figure 1.3. 
The chairman of SEBI reflected on the Indian IPO market, of 2011, when IPOs 
made very substantial gains on their first day of trading before falling back, stating that 
                                                     
6 ‘Money left on the table’ is defined as the first day price gain multiplied by the number of 
shares sold. 
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"There was a feeling in this country that many IPOs are manipulated" (Wall Street 
Journal, Jan 03, 2013)7.   
 
Figure 1.2: Initial IPO returns in European IPOs. 
Source: Jay Ritter IPO website. 
Although much existing research investigates the implications of allocation 
mechanisms on underwriters’ information sharing relationships with institutional 
investors, there is very limited research that considers the effect of granting allocation 
discretion and regulating it, in regard to underwriters’ behaviour, their incentive 
structure, and the impact on underpricing. Following Ritter and Welch (2002), we 
might anticipate future research will contribute to a deeper understanding of IPO 
allocation issues and behavioural explanations, and seek to explain changes in 
underpricing in relationship to these factors. This research attempts to bridge this gap 
in the literature. 
Most of the markets where bookbuilding was introduced have similar rules to 
the US (Ljungqvist et al., 2003). In the US market, data on investor participation and 
allocation of shares to investors is confidential and therefore not available in the public 
domain. This makes it difficult to test the effect of allocation discretion on 
                                                     
7 Anand, S. & Jain, S. 2013, In IPO Cleanup, India Weighs a Refund Plan, Eastern edition, New 
York, N.Y. 
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underwriters’ behaviour in the IPO market and, in turn, its effect on IPO underpricing. 
This limits our ability to gain an understanding of the role of underwriters in the IPO 
process and their relationship with IPO investors. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Initial IPO returns in non-European IPOs.  
Source: Jay Ritter IPO website. 
Against this background, I aim to contribute to a better understanding of the 
IPO market mechanism and propose to disentangle the debate on regulating the 
allocation process for underwriters by addressing the key research question: Do 
underwriters need discretion in IPO allocation? 
I develop a conceptual framework of information sharing, with and without 
allocation discretion, to underwriters. In addition, I test a range of hypotheses, as 
formulated in the conceptual framework. Hence, this thesis is based on a strong 
motivation to address some notable gaps in the literature by providing a 
comprehensive analysis of information sharing literature and the role of underwriters 
in the IPO market, from perspective of the welfare of market participants. The 
research focuses on information sharing theory and the explanation of underwriters’ 
behaviour in the IPO market in the context of different allocation mechanisms, with 
different incentive structures.  
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Objectives and Research Questions 
To make a contribution to the IPO and financial intermediation literature from 
the perspective of market welfare a look at the regulatory rationale and design for the 
Indian IPO market. The exogenous change in the Indian IPO market that followed 
regulating the discretionary allocation powers of underwriters, plus the presence of an 
active grey market, influences the behaviour of underwriters during an IPO process. In 
looking at this, I hope to fill a gap in the literature about the conditions under which 
underwriters should be allowed allocation discretion.  
In this setting, the objectives of this study are to: 
1. discuss the role of underwriters in the IPO market, with and without allocation 
discretion; 
2. examine the effect of allocation discretion on IPO pricing; 
3. discuss how underwriters can reduce information asymmetry for uninformed 
retail investors vis a vis institutional investors; 
4. investigate the impact underwriters have on their signaling behaviour in the 
grey market of granting allocation discretion; 
5. examine the determinants of IPO syndication; 
6. investigate the effectiveness of syndication as an indirect medium of discretion 
for underwriters: and  
7. explore the motivation behind IPO syndication by top-ranked underwriters.  
Thus, the main underlying research questions addressed in this thesis are:   
Research Question 1a: What is the efficacy of discretionary and proportionate 
policy regimes on information sharing between underwriters and institutional 
investors?  
Research Question 1b: What are the consequences for underwriters when their 
allocation power is regulated, and how can they overcome the regulation hurdle?  
Research Questions 1a and 1b are addressed in Chapter 3 (Study 1). 
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Research Question 2a: How can underwriters use the grey market as a 
signaling environment to reduce information asymmetry between IPO investors?  
Research Question 2b: In the grey market does allocation discretion affect a 
behavioural change in the pattern of signaling by underwriters? 
Research Questions 2a and 2b are addressed in Chapter 4 (Study 2). 
Research Question 3a: When and why do underwriters form an underwriting 
syndicate? 
Research Question 3b: When the allocation power of underwriters is regulated, 
can syndication amongst underwriters act as a substitution mechanism for higher 
information and risk sharing? 
Research Question 3c: What is the effect on IPO pricing of syndication by an 
underwriter? 
Research Questions 3a, 3b and 3c are addressed in Chapter 5 (Study 3) 
For a better understanding of IPO allocation mechanisms, in Study 1 I develop a 
conceptual framework to introduce the idea of information sharing under the 
condition that underwriters have discretion in the allocation of shares to institutional 
investors and that the market is regulated. Thus, Study 2 and Study 3 contribute to the 
IPO and financial intermediation literature by providing empirical evidence that 
informs concepts discussed in the literature. Specifically, the study advances the 
information sharing literature by linking it to the signaling and syndication literature by 
investigating underwriters’ behaviour in the IPO market. Thus, Study 2 and Study 3 
leverage the conceptual foundation of information sharing literature established in 
Study 1. Nevertheless, each study has its distinct rationale, empirical modelling and 
contribution.  
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The findings of this research are intended to shape aspects of policy 
consideration in markets that allow bookbuilding as a mechanism for the issue of IPO 
shares. Each of the three studies will now be briefly outlined. 
1.3.1 Study 1-Conceptual Framework (Chapter 3) 
In Study 1, I introduce a conceptual framework of information sharing under 
two different allocation mechanisms: with and without allocation discretion to 
underwriters. I test this conceptual framework empirically.  
To arrive at the proposed hypotheses, I divide the literature into two groups, 
depending on the perspective of the information shared between underwriters and 
institutional investors. I advance the literature by illuminating the positive and 
negative implications of granting allocation discretion to underwriters, as opposed to 
regulating allocations. 
In addition, I contribute by applying signaling theory to the IPO market setting 
to address the effect of information asymmetry on IPO investors in the presence of a 
grey market. I examine whether the price signal by underwriters about the IPO quality 
in the grey market can reduce the information asymmetry for uninformed retail 
investors and motivate them to actively participate in the IPO market towards IPO 
success.  
Moreover, the study contributes to understanding the effect of allocation 
discretion on underwriters’ signaling behaviour in the grey market, as a function of 
their motivation to use the information they hold about an IPO, for their own or the 
market’s benefit. The analysis of such motives contributes to an in-depth 
understanding of grey market dynamics. The findings predict different outcomes for 
retail investor participation and IPO underpricing, depending on the signaling 
behaviour of the underwriters in the grey market.  
In this study, I address the determinants of underwriting syndicates in the IPO 
market and examine the motivation of underwriters to form IPO syndicates as either (i) 
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risk mitigation or (ii) price manipulation. I contribute to knowledge by modelling the 
effectiveness for underwriters of syndication as a substitute mechanism for higher 
information and risk sharing, thereby creating an indirect medium of discretion for 
underwriters when their allocation power is regulated. Finally, I contribute by 
exploring the motivation of syndication by reputedly top underwriters and examine 
whether, in the absence of allocation discretion, reputation-based syndication results 
in higher information sharing or price manipulation in an IPO. 
In summary, I contribute to the literature by addressing the inconclusive 
evidence as to the implications of granting allocation discretion to underwriters, and 
the responses of underwriters when allocation discretion is regulated. Thus, I bring a 
new dimension to the information sharing literature by linking allocation with the 
signaling and syndication literature to analyse underwriters’ behaviour in the IPO 
market and its impact on IPO pricing. 
1.3.2 Study 2-Underwriter Signaling (Chapter 4) 
Study 2 builds on the idea of information asymmetry in the IPO market by 
elaborating on the information asymmetry between informed institutional investors 
and uninformed retail investors. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first such 
study to examine the application of signaling theory in an IPO market setting in the 
presence of a grey market for IPOs. The study explains the functioning of the grey 
market by means of interviews allocated by a scoping technique, which encompasses 
market operators, brokers, investors and a newspaper editor. This study overcomes 
the data limitations of past studies in India by using a large sample size and a data 
sample that covers a longer period, i.e. from the start of bookbuilding in 2000 until 
2013. 
To the best of my understanding, this is the first study to examine whether the 
grey market can be used as a signaling environment to signal IPO quality to 
uninformed retail investors, thereby reducing the information differential.  
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I investigate how underwriters’ underlying behaviour in the grey market can 
dictate the market reaction of uninformed retail investors. Previous research has 
found that the participants of the grey market are sentiment-driven uninformed retail 
investors (Cornelli et al., 2006; Dorn, 2009). In this study, I contribute to knowledge by 
exploring the possibility of informed underwriters as participants in the grey market. 
The unique regulatory environment of the Indian IPO market allows me to test 
whether granting allocation discretion to underwriters results in a higher level of 
information sharing between underwriters and informed institutional investors.  
In addition, I examine how granting allocation discretion to underwriters affects 
their interests and the consequential dynamics of the grey market. This is important as 
different outcomes for retail investor participation and underpricing are possible, 
depending on the signaling behaviour of underwriters in the grey market. Thus, this 
study on the Indian IPO market illuminates the effectiveness of regulatory 
intervention, in the presence of a grey market for IPOs. 
1.3.3 Study 3-Underwriter Syndication (Chapter 5) 
In the IPO underwriting industry, a significant number of underwriters compete 
for business which, in theory, should eliminate underpricing. However, many IPOs are 
underpriced, while highly reputable underwriters do not appear to be losing their 
underwriting business to other underwriters. Past academic research has focused 
extensively on underpricing, from the perspective of an individual underwriter. 
However, there is limited literature discussing the effect of underwriter syndication on 
IPO underpricing, although most successful IPOs are managed by a group of 
underwriters who form an underwriting syndicate. Thus, the objective of Study 3 is to 
contribute to the literature by advancing the conceptual and empirically examination 
of underwriter syndication in the IPO market.  
Traditional risk sharing theory indicates that underwriters form a large 
syndicate for market risk sharing (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; Mandelker and Raviv, 
1977). Such studies find no relationship between market risk sharing and the size of an 
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underwriting syndicate (Corwin and Schultz, 2005; Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). This 
motivates me to address the gap in the literature as to why underwriters form a 
syndicate. The study by Corwin and Schultz (2005) investigates the relationship 
between the size of an underwriting syndicate and the risk of an IPO. However, the 
authors do not consider that syndication might be motivated by price manipulation. I 
extend the Corwin and Schultz (2005) study by investigating whether syndication is 
motivated by risk mitigation or price manipulation.   
The academic literature refers to the risk of an IPO (IPO Risk) as the external 
market-specific risk that the underwriter faces while managing an IPO. In this study, I 
propose an additional risk that the underwriter confronts, an internal, underwriter-
specific risk (inventory risk). Inventory risk refers to whether underwriters can 
successfully sell an IPO. Thus, I contribute to the literature by examining the risk 
factors that impact syndication amongst underwriters. 
The extant literature has examined the influence of underwriter reputation on 
IPO underpricing (Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990). However, it has 
not explored how syndication by reputable underwriters affects IPO underpricing. I 
address this question by investigating the effect of reputation-based syndication on 
IPO underpricing.  
Thus, in this study, I combine the information sharing literature with IPO 
syndication theories to explore underwriter syndication. This study thereby 
contributes to our knowledge of IPO syndication and its effect on IPO pricing. The 
findings arising from this study are expected to provide new directions with respect to 
an understanding of the motivation of reputed underwriters to form a syndicate and 
its effect on IPO pricing. 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The current chapter has introduced the 
thesis. Chapter 2 discusses the background of the institutional features of the Indian 
IPO market, including the grey market. Chapter 3 (Study 1) introduces an integrated 
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conceptual framework of information sharing, with and without allocation discretion 
to underwriters, by linking information sharing theories with signaling and syndication 
theories. Chapter 4 (Study 2) applies signaling theory in the Indian IPO market setting 
to understand the effect of the information asymmetry between IPO investors. It 
further examines the effect of allocation discretion on the signaling behaviour of 
underwriters in the grey market. The objective of Chapter 5 (Study 3) is an examination 
of the determinants of underwriter syndication and the motivation of underwriters in 
the Indian IPO market to form IPO syndicates. This study also explores the relationship 
between syndication by a reputed underwriter and its effect on IPO pricing. The 
conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future research are examined in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2 Institutional Features  
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I give a detailed discussion of the institutional setting in the 
Indian IPO market, including the grey market. I discuss the key differences in the 
bookbuilding mechanisms of the Indian and the US IPO markets. Finally, I give a brief 
overview of the IPO underwriting market in India and present its key differences from 
the US market.  
2.2 Indian IPO Market  
Before 1992, the Indian primary market was regulated by the government 
regulator, the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI), who determined at what price the firm 
would offer shares to investors. In 1992, the government deregulated the capital 
market and created the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) as the new 
market regulator to oversee capital market regulations. The role of SEBI is analogous 
to the role of the US market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
The SEBI regulates the primary market issues in India through Disclosure and Investor 
Protection (DIP) guidelines.  
A series of reforms initiated by SEBI started with the abolition of the position of 
the CCI, which brought to an end the control on pricing of new issues. Hence, market 
forces were allowed to play a greater role in the capital issuing process as it introduced 
market-based pricing of IPOs through fixed priced offerings.  
Historically firms would raise capital in an IPO through a fixed price mechanism. 
In 19958, SEBI introduced a bookbuilding mechanism for the issue of IPO shares with 
guidelines very similar to those used in the US, Europe and other international 
markets. However, as discussed below, three important features differentiate the 
bookbuilding mechanism of India from those of the US and other markets. 
                                                     
8 Although the bookbuilding mechanism was introduced in 1995, the first time the bookbuilding 
mechanism was used to issue IPO shares was in 1999. 
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2.2.1 Investor Classification and Allocation Proportion 
In the Indian market, IPO shares are reserved and allocated in three investor 
categories depending on the investor type and the amount bid. The three investor 
types are categorised as individual retail investors, non-institutional investors (NIIs), 
which comprise high net worth individual investors investing large amounts of funds, 
and qualified institutional buyers (QIBs).  
Institutional investors such as commercial banks, venture capital funds, FIIs and 
mutual funds are QIBs. Table 2.1 gives a list of entities that are included in the 
categories considered as QIBs for the purpose of participating in the Indian IPO 
process. 
Table 2.1: List of Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs) 
In terms of clause 2.2.2B (v) of DIP Guidelines, a 'Qualified Institutional Buyer' shall mean: 
a. Public financial institution as defined in section 4A of the Companies Act, 1956 
b. Scheduled commercial banks 
c. Mutual funds 
d. Foreign institutional investor registered with SEBI 
e. Multilateral and bilateral development financial institutions 
f. Venture capital funds registered with SEBI 
g. Foreign venture capital investors registered with SEBI. 
h. State industrial development corporations 
i. Insurance firms registered with the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority  
j. Provident funds with minimum corpus of Rs.25 crores 
k. Pension funds with minimum corpus of Rs. 25 crores) 
Source: SEBI DIP (2006) Guidelines  
As per the introductory SEBI (DIP) guidelines 2000,9 a retail individual investor 
in public issue was defined as an individual who applies for less than 1000 shares in an 
IPO. However, this definition was revised by an amendment to the DIP guidelines in 
2003 which identified retail investors as an individual investor who applies for shares 
for a value of not more than INR 50,000 in an IPO10. In 2005, the DIP guidelines were 
                                                     
9 SEBI disclosure and investor protection (DIP) guidelines, 2000 
 
10 SEBI disclosure and investor protection (DIP) guidelines, 2003 
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further amended lifting the limit from INR 50,000 to INR 100,00011. With the 
amendment to SEBI (ICDR) Regulations in 2010, the limit for an individual retail 
investor was further increased to INR 200,000 (about US$2940) 12,13. Investors that bid 
for more than INR 200,000 and are not classified as QIBs, which come under the non-
institutional investor category.  
In addition, as per the 2009 SEBI guidelines14, as shown in Table 2.2, IPO shares 
have to be reserved and allocated in the following proportion for each category of 
investors. The highest proportion of shares is reserved for the institutional investor 
category, followed by retail investors and the non-institutional investor category is 
allocated the lowest proportion of shares. In a limited number of IPOs, a small portion 
of shares is reserved for firm employees.  
Regulations allow underwriters to move unsubscribed shares from one investor 
category to other investor categories that are oversubscribed ignoring the original 
share allocation ratio. 
Table 2.2: Allocation Proportion 
Investor Type Allocation Proportion 
Institutional Investors (QIBs) 50% 
Retail Investors 35% 
Non-Institutional Investors (NIIs) 15% 
Total 100% 
 
2.2.2 Allocation Mechanisms  
With different allocation baskets dependent on investor type, and the amount 
bid, during the introductory phase of bookbuilding, the SEBI regulations allowed 
                                                     
11 vide circular no. SEBI/CFD/DIL/DIP/15/2005/29/3 dated March 29th 2005 
 
12 1 USD = 68 Indian Rupee (INR) 
 
13 Available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/cms/sebi_data/attachdocs/1287745071684.pdf 
 
14 SEBI Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements (ICDR) Regulations 2009 
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allocation of shares to the institutional investors category on a discretionary basis, 
while for retail and non-institutional investors the allocation could be done on a non-
discretionary (proportionate) basis. 
In the discretionary allocation mechanism, underwriters could allocate shares 
to institutional investors depending upon their individual selection criteria. The SEBI 
(DIP) guidelines 2000 Chapter XI clause 11.3.2(iv) states that “The allocation to the 
Qualified Institutional Buyers shall be determined by the Book Runner(s) based on 
prior commitment, investor quality, price aggression, earliness of bids, etc.”  
As there are no specific allocation parameters for underwriters under these 
rules, the allocation of shares to institutional investors could depend on various factors 
and, more importantly, on the relationship between underwriters and institutional 
investors.  
 
Figure 2.1: Allocation Mechanisms 
Regulatory investigation15 and academic studies (Nimalendran et al., 2007; 
Reuter, 2006) give evidence of misuse of allocation discretion by underwriters to 
benefit themselves. Hence, on Sept 19, 2005, through its Disclosure and Investor 
                                                     
15 http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/csfbipo.htm 
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Protection (DIP) guidelines16, SEBI stripped underwriters of their ability to allocate 
shares to institutional investors on a discretionary basis. Hence, in the new regulated 
environment, as shown in Figure 2.1, the allocation of shares to institutional investors 
is done on a proportionate (pro-rata) basis. 
 
Figure 2.2: Pre- and Post-Regulation period 
For this thesis, the period before the regulation change is termed the pre-
regulation period and the period after the regulation change is termed the post-
regulation period, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2.1, in both 
periods, allocation to retail investors and non-institutional investors is done on a 
proportionate basis. 
Also, the one other thing that is common to both regimes is that underwriters 
have pricing flexibility at their discretion. Furthermore, the change in regulation does 
not affect the activities that underwriters perform (such as road shows and 
presentations to institutional investors) to establish an understanding of the price and 
demand information of these investors. This pre-market information gathering from 
prospective institutional investors assists underwriters in setting the initial price band 
for an IPO. 
2.2.3 Transparency in the Indian IPO Market 
The bookbuilding mechanism in India is quite transparent when compared to 
that followed in the US and European markets. The Indian regulation requires that the  
                                                     
16 SEBI Circular No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/DIP/16/2005/19/9 dated September 19, 2005. 
 http://www.sebi.gov.in/guide/DipGuidelines2009.pdf 
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Table 2.3: The US versus Indian IPO Bookbuilding mechanisms 
 India USA 
Price Band The upper price band has to be 20 
percent of the lower price band. 
The typical price range difference is 
$2 or 10 percent. 
Bids As the bids are legally binding, 
bidders with valid bids have to take 
the allocations awarded by the 
underwriters. 
The bids are an indicative expression 
of interest. 
Price Band 
Revision 
Almost never revised upwards, but 
revised downwards if investors 
demand is low. 
May be revised upwards several times 
before the filing becomes effective.  
In 25 percent of the offers the price 
range is revised upwards (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2002).  
Bookbuilding 
Offer Time 
Around 21 days from the filing of a 
final prospectus with the Registrar of 
Companies17. 
No delay in the offer becoming 
effective, and listing on the stock 
exchange. 
Transparency Regulation requires that a 
subscriber's application information 
(by investor type) be available online 
during the IPO subscription period. 
The book is built in private, and the 
information on the book is very rarely 
made public. 
Allocation 
Baskets 
Fixed proportion of shares allocated 
to three different categories of 
investors. 
There is no such categorisation of 
investor type. 
Allocation 
Mechanism 
Shares allocated to all investor 
categories on a pro-rata basis. 
Underwriters have the discretion to 
allocate shares to any investors. 
Allocation to 
Institutional 
Investors 
A maximum of 50 percent of the 
issue size. 
Historically, around 2/3 of the shares 
are allocated to institutional investors 
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). 
subscribers’ information by investor type be publicly available online throughout the 
subscription period of an IPO. This information is made public on a real-time basis on 
the web page of the two major stock exchanges (the National Stock Exchange (NSE) 
and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)). This information allows market participants 
and potential investors to observe the cumulative demand of shares at various price 
points in the initial price band, and also see any oversubscription of IPO shares by 
different investor categories for their respective portions of the offer. In the US 
                                                     
17 Recent SEBI guidelines has decreased the time frame between IPO closing and listing to 6 
days. http://www.bseindia.com/downloads1/Streamlining_the_Process_of_Public_Issues.pdf 
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market, there is no information available to any market participant with respect to 
investors’ participation during the offer period. Even after the completion of the IPO 
process and listing, investors’ participation and allocation details are not disclosed to 
other market participants. 
Table 2.3 summarises the key differences between the Indian and American 
bookbuilding mechanisms. 
2.3 Institutional Features of the Grey Market 
An informal, pre-IPO market, commonly known as the grey market for IPOs, 
exists in India. It is an over-the-counter market where investors can trade yet-to-be-
issued new equity shares before they are listed on any stock exchange. The grey 
market provides liquidity to investors before the start of official trading for an IPO. The 
grey market is also known as a “when-issued market” as the shares which are traded 
here have still not been issued to the investors. Grey market contracts are forward 
contracts in which the price is fixed today, and the contract is exercised when the IPO 
shares get listed on the stock exchange.  
Using scoping technique, and by way of discussions with 12 participants who 
operate/operated in grey market in India, I obtained detailed information about the 
operational features of the grey market in India and also got an idea of the role of 
different IPO market participants. In India, the grey market is active in cities such as 
Ahmedabad, Baroda, Chennai, Delhi, Rajkot, Jaipur, Kolkata, and Mumbai. As the 
market is unregulated and there is no official platform for trades, brokers who execute 
trades in the grey market for investors do it only on the trust factor between them. 
2.3.1 Grey Market Timeline 
Figure 2.3 gives an overview of the timing of events of an IPO, from the start of 
the price discovery process to the day the IPO shares get listed on the stock exchange. 
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Figure 2.3: Timeline of events for an IPO 
The IPO timeline is divided into three stages 
Stage 1: This is the period before the start of grey market trading. During this stage, 
underwriters gather pricing related information from informed institutional investors 
that is then used in setting the offer price range for a given IPO. 
Stage 2: This is the period during which grey market trading remains active. Grey 
market trading for an issue becomes active from the time the offer price range is 
announced18. The offer price range is announced five days before the start of the 
subscription period. The subscription period for an IPO ranges from three to ten days. 
The grey market for a given IPO remains active for a period of around 20-30 days 
before the issue gets listed on the stock exchange as shown in Stage 2 of Figure 2.3. 
The number of trading days in a grey market period is closely linked to the days the 
issue remains open for subscription. The trading activity heightens during the 
subscription period and remains high till the final issue price is set. After this, the grey 
market activity declines, increasing again a few days before the listing of the IPO on 
                                                     
18 There are a few cases where a grey market premium has been quoted even before the offer 
price range is announced. In this situation, the grey market premium is quoted on an expected 
offer price range. 
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the stock exchange. In recent times, SEBI has reduced the time required for listing and 
closing of an IPO to six days, resulting in a lower number of trading days in the grey 
market19. 
Stage 3: The day an IPO starts trading on any one of the designated stock exchanges, 
the grey market for that IPO becomes inactive. 
2.3.2 Grey Market Instruments and Pricing 
The two instruments available for investors to trade in the grey market are -  
 Selling or buying an application for a fee known as ‘Kostak’. 
 Selling or buying shares of an IPO at grey market premium (GMP) 
Kostak  
Kostak is the name given to a trading instrument in the grey market, it involves 
buying or selling an IPO application for a lump sum fee. Kostak involves the investor 
applying for the highest eligible quantity of shares allowed under the retail category 
and then selling the application to the buyer in the grey market20. Kostak operates like 
a cash market, as retail investors have to invest a full amount in the IPO. Kostak prices 
depend on the demand and supply of the IPO applications in the grey market. The 
Kostak price stops getting quoted once the issue has closed for subscription. In 
addition to demand and supply, the Kostak fee to some extent depends on the 
prevailing interest rate and liquidity in the financial market. 
The unique feature of this transaction is that the fee does not depend on the 
number of shares allocated to the investor that has sold the IPO application. The total 
shares allocated to the investor selling the IPO application has to be transferred to the 
buyer of this application. This became a regular instrument for transacting in the grey 
                                                     
19 http://www.bseindia.com/downloads1/Streamlining_the_Process_of_Public_Issues.pdf 
 
20 In recent times, due to changes in allocation criteria for retail investors, Kostak rates are also 
available for investors who apply for a minimum allowable quantity of shares in an IPO. 
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market as individual retail investors would apply in the IPO and then sell the 
application for a fee in the grey market. This instrument is largely used to attract retail 
investors to participate in the IPO market, it allows retail investors to hedge 
themselves against the uncertainty in the number of shares allocated and the listing 
returns. Hence, Kostak is a tool to increase subscription from retail investors and can 
result in improved IPO performance. 
Grey Market Price 
The most common way to get the grey market quote for an IPO is the grey 
market premium (GMP), which is the difference between the grey market price and 
issue price. Grey market premium is analogous to an options premium where the 
participants have only to pay the premium to take a position in the stock, thus 
eliminating the need for a big investment. 
The grey market premium is determined by supply and demand of shares in the 
grey market. Supply and demand depend on a number of factors, like quality of an IPO, 
investor interest, and current returns in the secondary market. Most of the issues sell 
at a premium to the offer price. Infrequent trading activity is observed for issues that 
trade at a discount to the issue price.  
Practitioners indicate that leading portfolio managers and executives from 
foreign institutional investors contact brokers and operators to get a quote of the grey 
market premium before taking an IPO investment decision. Street smart investors also 
don’t just look at the fundamentals of the IPO firm while deciding about participation 
in an IPO, they look at this as a signaling indicator. In India, even with regulations in 
place to curtail operations, the grey market is active for most IPOs. 
Because of the nature of the product, Kostak only attracts retail investors as 
participants. On the other hand, participants who trade using the grey market 
premium are retail and high net worth investors. Due to the absence of legal status, 
institutional investors do not trade in the grey market.   
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2.3.3 Settlement of Grey Market Trades  
On the day an issue gets listed on the stock exchange, trades executed by 
participants in the grey market are settled. The sellers of shares in the grey market 
must deliver the shares to the buyers. If an investor has applied in an IPO and then sold 
more shares in the grey market than they had been allocated, the shortfall can be 
purchased from the secondary market. Another option is that traders can square off 
the transaction by making a reverse trade on the stock exchange and settle the 
difference amount in cash. When the issue is cancelled or devolved, grey market 
trades are declared void for that particular IPO.  
2.3.4 Grey Market Information 
As the grey market is an informal and unregulated market for trading, none of 
the reputed equity market publications provide grey market prices. However, grey 
market prices are published in regional newspapers (e.g. Smart Investment, Money 
Times and Blue Chip Investments). Investors can also get grey market prices online 
from finance and investment portals such as smartinvestment.in21 (an online portal of 
Smart Investment newspaper), chanakyanipothi.com22 and chittorgarh.com23. Smart 
Investment portal publishes the closing grey market price for each day while the other 
two websites facilitate discussion blogs where potential investors can disseminate grey 
market price information. Through these websites, investors can get an idea of the 
recent grey market price. For investors to trade, they have to go through their broker 
or remisier to execute trades for them in the grey market24. 
                                                     
21 http://www.smartinvestment.in/ 
22 http://www.chanakyanipothi.com/category/ipo-and-grey-market-analysis/ 
23 http://www.chittorgarh.com/newportal/ipo_gray_market_premium.asp 
 
24 A remisier is an agent of a broker and is registered with the stock exchange. However a 
remisier is not authorised to issue a contract/confirmation note to an investor, instead the 
contract is issued by the broker, and as such the broker takes full responsibility in respect of 
that deal. 
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2.3.5 Indian Grey Market versus the American and European Markets  
In the US, although pre-IPO trading is allowed for Treasury bills, Securities and 
Exchange Commission laws do not permit it for shares. The rationale for the restriction 
being: “Such short sales could result in a lower offering price and reduce an issuer’s 
proceeds”25 (Bikhchandani and Huang, 1993; Nyborg and Sundaresan, 1996). However, 
investors in the US can put a bet on the outcome of an IPO (Aussenegg et al., 2006). An 
example was Google’s IPO in 2004 in which the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) offered 
betting contracts on the market capitalization at the end of the first trading day of 
Google’s share on the exchange. 
In contrast to the US market, many countries in Europe feature an active when-
issued pre-IPO market for shares. A fundamental difference between the operation of 
the grey market in India and Europe is that the grey market in Europe is regulated and 
therefore both retail and institutional investors actively participate. Moreover, in 
Germany, the pre-IPO market is quite active as compared to other pre-IPO markets in 
Europe. The forward contract instrument traded in the pre-IPO market in Germany 
specifies physical delivery. In the UK, IPO shares are bought at a specified markup over 
the unknown offer price, and the settlement of the trade is done in cash (Aussenegg et 
al., 2006).  
2.4 IPO Underwriting Market in India 
In this section, I discuss the IPO underwriting market in India and also present 
the key differences with the American underwriting market.  
In the American market, a firm commitment underwriting is used to issue IPO 
shares through the bookbuilding process. In this mechanism, the issuer selects one 
underwriter as the book-running manager. The book-running manager (also called the 
lead underwriter) must decide the size of the IPO syndicate that should be used in the 
                                                     
25 See Paragraph II.F. of the Securities Exchange Act Release No. 38067 (December 20, 1996) on 
Regulation M, found at the Website, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-38067.txt.  
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offering and identify the underwriters that will participate as syndicate members. 
Hence, a group of underwriters form an IPO syndicate that buys the shares from the 
issuing firm at a discount on the IPO offer price and resells the shares to the public at 
the IPO offer price. The underwriting syndicate members have to pay the issuing firm 
the amount committed regardless of whether they can resell the securities to the 
investing public or not. Thus, the risk of the offering is shifted from the issuer to the 
members of the underwriting syndicate. The lead underwriter has more control over 
the offering (compared to the syndicate members) and normally earns a higher 
percentage of the gross spread in the offering. Gross spread is defined as the 
difference between the IPO final offer price, and the price at which underwriters buy 
the shares from the issuers. 
Traditionally, large syndicates were used to spread the risk of loss among 
underwriters (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; Mandelker and Raviv, 1977). However, in 
recent years, syndicates have been used more for distribution purposes than for 
sharing the underwriting risk (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001).  
In summary, issuers shift the risk of the IPO offering to underwriters and, 
underwriters, in turn, form an IPO syndicate to share the risk. Also, syndicate members 
take advantage of the distribution network of each member, resulting in marketing risk 
sharing. 
A major difference between the American and Indian underwriting markets is 
that when bookbuilding was introduced in India, SEBI did away with the requirement 
of compulsory underwriting, and most underwriters now use the best efforts 
underwriting method to sell shares. In this method, underwriters do not buy the 
shares from the issuers but only act as a selling agent and receive a commission from 
the issuers on successful completion of the IPO. 
2.4.1 Example of an Underwriting Syndicate  
In a typical IPO, the number of shares underwritten varies substantially across 
underwriter syndicate members. Table 2.4 provides an example of the IPO of GMR 
32 
 
Infrastructure Ltd issued in India (2006) with underwriter syndicate members and the 
underwriting commitment of each member with respect to shares and amount 
underwritten. This IPO is an example of a large, but typical, IPO in the Indian market. In 
this example, most of the shares are underwritten by the lead underwriters while the 
syndicate members have underwritten 100 shares each, which is just a token of the 
total number of shares issued.  
Note that in Table 2.4 one can see that lead underwriters/managers and 
syndicate members are mentioned distinctly in the IPO prospectus. The syndicate 
members are mostly the broking or distributing arm of the lead underwriters.  
Table 2.4 : Underwriting Syndicate members for  
GMR Infrastructure Ltd 
Underwriter Underwriter Acronyms 
Shares 
Underwritten 
Amt 
Underwritten 
(INR million) 
Member Role 
JM Morgan Stanley 
Private Limited 
JMMS 14301218 3003.26 Lead Manager 
DSP Merrill Lynch Limited DSPML 12394469 2602.84 Lead Manager 
Enam Financial 
Consultants Private 
Limited 
Enam 7627246 1601.72 Lead Manager 
SSKI Corporate Finance 
Private Limited 
SSKI 3813548 800.85 Lead Manager 
JM Morgan Stanley 
Financial Services Private 
Limited 
 100 0.021 Syndicate member 
Enam Securities Private 
Limited 
 100 0.021 Syndicate member 
Sharekhan Limited (SSKI)  100 0.021 Syndicate member 
Edelweiss Securities 
Private Limited 
 100 0.021 Syndicate member 
Karvy Stock Broking 
Limited 
 100 0.021 Syndicate member 
Total shares 
Underwritten 
 38136981   
Source: Prospectus of GMR Infrastructure Ltd (2006). 
In this study, the term ‘underwriter syndicate member’ refers only to the lead 
managers of an IPO that are mentioned in the IPO prospectus, not to the syndicate 
members. 
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An IPO can either be managed by a single underwriter or multiple underwriters. 
In the case of multiple underwriters, each is classified as a lead underwriter. This is in 
contrast to the US market where there is only one lead underwriter, and other 
underwriters are classified as syndicate members.  
Underwriters are under no obligation to sell the entire offering. The shares 
underwritten is an agreement amongst underwriters over how many shares each of 
them will sell. However, if an offering was to be unsuccessful, it would adversely affect 
the reputation of the IPO syndicate members and hence future business from the 
underwriting industry. Thus, in India, the main risk for the underwriters is not the 
market risk but the risk involved in marketing and distributing the IPO shares 
successfully to investors. 
The research done by Torstila (2003) estimates average underwriting spread in 
the Indian market ranges from 1.5 to 2.5%26. In comparison, the average underwriting 
spread in the US is around 7%, while in Europe it is between 2.5 and 4%. Overall, the 
authors advocate that fees in emerging markets, such as India, tend to be lower than 
mature markets, such as the US and Europe because large and reputed underwriters 
are more focused on gaining market share by seeking lower underwriting fee while 
managing the IPO.  
Table 2.5 gives the specific functions of lead managers/underwriting syndicate 
members as listed in the 2006 prospectus of GMR Infrastructure Ltd. The table shows 
that the activities and responsibilities related to managing the IPO are equally shared 
amongst all the underwriting syndicate members. This is in contrast to the US IPO 
market, where in a case like this there would be one lead manager who would be the 
final authority in regard to decisions with respect to the IPO. 
 
                                                     
26 The underwriting (gross) spread is the difference between the amount paid to the 
underwriting syndicate in a new issue of securities by the issuer and the price at which 
securities are offered for sale to the public. 
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Table 2.5: Inter Se Allocation of Responsibilities of the Underwriting Syndicate 
Members for GMR Infrastructure Ltd 
No Activities Responsibility Co-ordinator 
1 Capital Structuring with relative components and formalities 
such as the type of instruments, etc. 
JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
JMMS 
2 Due diligence of Company’s operations/ management/ business 
plans/legal etc. Drafting and design of Prospectus and of 
statutory advertisement including memorandum containing 
salient features of the Prospectus. The BRLMs shall ensure 
compliance with stipulated requirements and completion of 
prescribed formalities with the Stock Exchanges, RoC and SEBI 
including finalisation of Prospectus and RoC filing. 
JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
JMMS 
3 Drafting and approval of all publicity material other than statutory 
advertisement as mentioned in (2) above including corporate 
advertisement, brochure, etc. 
JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
DSPML 
4 Appointment of Registrar, Bankers, JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
DSPML 
5 Appointment of Printer and Ad agency JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
DSPML 
6 Non-Institutional and Retail Marketing of the Issue, which will 
cover, inter alia, 
-Formulating marketing strategies, preparation of publicity 
budget 
-Finalise Media & PR strategy 
- Finalising centers for holding conferences for brokers, etc. 
- Follow-up on distribution of publicity and Issuer material 
-including form, prospectus and deciding on the quantum of the 
Issue material 
- Finalise collection centers 
JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
Enam 
7 Domestic Institutional marketing of the Issue, which will cover, 
inter alia, 
-Finalising the list and division of investors for one to one 
meetings, and 
-Finalising road shows schedule and investor meeting schedules 
JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
JMMS 
8 International Institutional marketing of the Issue, which will 
cover, inter alia,                                                                             
-Finalising the list and division of investors for one to one 
meetings, and 
-Finalising road shows schedule and investor meeting schedules 
JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
DSPML 
9 Finalisation of pricing in consultation with company JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
JMMS 
10 Post-bidding activities including management of Escrow 
Accounts, co-ordination with Registrar and Banks, Refund to 
Bidders, etc. The post Issue activities of the Issue will involve 
essential follow-up steps, which must include finalisation of the 
listing of instruments and dispatch of certificates and refunds, 
with the various agencies connected with the work such as 
Registrars to the Issue, Bankers to the Issue, and the bank 
handling refund business. BRLMs shall be responsible for 
ensuring that these agencies fulfil their functions and enable him 
to discharge this responsibility through suitable agreements with 
the Company 
JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
DSPML 
11 Any other activities in connection with the offering which are not 
covered above 
JMMS, DSPML, 
Enam, SSKI 
JMMS 
Source: Prospectus of GMR Infrastructure Ltd (2006). 
35 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, the distinct environment of the Indian IPO market and a presence 
of an active grey market provides an opportunity to examine several important issues 
related to allocation power of underwriters and its effect on underwriters’ behaviour 
in the IPO market, which have not been discussed in the finance literature. 
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Chapter 3 (Study 1)  
Conceptual Framework of Information Sharing in 
the Presence and Absence of Allocation Discretion 
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Abstract 
Financial regulators, as well as academics, are divided as to the optimal method 
to be adopted by underwriters in the allocation of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). 
Allocation discretion can benefit underwriters in developing and maintaining truthful 
information sharing relationships with informed institutional investors. This assists 
underwriters to extract private information about IPO pricing from institutional 
investors, which in turn benefits the issuers with likely lower underpricing. However, 
allocation discretion can also have a negative effect on market welfare when 
underwriters use it for rent-seeking activity for higher self-benefit. This occurs when an 
allocation of underpriced shares is made to regular institutional investors by 
underwriters in return for reciprocal benefits.  
Alternatively, disallowing discretion and facilitating proportionate allocation to 
underwriters can have adverse implications because it is difficult for underwriters to 
form and maintain a truthful information sharing relationship with institutional 
investors. In this case, reduced information sharing between underwriters and 
informed institutional investors can result in greater underpricing in an IPO. Also, there 
is increased uncertainty associated with the subscription from institutional investors 
for IPOs, which can negatively affect the IPO success. This has an adverse effect on the 
income of underwriters and affects their ability to sustain themselves long-term in the 
IPO market. Hence, regulating allocation discretion increases the overall risk for 
underwriters managing an IPO. I, therefore, develop a conceptual framework of 
information sharing to highlight the effect of granting allocation discretion to 
underwriters, the implication of information sharing relationships with institutional 
investors, and the outcome effects on IPO pricing.  
By developing information sharing relationships with institutional investors, 
underwriters share their own information relating to the IPO valuation and pricing. 
However, underwriters do not have an incentive to share this information with retail 
investors as there is no reciprocal benefit. This results in information asymmetry 
between informed institutional investors and uninformed retail investors. To address 
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this, I apply the implication of signaling theory in the Indian IPO market setting to 
discuss how underwriters can reduce the information asymmetry for uninformed retail 
investors, with the outcome that such retail investors are motivated to actively 
participate in IPOs. This is made possible for underwriters by using the grey market as 
a signaling environment to indicate IPO quality to otherwise uninformed retail 
investors. Further, I examine how allocation discretion affects the grey market 
dynamics as an outcome of the behavioural change in the pattern of signaling by 
underwriters in the grey market — depending on their incentive structure — that, in 
turn, affects the participation of retail investors in an IPO.  
In addition, I conceptualise whether syndication by underwriters can act as a 
substitution mechanism for information and risk sharing in the absence of allocation 
discretion. Finally, I explore whether reputation-based syndication by top underwriters 
is motivated more by information sharing or by price manipulation, and further discuss 
the impact on this relationship of regulating allocation discretion. 
Overall, I contribute to a better understanding of the IPO market mechanism 
and address the question of regulating the discretionary allocation power of 
underwriters from the welfare perspective of IPO market participants. 
Keywords: Information Sharing, Allocation Discretion, Signaling, Grey Market, IPO 
Syndicate, IPO Underpricing. 
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Conceptual Framework of Information Sharing in the Presence and 
Absence of Allocation Discretion 
3.1 Introduction  
In this study, I introduce an integrated conceptual framework of information 
sharing for the IPO market under two different allocation mechanisms. In the first 
case, I consider that underwriters have discretion in the allocation of shares to 
institutional investors. In the second case, I consider that they do not have such 
allocation discretion.  
When underwriters have allocation discretion, they are able to develop and 
maintain truthful information sharing relationships with informed institutional 
investors. This allows an underwriter to extract private information about IPO pricing 
from institutional investors and assists the underwriter in pricing an IPO at the fair 
value (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, 2002). This, in turn, benefits the issuer with lower underpricing for the IPO27. 
Allocation discretion is detrimental to market welfare when underwriters use it 
for rent-seeking activity to attain higher self-benefit. This is made possible when 
underwriters allocate a higher quantity of underpriced shares to regular institutional 
investors in a reciprocal exchange for higher benefits (Jenkinson and Jones, 2009; 
Nimalendran et al., 2007; Reuter, 2006).  
On the other hand, regulating allocation discretion and facilitating a 
proportionate allocation mechanism for the issue of IPO shares to institutional 
investors can also have adverse implications on the relationship between underwriters 
and institutional investors. For example, it can be difficult for underwriters to maintain 
a truthful information sharing relationship with institutional investors (Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, 2002). Reduced information sharing between underwriters and informed 
                                                     
27 Underpricing (Initial Return) is defined as the percentage change in the price of the share at 
the end of the first day of trading and the IPO offer price. 
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institutional investors is likely to lead to a greater divergence of the IPO price from fair 
value. An increase in underpricing implies a long-term negative effect on the IPO 
market. In addition, there is an increased uncertainty associated with subscription 
from regular institutional investors, adversely affecting the success of the IPO (Hanley 
and Wilhelm, 1995). As an outcome, underwriters’ income is adversely affected, and 
their long-term survival in the IPO market is comprised (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). 
Thus, regulating allocation discretion increases the overall risk for underwriters 
managing an IPO. 
In this study, I address the debate in the literature on the allocation policy for 
underwriters. To this end, I separate the issues on regulating the allocation power of 
underwriters so as to determine the implications from the perspective of all market 
participants. The second section of this study introduces a conceptual framework for 
information sharing, with and without allocation discretion to underwriters. In the 
third section, I determine the implications of allocation discretion for information 
sharing relationships between underwriters and informed institutional investors. This 
results in the development of an information sharing hypothesis.   
In the fourth section, I enhance the understanding of the effect of information 
asymmetry on IPO market participants from the perspective of signaling theory. 
Allowing that the participation of uninformed retail investors is necessary for the 
success of an IPO (Rock, 1986), I discuss how underwriters can use the grey market for 
IPOs as a signaling environment aimed at reducing the information asymmetry for 
uninformed retail investors and thereby incentivising their more active participation in 
IPOs. In addition, I consider how underwriters’ discretion might affect their interests 
and thereby grey market dynamics. This leads to the development of various signaling 
hypotheses. 
In the fifth section, I consider whether syndication amongst underwriters can 
act as a substitute mechanism for information and risk sharing in the case of regulated 
allocation discretion. Here, I investigate the usefulness of syndication as an indirect 
medium of discretion for underwriters. In addition, when regulators enforce 
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constraints on allocation discretion, I consider whether reputation-based syndication 
by top underwriters is more likely to be motivated by higher information sharing, as 
opposed to price manipulation. Here, I develop information sharing and price 
manipulation hypotheses.  
In the last section, I discuss the implications of granting allocation discretion to 
underwriters and thereafter regulating such discretion. I consider the implications for 
information sharing between underwriters and institutional investors and the impact 
on IPO pricing. Here, I combine information sharing theory with signaling and 
syndication theories. 
The conceptual framework contributes to the academic literature on IPO 
allocation in the following ways. First, I contribute by analysing the implications for IPO 
pricing of granting allocation discretion to underwriters and thereafter regulating such 
discretion. Second, I contribute to an understanding of the effects of information 
asymmetry on IPO investors from the perspective of signaling theory. Third, I 
contribute by proposing how underwriters can use the grey market as a signaling 
environment to indicate IPO quality to uninformed retail investors. The grey market 
has the potential to lower information asymmetry for uninformed retail investors and 
to motivate them to participate more in IPOs, thereby ensuring the success of an IPO. 
In addition, I contribute by discussing how allocation discretion affects the signaling 
behaviour of underwriters in the grey market, depending on their incentive structure. 
My analysis results in alternative outcomes for retail investor participation and 
underpricing in an IPO. I make a fourth contribution by considering whether 
syndication amongst underwriters can act as a substitution mechanism for higher risk 
sharing when regulators enforce constraints on allocation discretion to underwriters. 
Finally, I contribute by considering whether reputation-based syndication is motivated 
by higher information sharing or by price manipulation. In addition, I examine the 
effect of the regulatory intervention on the relationship between information sharing 
and syndication by reputed underwriters. 
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The structure of this study takes the form of six sections. Following this 
introductory section. Section 3.2 presents the conceptual framework of information 
sharing with and without allocation discretion to underwriters. Section 3.3 develops 
the information sharing hypotheses by understanding the effect of allocation 
discretion on the degree of information sharing between underwriters and 
institutional investors and its impact on IPO pricing. Section 3.4 discusses allocation 
discretion and the quality of information sharing with IPO investors and develops the 
signaling hypotheses. Section 3.5 considers the effects of regulating allocation 
discretion on underwriter syndication and develops the syndication hypothesis. This 
section also determines the implications for IPO pricing of reputation-based 
syndication by top underwriters and considers the effect of regulating allocation 
discretion on this relationship. These insights lead to a development of the information 
sharing and price manipulation hypotheses. The final section, 3.7, concludes by 
discussing the implications for underwriter behaviour in the grey market for granting 
allocation discretion to underwriters and thereafter regulating such allocation. This 
leads to a consideration of the usefulness of underwriter syndication in achieving 
success when underwriter allocation is regulated. 
3.2 Introduction to Conceptual Framework 
In Figure 3.1, based on the allocation power of underwriters, I introduce an 
integrated conceptual framework that arranges current literature on information 
sharing between underwriters and institutional investors. The different sections lead 
to the development of hypotheses for each. Section A (represented by the red box in 
the conceptual framework) develops the information sharing hypotheses, Section B 
(the orange box) develops the signaling hypotheses, Section C (the blue box) develops 
the syndication hypotheses, and finally, Section D (represented by the green box) 
develops the information sharing and price manipulation hypotheses.  
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Allocation and Pricing Discretion to Underwriters  
The bookbuilding mechanism for the issue of IPO shares allows underwriters 
both allocation and pricing discretion. Pricing discretion enables underwriters to set 
the initial price band and arrive at the final offer price for an IPO. Granting allocation 
discretion to underwriters gives them control over how many shares are allocated to 
subscribers in an IPO and, more importantly, allows them to decide which investors 
obtain the shares. The study by Ritter and Welch (2002) supports the argument that 
allowing discretionary powers to underwriters enables them to price and allocate 
shares in the manner that they consider appropriate.  
Loughran et al. (1994) confirm that IPOs were underpriced across time in most 
equity markets. As this is still so, and IPOs are continuing to be underpriced28, 
underwriters have potential incentives to use discretionary allocation power to 
increase their income by way of rent-seeking activity. This is made possible by 
developing a profit sharing relationship with regular institutional investors, who in turn 
are willing to reciprocate by sharing a percentage of the higher profits they earn as an 
outcome of a favourable allocation of underpriced shares. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2002) show that allocation policies favour institutional investors everywhere. Further, 
the evidence from Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) indicates that institutional investors 
capture a significant portion of the short-run profits associated with IPOs.  
In summary, the discretionary allocation power given to underwriters in the IPO 
mechanism prompts us to enquire as to the implications of this power for the welfare 
of market participants.  
                                                     
28https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2016/03/Initial-Public-Offerings-Updated-
Statistics-2016-03-08.pdf 
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Figure 3.1: An Integrated Conceptual Framework of Information Sharing with and without Allocation Discretion to Underwriters 
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Allocation Discretion and Information Sharing 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) support giving discretionary powers to 
underwriters. They argue that when underwriters have allocation and pricing 
discretion, they use it to extract favourable information from informed investors. Such 
allocation discretion for underwriters benefits issuers through increased price 
discovery in the IPO process (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). Thus, allocation discretion 
encourages underwriters and institutional investors to share price and demand-related 
information. 
This information sharing relationship benefits underwriters when they use the 
private information extracted from informed institutional investors to price an IPO 
more correctly as it results in less underpricing. When underwriters price the IPO more 
correctly to a fair value, investors actively participate in the IPO, guaranteeing IPO 
success. With allocation discretion, underwriters can provide reciprocal benefits to 
informed institutional investors by way of a higher allocation of underpriced shares.  
In summary, this stream of literature supports the idea that granting allocation 
discretion to underwriters benefits them in developing truthful information sharing 
relationships with informed institutional investors. The outcome is increased price 
discovery for an IPO, resulting in increased market welfare due to less underpricing. 
Allocation Discretion and Rent-Seeking  
Allocation discretion can be exploited by underwriters to achieve higher 
income by way of rent-seeking activity. This is made possible by providing a favourable 
allocation of more highly underpriced shares to regular institutional investors, who in 
turn are willing to offer reciprocal benefits to underwriters by sharing a percentage of 
higher profits with them. This profit sharing relationship induces underwriters to price 
an IPO lower than the fair value, thereby increasing underpricing in an IPO. 
Nimalendran et al. (2007) conclude that significant commissions are given to 
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underwriters by institutional investors in return for a higher allocation of underpriced 
shares. 
In support of such observations, regulatory investigation in the US market by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2002 found that underwriters 
allocate IPO shares partly on the basis of trading commissions generated by regular 
investors to the underwriters29. Underwriters in the US were also criticised in instances 
when large numbers of shares in underpriced offerings were allocated to institutional 
investors at the expense of retail investors (Forbes, May 25, 1992)30.  
In summary, this stream of literature discusses the alternative argument that 
allocation and pricing discretion leads to a reduction in market welfare due to higher 
underpricing in an IPO.  
Regulatory Constraints on Allocation Discretion 
Due to the potential problem of misappropriation of share allocations to 
institutional investors by underwriters, a regulator can control the discretionary 
allocation power and impose proportionate allocation mechanisms wherein shares to 
institutional investors are allocated on a pro-rata basis.  
As a consequence of regulating the allocation power of underwriters, they are 
prevented from favouring institutional investors by allocating them a higher quantity 
of shares in return for sharing price and demand information. Thus, regulating 
discretionary allocation power can cause a potential problem in developing and 
maintaining truthful information sharing relationships with informed institutional 
investors (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). This can lead to an IPO not being priced at a 
fair value, with likely higher underpricing. Bubna and Prabhala (2011) support giving 
discretionary powers to underwriters in the Indian market and conclude that higher 
                                                     
29 http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/csfbipo.htm 
 
30 Schifrin, M & Coleman, L 1992, 'Members Only', Forbes, vol. 149, no. 11, pp. 42 
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levels of information sharing between underwriters and informed institutional 
investors results in lower underpricing when compared to when regulators enforce 
proportionate allocation mechanisms for the issue of IPO shares to institutional 
investors.  
Hence, regulating allocation discretion can adversely affect the efficiency of the 
IPO market mechanism. Furthermore, the increased uncertainty associated with 
subscription from regular institutional investors in an IPO can adversely affect the 
performance of an IPO (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995). This, in turn, results in 
underwriters’ income becoming more unpredictable. The outcome is an increase in  
overall risk exposure for the underwriters managing an IPO (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 
2002). Thus, allocation discretion is an incentive for underwriters to remain active in 
the underwriting industry. 
Current Debate on Allocation Discretion  
The IPO literature discusses the advantages and disadvantages of granting 
allocation and pricing discretion to underwriters and its effect on the welfare of IPO 
market participants. Granting allocation discretion to underwriters benefits the IPO 
market when the issue is being priced at a more fair value, which is to say, lower 
underpricing (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). However, allocation discretion can also be 
exploited by underwriters for their own benefit, in which case market welfare is 
negatively affected due to higher underpricing (Nimalendran et al., 2007; Reuter, 
2006). Regulating allocation discretion can also have adverse implications for the 
efficiency of an IPO market because of the difficulty underwriters have in developing 
and maintaining information sharing relationships with regular institutional investors, 
resulting in higher underpricing (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002).   
Thus, based on the above conflicting views, the evidence is inconclusive on 
whether underwriters should be granted allocation discretion and how the decision is 
likely to affect the welfare of IPO market participants. To address this question, I 
develop a conceptual framework of information sharing with and without allocation 
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discretion to underwriters that can be tested empirically. Depending on the perspective 
of information shared between the underwriters and institutional investors, I divide the 
current literature into two main groups so as to arrive at my proposed hypotheses. I 
thereby contribute to a fuller understanding of the IPO market mechanism in which I 
address the regulator's concern as to the wisdom of granting allocation discretion to 
underwriters. 
Information Sharing Hypothesis 
First, as represented in Figure 3.1 Section A of the conceptual framework, I 
analyse how discretion in allocation increases information sharing between 
underwriters and informed institutional investors, thereby assisting underwriters to 
price an IPO at a fair value. Thus, in regard to granting allocation discretion to 
underwriters and its effect on information sharing, I anticipate that when the shared 
information is used for the issuer’s benefit, the outcome is a lower underpricing of the 
IPO. 
Nevertheless, where underwriters are able to use the shared information for 
their own benefit, this can lead to higher underpricing that benefits the underwriters 
and their friendly institutional investors at the expense of overall market welfare.  
Thus, based on Figure 3.1 Section A, I seek to develop an information sharing 
hypothesis in the context of allocation discretion of underwriters and the effect on IPO 
pricing. 
Signaling Hypotheses 
Second, as shown in Figure 3.1 Section B of the conceptual framework, I 
investigate the effect of information asymmetry on IPO investors, from the perspective 
of signaling theory. Allowing that the participation of retail investors is necessary for 
the success of an IPO (Rock, 1986), I address the question of how underwriters can 
reduce the information asymmetry for uninformed retail investors and hence influence 
them to participate actively in an IPO. I propose that this is possible for underwriters 
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by using the grey market as a signaling environment to signal IPO quality to 
uninformed retail investors.  
In the presence of allocation discretion, this framework proceeds to be 
developed through a discussion of how the participation of underwriters in the grey 
market can lead to two different outcomes for retail subscription and underpricing in 
an IPO, depending on the incentive structure of the underwriters. When underwriters 
have allocation discretion, and they use shared price and demand information from 
informed institutional investors for the benefit of all market participants, they will 
participate in the grey market with a true grey market price signal that represents the 
fair value of an IPO. However, when underwriters use shared price and demand 
information for the benefit of themselves and friendly institutional investors, they will 
participate in the grey market with a false grey market price signal that does not 
represent the fair value of the IPO.  
By measuring the strength of the grey market price signal and the 
corresponding outcome, I examine whether underwriters participate in the grey market 
for the welfare of all market participants or, alternatively, to manipulate the grey 
market price signal for their own benefit. Thus, based on Figure 3.1 Section B, I discuss 
the impact on grey market dynamics of granting allocation discretion to underwriters 
and develop signaling hypotheses.  
Syndication Hypothesis 
Third, as shown in Figure 3.1 Section C, when underwriters do not have 
allocation discretion there is less information sharing between underwriters and 
informed institutional investors (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). This translates into 
higher uncertainty in IPO pricing and participation from institutional investors (Hanley 
and Wilhelm, 1995) and increases the overall risk for underwriters in managing an IPO.   
Thus, in the absence of allocation discretion, I consider whether syndication 
amongst underwriters can act as a substitute mechanism for information and risk 
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sharing, and thereby create an indirect medium of discretion for underwriters. Based 
on Figure 3.1 Section C, I develop a syndication hypothesis by proposing that when the 
overall risk of managing an IPO is high for underwriters, they form an underwriting 
syndicate to mitigate this increased risk. 
Information Sharing and Price Manipulation Hypotheses 
Fourth, as shown in Figure 3.1 Section D, in the absence of allocation discretion, 
the outcome of syndication can be differentiated into two scenarios, depending on the 
underwriter’s incentive structure. I argue in the first that in the absence of allocation 
discretion, reputation-based syndication by a top underwriter can result in more 
information being generated and shared, leading to lower underpricing. In the second 
scenario, I argue that such syndication can lead to higher underpricing when 
reputation-based syndication is used for collusion and price manipulation.  
Based on Figure 3.1 Section D, I develop an information sharing and price 
manipulation hypotheses by arguing that in the absence of allocation discretion, 
reputation-based syndication can result in either higher information sharing or price 
manipulation, depending on underwriters’ objectives in forming an IPO syndicate.  
In the following section, I advance the conceptual framework in the context of 
the prevailing literature.  
3.3 Allocation Discretion, Information Sharing and IPO Pricing 
In the previous section, based on the allocation power of underwriters, I 
present an integrated conceptual framework of information sharing between 
underwriters and institutional investors. In this section, I present a discussion of the 
literature and the development of the information sharing hypothesis. Bookbuilding, a 
mechanism for the issue of IPO shares, grants allocation and pricing discretion to 
underwriters, allowing them to forge long-term information sharing relationships with 
institutional investors. I debate the positive and negative aspects of this information 
sharing relationship on IPO pricing.  
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3.3.1 Allocation Discretion and Information Sharing  
Rock (1986) model on IPOs argues that some IPO investors are better informed 
than the issuer and other potential investors. Institutional investors are amongst the 
better informed about an IPO’s valuation and pricing because they have access to all 
the public information about an IPO, including market intelligence, and also have the 
necessary tools and resources to analyse all available information (Chiang et al., 2010; 
Field and Lowry, 2009). Such superior information resources contribute to accurately 
pricing an IPO.  
Before the setting of the initial price band of an IPO, private information about 
the valuation and pricing of an IPO flows between informed institutional investors and 
underwriters (Lowry and Schwert, 2004). This gives underwriters substantial 
information about the issue demand at different price levels. This information is 
important to underwriters, as while pricing an IPO, in addition to their detailed analysis 
and forecast about an IPO firm, they must also know what the market believes. 
Therefore, soliciting price and estimating demand information from informed 
institutional investors facilitates underwriters to set the initial price band and arrive at 
the final price for an IPO.  
However, when underwriters discuss valuation and pricing-related information 
with informed institutional investors, these investors may prefer not to share their 
positive information about the IPO firm. This is because positive information leads to 
an increase in the offer price from underwriters, and in turn, reduces the profits for 
informed institutional investors. Thus, informed institutional investors have a strong 
incentive to withhold positive information and moreover, share false information with 
underwriters that results in an IPO not being priced at a fair value. 
Hence, if underwriters do not have an honest information sharing relationship 
with an informed institutional investor, there is a high probability that the IPO may be 
either highly overpriced or underpriced. If an underwriter under prices IPOs quite 
frequently, it is a direct loss to issuers. Therefore, potential issuers will see that other 
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firms have been dissatisfied with the underwriter's performance and may prefer not to 
work with them. On the other hand, if underwriters overprice, it may lead to the issue 
being unsuccessful due to insufficient demand from the investing community.   
Both scenarios have a negative influence on underwriter reputation and 
adversely affect their current and future income. So, if underwriters are not able to 
price an IPO correctly at the fair value, it may have a detrimental effect on their long-
term survival in the underwriting industry. Thus, in order to price an IPO correctly and 
avoid the risk of being inactive in the underwriting industry, underwriters need a 
mechanism that assists them to motivate informed institutional investors to truthfully 
share price and demand information with them.  
3.3.2 Positive Effect of Allocation Discretion on IPO Pricing  
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) find that the bookbuilding mechanism that grants 
pricing and allocation discretion to underwriters allows them to extract positive private 
information about IPO pricing from informed institutional investors. This private 
information extraction benefits underwriters in pricing an IPO correctly and thereby 
results in less underpricing.  
Moreover, when informed institutional investors truthfully share private 
information about the IPO valuation and pricing with underwriters, discretion in 
allocation enables the underwriters to reward these investors by allocating them a 
higher quantity of IPO shares (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001). Also, with pricing 
discretion, underwriters allow some degree of underpricing in an IPO as an additional 
incentive to the informed institutional investor to increase their investment returns 
(Hanley, 1993).  
Supporting the work of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), a study by Sherman and 
Titman (2002) finds that underwriters benefit when they have allocation and pricing 
discretion as they are able to influence informed investors to share more information 
about an IPO. Furthermore, the study by Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) and that of 
Spatt and Srivastava (1991) supports granting allocation discretion to underwriters by 
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arguing that discretion stimulates price discovery in the IPO process and aids 
underwriters in pricing an IPO at a fair value.  
As underwriters and institutional investors deal with each other quite often in 
the IPO market, allocation discretion allows underwriters to exclude informed 
institutional investors from current, and future, IPOs they manage, if investors have 
not shared price and demand information truthfully. Thus, the evidence presented in 
this sub-section suggests that granting allocation discretion to underwriters is 
beneficial for the IPO market as it promotes price discovery in the IPO mechanism and 
hence leads to less underpricing. 
In addition, allocation discretion facilitates underwriters in forming strong long-
term relationships with their regular informed institutional investors, benefitting both 
parties (Sherman, 2005). The regular informed institutional investors gain as 
underwriters treat them more favourably by giving them a higher allocation of shares 
than occasional investors, in the instances of occasional investors bidding more 
aggressively in an IPO than regular institutional investors.  
However, this benefit to regular institutional investors from the relationship 
with their underwriters comes with the expectation that these investors will 
participate in IPOs that are less attractive and overpriced. Therefore, if underwriters 
overprice an IPO, regular informed institutional investors act as insurance by taking 
some part in these offerings, although they have less incentive to subscribe. If regular 
institutional investors do not participate in overpriced and undersubscribed IPOs, then 
allocation discretion introduces a threat for these investors of exclusion from all future 
underwriter managed IPOs. This is possible as a consequence of discretion in 
allocation, allowing the underwriters to discriminate in share allocation. A study by 
Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) finds that institutional investors are favoured with higher 
allocation when underwriters have discretion, but this is with an expectation that 
these investors will participate in IPOs that are less attractive to investors. Thus, 
underwriters favour regular institutional investors with higher allocation in underpriced 
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offerings as these investors act as insurance for the underwriters in overpriced and 
undersubscribed IPOs.  
Hence, allocation discretion enables underwriters to form a long-term 
relationship with regular institutional investors that ensures the success of IPOs 
managed by the underwriters. This also benefits underwriters by reducing risk as there 
is less uncertainty in subscription from institutional investors. Therefore, a consistently 
successful history in managing IPOs increases the reputation of an underwriter and 
establishes them as a long-term player in the industry.  
3.3.3 Negative Effect of Allocation Discretion on IPO pricing  
During the period 1990-2015, IPOs in the USA left around US$120 billion31 on 
the table32 by way of underpricing. Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) observed in 1996 that 
in many countries IPOs are often in excess demand, with high oversubscription from 
the investing community.  
With allocation and pricing discretion, underwriters can give a higher allocation 
of shares to their network of regular institutional investors in oversubscribed and 
underpriced offers. These investors are willing to reciprocate by sharing a part of the 
consequent higher profits with their underwriters. The evidence by Aggarwal et al. 
(2002), Loughran and Ritter (2003) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) supports the 
view that when underpricing in an IPO is high, underwriters use their discretionary 
allocation power to favour regular informed institutional investors. Moreover, a study 
by Binay et al. (2007) shows that regular investors are favoured by underwriters with a 
higher allocation of shares in underpriced IPOs. 
Goldstein et al. (2011) claim that paying commissions to the brokerage arm of 
an underwriter is an easy way to return the higher profits received by institutional 
                                                     
31 Jay Ritter IPO website (https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data) 
 
32 Money left on the table is defined as the first day price gain multiplied by the number of 
shares sold. 
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investors. This position is evidenced in a study by Nimalendran et al. (2007) that finds 
large commissions were given to underwriters by institutional investors in return for 
favourable IPO allocations. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) support the profit sharing 
hypothesis by concluding that rent-seeking activity occurred when underwriters 
received a commission from investors who were allocated a higher number of 
underpriced shares in an IPO.  
Moreover, the survey on institutional investors done by Jenkinson and Jones 
(2009) supports the argument by finding that the most important factor that 
influences the allocation of shares by underwriters to institutional investors is their 
broking relationship. While investigating the allocation of underpriced shares to 
mutual fund schemes by underwriters, Reuter (2006) finds that the most significant 
determinant of allocation of IPO shares is the strength of the business relationship 
between the mutual fund house and the underwriters managing the IPO. 
In support of the academic literature, regulatory investigations by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2002 indicate that underwriters allocate 
IPO shares partly on the basis of trading commissions generated by investors33. This 
profit sharing relationship between regular institutional investors and underwriters 
was criticised when large numbers of shares in underpriced offerings were allocated to 
institutional investors, because this favouritism occurred at the expense of retail 
investors in the US (Forbes, May 25, 1992)34. 
Hence, the bookbuilding mechanism is subject to criticism as discretionary 
allocation power bestows underwriters with the ability to distribute large amounts as 
profit to regular institutional investors. When underwriters develop profit sharing 
relationships with informed institutional investors, this translates into increased 
income for them as they receive a higher share of benefit from their regular 
institutional investors. This share of profit to underwriters is in addition to the 
                                                     
33 http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/csfbipo.htm 
 
34 Schifrin, M & Coleman, L 1992, 'Members Only', Forbes, vol. 149, no. 11, pp. 42 
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underwriting fee they receive from the issuer for successfully managing an IPO. 
Therefore, allocation discretion that enables rent-seeking can result in a higher total 
economic benefit for underwriters.  
Thus, the evidence presented in this sub-section suggests that allocation 
discretion can encourage underwriters to underprice an IPO more than required to 
procure a higher income. However, this is at the expense of the issuer and small retail 
investors, thus negatively affecting the welfare of IPO market participants overall. 
3.3.4 Allocation Discretion and IPO Underpricing 
As illustrated by the above conflicting views, the research on IPOs is 
inconclusive as to whether underwriters must be granted allocation discretion and 
whether it results in increased 
welfare of all market participants. 
However, due to the success of 
bookbuilding mechanisms in most 
IPO markets (Jagannathan et al., 
2010), I expect that  granting 
allocation discretion to underwriters 
enables them to form truthful 
information sharing relationships 
with informed institutional 
investors. This exchange of private 
information between underwriters and their regular institutional investors leads to the 
IPO being priced at a fair value. Thus, as shown in Figure 3.1 Section A, I develop the 
information sharing hypothesis by conceptualising that the allocation discretion of 
underwriters results in lower underpricing in an IPO. 
These arguments lead to the first hypothesis. 
H1:  When underwriters have allocation discretion, underpricing will be lower in 
an IPO. 
 
Figure 3.1 Section A: Information Sharing 
Hypothesis 
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3.4 Allocation Discretion, Quality of Information Sharing and Signaling  
In the previous section, I discuss how allocation discretion facilitates 
underwriters to form information sharing relationships with informed institutional 
investors and debate the positive and negative effects on IPO pricing of this 
information sharing relationship.  
In this section, I discuss the effect of information asymmetry on IPO investors 
from the perspective of signaling theory. I also discuss how allocation discretion affects 
underwriters’ signaling behaviour in the grey market, depending on their motivation to 
use the information they hold about the IPO quality, either to benefit all market 
participants or for their own advantage. 
3.4.1 Information Asymmetry between IPO Investors 
Stiglitz (2002) explains that information asymmetry arises when people have 
different levels of information. As all information is not available in the public domain 
and some information is private, information asymmetry arises between those who 
have access to private information and those who do not. Therefore, those who do not 
have access to private information are disadvantaged, as the information asymmetry 
limits their potential ability to make a more informed decision.  
In the case of an IPO, investors make the decision to subscribe on the basis of 
public information, that is freely available to all investors, and private information, 
which is available only to a select category of investors. Thus, information asymmetry 
arises amongst IPO investors. 
In the IPO market, investors can be classified into two distinct categories, 
informed and uninformed, depending on the level of information they hold about the 
issuing firm. 
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Institutional Investors - Informed Category  
Institutional investors that manage large amounts of funds have access to 
quality information, including market intelligence, and the necessary resources for 
analysing the information made available to them. Such superior information 
resources help to value the quality of an IPO firm. Research studies by Field and Lowry 
(2009) and Chiang et al. (2010) show that institutional investors have both the 
resources and analytical skills to value the fundamental quality of an IPO with the 
information that is made available to them. Underwriters want to develop and 
maintain a trusting relationship with institutional investors as it gives them access to 
private information about an IPO. Hence, this information sharing relationship assists 
underwriters to understand the price and demand information of informed 
institutional investors at different price levels of an IPO price band. 
For institutional investors, as their underwriters share information about firm 
valuation and pricing with them, it gives them access to quality information about the 
issuing firm. Hence, this sharing of private information about IPO pricing and demand 
benefits underwriters to price an IPO at the fair value and at the same time benefits 
institutional investors to get more detailed, quality information about the IPO firm. 
Bookbuilt IPOs allow underwriters to develop a relationship with regular institutional 
investors, assisting participants to share their own information about firm valuation 
and pricing with each other (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989).  
Therefore, institutional investors come under the informed category of investors 
as they have access to private information from underwriters about an IPO and more 
importantly, they have the necessary tools and requisite skills to interpret and analyse 
the information made available to them.  
Retail Investors - Uninformed Category  
In comparison, the less sophisticated investors, mainly small retail investors, 
come under the uninformed investor category. These investors do not have access to 
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private information from underwriters about an IPO and therefore are at a 
disadvantage when compared to institutional investors. This is because underwriters 
have no incentive to share their private information about firm valuation and pricing 
with small retail investors as there is no reciprocal benefit by way of increased price 
and demand information. In addition, these investors lack the necessary analytical 
skills and resources to value an IPO firm from the information that is made available to 
them. A research study by Field and Lowry (2009) shows that majority of retail 
investors do not pay attention to the available public information and either 
misinterpret or disregard this information.  
Past academic studies of IPOs suggest that uninformed potential investors are 
uncertain about the fair value and quality of a firm’s IPO as there is no previous price 
information available on the market to assist them to value it. Studies find that the 
participation of retail investors in the IPO market is linked to market sentiment and/or 
return-chasing behaviour (Chiang et al., 2010). Hence, the investment decision of retail 
investors usually relies on market conditions and available signals in the IPO market 
that assist them to interpret the fair value of an IPO. 
Therefore, retail investors come under the category of uninformed investors 
because of limited information availability and, more importantly, due to the lack of 
requisite skills and tools to interpret and analyse available information to price risky 
securities such as IPOs. Moreover, as participation of small retail investors in an IPO is 
linked to market sentiment, therefore these investors are also known as sentiment 
driven retail investors. 
Effect of Information Asymmetry on Retail Subscription 
In his model, Rock (1986) presents that for an IPO to be successful, in addition 
to the participation of informed institutional investors, the continuous participation of 
uninformed retail investors is necessary. Rock (1986) says that even in offers where 
underwriters price an IPO attractively to increase demand from potential investors, 
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informed institutional investors’ participation alone cannot guarantee the success of 
an IPO.  
Moreover, Rock (1986) goes on to argue that the information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors imposes a ‘winners’ curse’ on 
uninformed investors. The limited information available to uninformed retail investors, 
and their generally inadequate skills in interpreting existing information to their 
advantage, means that in offerings that are overpriced, and where subscription by 
informed institutional investors is less, uninformed retail investors will receive all the 
shares they have requested for.  
However, in underpriced offerings, uninformed retail investors will receive a 
lower quantity of shares compared to when an IPO is overpriced. This is because 
institutional investors can identify that an IPO is attractively priced and will participate 
more strongly in that instance, which leads to oversubscription, displacing retail 
investors. 
When investigating the Rock (1986) model, using IPO data from Singapore, Koh 
and Walter (1989) find that uninformed retail investors get returns that are not 
significantly different from zero after adjusting for allocations. Also, a study by Amihud 
et al. (2003) on IPOs in Israel finds that uninformed retail investors earn negative 
allocation weighted returns on their investment. Thus, when overall investment 
returns for retail investors are less than zero, they may not prefer to remain active in 
the IPO market. This tends to have an adverse outcome on IPO performance.  
Thus, to improve IPO performance, it is important that uninformed retail 
investors continue to participate in the IPO market. This can be made possible by 
reducing the information asymmetry for uninformed retail participants through a 
signal in the IPO market that assist them to interpret the fair value and quality of an 
IPO. 
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In summary, the sharing of private information about an IPO assists 
underwriters to reduce the information asymmetry between themselves and regular 
institutional investors. However, while setting the initial price band, underwriters do 
not have any incentive to share their private information about firm valuation and 
pricing with potential small retail investors. A dissimilar level of information available 
to uninformed retail investors results in information asymmetry about the fair price 
and quality of an IPO firm between retail investors and informed institutional 
investors.  
Thus, the objective of this section is to address the question of how underwriters 
can reduce the information asymmetry for uninformed retail investors and motivate 
them to participate more in the IPO market. 
3.4.2 Effect of Information Asymmetry on IPOs: Signaling Theory Perspective  
When participants have access to dissimilar information, signaling theory can 
be used to understand and explain the information asymmetry (Spence, 2002). This 
sub-section implements signaling theory in an IPO market setting and explains how 
underwriters can reduce the information asymmetry for uninformed retail investors by 
giving them a signal about the quality of an IPO.  
Underwriters gather substantial qualitative and quantitative information about 
a firm making an IPO and conduct detailed fundamental analysis and forecasting, to aid 
them in valuing the IPO correctly. In addition, underwriters have extensive knowledge 
and information about the financial market, giving them an understanding of current 
market conditions. Moreover, as underwriters have relationships with informed 
institutional investors, they have access to information about the pricing and valuation 
of an IPO from the perspective of informed investors, and also an indication of the 
expected demand for shares from these investors. These factors result in underwriters 
being the most informed IPO market participants. As such they have a responsibility to 
attract investors to participate in an IPO to make it a successful offer.  
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The success of an IPO is important to underwriters as it entitles them to receive 
income, by way of an underwriting fee, from the issuer. In addition, the success of 
offerings enhances the reputation of underwriters and establishes them as long-term 
players in the underwriting market.  
Underwriters can communicate information about the quality of an IPO to 
uninformed retail investors by way of a price signal that can attract them to participate 
in the IPO. In this case, IPO quality refers to the unobservable value of a firm making 
the IPO. This signal of IPO quality specifically reduces uninformed retail investors’ 
uncertainty associated with price and value. Uninformed retail investors are more 
likely to actively participate in an IPO that has signalled higher profitability. This results 
in improved IPO performance and, in turn, leads to the success of the IPO.  
Thus, I discuss how underwriters can use a signaling mechanism as a tool to 
reduce information asymmetry between IPO investors, by taking advantage of the 
information they hold about the IPO firm and the current market conditions.  
Grey Market: A Signaling Environment for IPO Signal 
Academic literature finds that underpricing is the most common signal about 
an IPO for potential retail investors considering an IPO investment decision (Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989). However, as retail 
investors cannot observe the listing price while applying for an IPO, they cannot 
estimate the underpricing. Therefore, an underpricing signal does not aid in reducing 
information asymmetry for these investors. I propose, in this study, that the grey 
market price signal for an IPO, through the medium of grey market, gives an ideal 
signaling environment to underwriters for effective communication of information 
about IPO quality to uninformed retail investors. 
Cornelli et al. (2006) and Aussenegg et al. (2006) show that there is a positive 
relationship between the grey market price and listing price of an IPO. Furthermore, 
research done by Löffler et al. (2005) on the influence of the grey market price on 
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listing price finds that grey market price is a strong predictor of the listing price. A 
more recent study, by Neupane et al. (2014), of Indian IPOs further supports these 
results by finding that grey market price is a strong determining factor of the listing 
price of an IPO. Hence, if uninformed retail investors have access to a grey market 
price signal, they can observe the fair price of the IPO.  
Thus, as a grey market price signal is a proxy of the listing price and a direct 
measure of underpricing, retail investors can estimate the notional profits they can 
earn. This information can empower them to make an investment decision about their 
participation, or otherwise, in an IPO. Hence, the grey market price signal given by 
underwriters helps to decrease the information differential between informed 
institutional investors and uninformed retail investors.  
Consistent with this assertion, I argue that a grey market provides an 
environment where underwriters can send a signal about IPO quality to uninformed 
retail investors to attract them to actively participate in an IPO.  
3.4.3 Effect of the Grey Market Signal on Retail Subscription and Underpricing 
The participation of retail investors is strongly influenced by the grey market 
price (Neupane et al., 2014). A study by Ritter and Welch (2002) of emerging markets 
finds that higher participation of sentiment-driven (uninformed) retail investors leads 
to high underpricing. A model developed by Derrien (2005), using a sample of French 
IPOs, finds that subscription by retail investors in an IPO has a positive influence on 
underpricing. In addition, the study of Indian IPOs by Brooks et al. (2014) finds that 
when the grey market price is high, it results in an increased subscription from retail 
investors and high underpricing.  
Thus, I propose that a strong grey market price signal will result in higher retail 
subscription, and hence lead to a high underpricing of an IPO. 
In summary, potential investors make the decision to subscribe in an IPO 
depending on freely available public information and private information, only 
64 
 
available to a few investors. Allocation discretion allows underwriters and informed 
institutional investors to have an information sharing relationship. This results in 
information asymmetry between the informed institutional investors, who have access 
to private information from underwriters, and uninformed retail investors, who do not 
have access to private information. The participation of retail investors is necessary for 
the success of an IPO. The grey market allows these investors to access a signal of 
positive information about IPO quality and become informed. As the grey market price 
signal dominates all available signals of IPO quality, a strong grey market price can 
result in higher participation from retail investors. This, in turn, leads to a more 
underpricing of the IPO.  
Thus, when underwriters participate in the grey market with a price signal, it 
can result in higher participation from uninformed retail investors and, as a 
consequence, lead to higher underpricing in an IPO. 
These arguments lead to the second and third hypotheses that are  
H2: Grey market price signaling is positively linked to participation from retail 
investors in an IPO. 
H3: Retail investor participation is positively linked to underpricing of an IPO. 
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3.4.4 Effect of Allocation Discretion on Underwriter Signaling  
 
Figure 3.1 Section B: Signaling Hypotheses 
In this previous sub-section, I discuss the effect of information asymmetry on 
IPO investors from the perspective of signaling theory. I also investigate how 
underwriters use the grey market as a signaling environment to reduce the 
information asymmetry of uninformed retail investors.  
In this sub-section, following on from the literature discussion in the previous 
sub-section, I develop the signaling hypotheses, as represented by the conceptual 
framework in Figure 3.1 Section B. I argue that with the presence of allocation 
discretion, signaling in the grey market by underwriters can lead to two different 
outcomes for retail investor participation and underpricing, depending on an 
underwriter’s incentive structure. 
True Grey Market Price Signal for Market Benefit 
Using the grey market as a signaling environment, underwriters can convey a 
price signal about the IPO quality to attract uninformed retail investors to participate 
in an IPO. When underwriters communicate truthful information to all market 
participants, their participation in the grey market will be with a true signal and will be 
close to the fair value of an IPO. In this condition, it will result in a lower signaling cost 
to underwriters.  
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Signaling cost is defined as the difference between the grey market price signal 
and the issue price. Thus, in this case, when underwriters share information truthfully 
with all market participants, underwriters participation in the grey market will be with 
a true grey market price signal and hence lead to a lower signaling cost for them. In 
this case, the only income that underwriters receive is an underwriting fee from the 
issuer on successful completion of the IPO.  
False Grey Market Price Signal for Underwriter Benefit 
As a consequence of a favourable regulatory environment that has discretion in 
allocation, underwriters are in an advantageous position for absorbing a higher 
signaling cost and are motivated to attempt false signaling. False signaling is made 
possible by underwriters when the cost of producing a false signal will directly result in 
a higher benefit to them.  
When the signaling cost is high, underwriters will have a higher grey market 
participation loss. The condition for loss is that there is a high likelihood that a grey 
market price signal is greater than an issue price. The trade-off for underwriters to 
mitigate the increased loss caused by a false signal is to have high underpricing. This is 
because a higher underpricing will increase profits for regular institutional investors, 
and hence increase the share of income that the underwriters receive from these 
investors as a result of rent-seeking activity (Nimalendran et al., 2007; Reuter, 2006).  
To have higher underpricing, underwriters manipulate the grey market signal 
by not truthfully communicating information to uninformed retail investors. In this 
condition, they give a strong false signal about the IPO quality to increase participation 
from retail investors. This results in a higher subscription from retail investors, as their 
participation depends heavily on the strength of the grey market price signal (Cornelli 
et al., 2006; Neupane et al., 2014). When participation from uninformed retail 
investors is high, it results in higher underpricing in an IPO (Derrien, 2005; Neupane et 
al., 2014). Hence, allocation discretion and the grey market empowers underwriters to 
increase their income by giving a false grey market price signal. In this case, when 
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underwriters have allocation discretion and participate in the grey market for their own 
benefit, it will be with a false grey market price signal, and hence result in a higher 
signaling cost for them.  
In summary, in the presence of allocation discretion, when underwriters signal 
in a grey market to benefit all market participants, it will be a true signal, and the grey 
market price will be low. This will result in a lower signaling cost for underwriters.  
On the other hand, I present a case where there is a possibility that when 
underwriters participate in the grey market for their own benefit, there will be a false 
signal, and the outcome will be a higher grey market price. This will result in a higher 
signaling cost for underwriters. Thus, as shown in Figure 3.1 Section B, when 
underwriters have allocation discretion and participate in the grey market with a true 
price signal, it will result in a lower signaling cost to them. On the other hand, in the 
presence of allocation discretion, when underwriters participate with a false price 
signal, it will result in a higher signaling cost to them.  
These arguments lead to the fourth hypothesis that is  
H4: With allocation discretion, a true (false) grey market price signal is 
associated with a lower (higher) signaling cost. 
3.5 Regulating Allocation Discretion and Underwriter Syndication   
In the previous section, I discuss the effect of information asymmetry on IPO 
investor, from the perspective of signaling theory. I also investigate how the grey 
market is used as a signaling environment to allow underwriters to reduce information 
asymmetry for uninformed retail investors by signaling the IPO quality to them. I 
further discuss how allocation discretion can affect the behaviour of underwriters to 
signal in the grey market, depending on their incentive structure.  
In this section, I concentrate on the disadvantages to underwriters when 
allocation discretion is regulated. I conceptualise that in the absence of allocation 
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discretion syndication amongst underwriters can act as a substitute mechanism for 
higher information and risk sharing by creating an indirect medium of discretion for 
them. Finally, I debate how reputation-based syndication affects IPO pricing and 
discuss the effect of the regulatory intervention on this relationship. 
3.5.1 Regulating Allocation Discretion  
When regulators enforce constraints on underwriters in the allocation of shares 
to institutional investors by changing the allocation process from discretionary to non-
discretionary (proportionate), underwriters lose their discretionary power in allocating 
shares to the institutional investors who have subscribed in an IPO. Thus, in a 
proportionate allocation mechanism, allocation of shares to institutional investors is 
done on a pro-rata basis, and underwriters cannot favour any of their regular 
institutional investors.  
When allocation discretion is regulated in the IPO market, underwriters 
experience difficulty in developing and maintaining long-term information-sharing 
relationships with regular institutional investors. This is because there is no reciprocal 
benefit to regular institutional investors for sharing truthful price and demand 
information, as underwriters cannot favour them with a higher allocation of 
underpriced shares. Hence, such restrictions reduce information sharing between 
underwriters and institutional investors and this has the potential to increase the risk 
for underwriters managing an IPO (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). 
In addition, regulating allocation discretion has an undesirable impact on future 
IPOs managed by an underwriter as regular institutional investors may not participate 
in overpriced and undersubscribed offers (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995)  as part of a quid 
pro quo. Increased uncertainty in subscription from regular institutional investors 
adversely affects IPO performance, which increases the likelihood of an IPO failing. 
This, in turn, negatively affects underwriter reputation, which is a function of how 
successfully underwriters have managed past IPOs and also has an adverse effect on 
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underwriters’ income and their long-term survival in the IPO market. These factors 
result in an increased overall risk for underwriters managing an IPO.  
Thus, when allocation discretion is regulated, underwriters need an alternative 
mechanism that stimulates information sharing between themselves and regular 
institutional investors and also reduces the uncertainty associated with subscriptions 
from institutional investors, thus lowering the risk for underwriters in managing an IPO. 
Syndication: A Substitution Mechanism in the Absence of Allocation Discretion   
Syndication amongst underwriters can act as an alternative mechanism for 
stimulating information production from informed institutional investors and hence 
can assist underwriters in correctly pricing an IPO at the fair value (Corwin and Schultz, 
2005). A syndicate is defined as a group that comes together to make a joint decision 
under uncertainty that will result in a payoff that is shared jointly among the group 
members (Wilson, 1968). Thus, when allocation discretion is regulated, syndication can 
create an indirect form of discretion for underwriters to mitigate the increased risk of 
managing an IPO. Also, syndication can provide underwriters with an opportunity to 
maintain their income and long-term survival in the industry. 
Regulating Allocation Discretion and Syndication 
Risk sharing theory on underwriter syndicate in an IPO market suggests that 
large syndicates are formed as a tool for risk sharing (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; 
Mandelker and Raviv, 1977). Hence, in the absence of allocation discretion, syndication 
with more number of underwriters as syndicate members reduces the overall risk of 
managing an IPO for underwriters. This is due to enhanced information production and 
sharing between informed institutional investors and underwriters in a syndicate, and 
also amongst the syndicate members themselves. Also, more underwriters in a 
syndicate result in decreasing the risk of exposure to the IPO for each syndicate 
member, as they share the risk amongst themselves. 
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Figure 3.1 Section C: Syndication Hypothesis 
Also, forming an underwriter syndicate by having a higher number of syndicate 
members can result in underwriters indirectly tapping into other syndicate members 
investors network, resulting in marketing skills sharing (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). 
This is because underwriters can access a wider audience due to a large investors base, 
as the investor base of each underwriter is unique as institutional investors do not 
have relationships with all underwriters. Thus, as shown in Figure 3.1 Section C, in the 
absence of allocation discretion, large underwriting syndicate can lead to risk sharing 
amongst underwriters, thus lowering the overall risk for each syndicate member. 
This leads to the fifth hypothesis. 
H5: In the absence of allocation discretion to underwriters, there is a higher 
likelihood of a large underwriting syndicate. 
3.5.2 Reputation-based Syndication and IPO Pricing 
In the previous sub-section, I discuss that in the absence of allocation 
discretion, when the overall risk of managing an IPO is high for underwriters, they form 
large syndicates. In this sub-section, I debate the influence of reputation-based 
syndication on IPO pricing by analysing whether syndication by top underwriters is for 
higher information sharing or for collusion and price manipulation. 
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Positive effect on IPO Pricing of Syndication  
In the IPO market, a highly reputable underwriter develops strong, long-lasting 
relationships with a network of institutional investors. This arises from being active in 
the IPO market for a long period and having managed a large number of successful 
IPOs. Hence, when reputable underwriters are members of an IPO syndicate, it 
contributes to the syndicate’s strong network of informed institutional investors and 
assists in attaining positive information about IPO pricing from these investors. This 
shared information contributes to the IPO being priced correctly at the fair value. Thus, 
the outcome of syndication is that when a reputable underwriter is part of an IPO 
syndicate, there is higher information production and exchange, resulting in lower 
underpricing. 
Negative Effect on IPO Pricing of Syndication  
I suggest an alternative prospect, in that syndication by underwriters may lead 
to collusion and price manipulation and consequently increase underpricing in an IPO. 
For the IPO market to be efficient, the underwriting environment must be highly 
competitive, with few restrictions to entry for new players. This, in turn, should make it 
difficult for underwriters to collude amongst themselves. According to the US 
Department of Justice, market concentration is one important measure of monopoly 
power (Fu and Li, 2007)35. A study by Scherer and Ross (1990) finds that concentration 
is high in markets that are monopolised while competitive markets are less 
concentrated. Also, when it is challenging for new players to enter and survive, it 
indicates high concentration and a monopolised market.  
Past research on IPO underpricing finds that although there is a vast number of 
underwriters competing for business amongst themselves, many IPOs are still 
underpriced (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Ritter, 1991). When underpricing is high in a very 
competitive market, and the top, reputable, underwriters are not losing underwriting 
                                                     
35 A concentrated industry is a market scenario where a few large companies have a very high 
market share in the business in the industry. 
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business to other underwriters, the evidence suggests that the IPO market is not very 
efficient. As a result, I propose that when underwriters have a monopoly of power, they 
can collude for higher income by forming an IPO syndicate. 
If underwriters compete amongst themselves for IPO business, it can result in 
lower underpricing and thus increased market welfare. However, if underwriters 
collude, their power to set a lower IPO offer price, thereby increasing underpricing, 
allows them to realise a higher income for themselves. If higher underpricing is 
sustainable and does not impact the current and future market share of underwriters, 
then they prefer to collude for higher income. This income adds to the underwriting 
fee received by the underwriter from the firm issuing the IPO. The evidence from the 
Fu and Li (2007) study is that underwriter collusion is highly possible when the market 
is concentrated. Moreover, the authors find that the US market is highly concentrated 
and there is a significant barrier for new players to enter and survive in the IPO market. 
This study also concludes that underwriters in the US do not prefer to compete on 
prices, including underwriting spread and underpricing36.  
Chen and Ritter (2000) find that the gross spread for underwriters is clustered 
around 7% for IPOs that are issued in the US market. Hence, they argue that there is a 
possibility of collusion amongst underwriters. A study by Torstila (2003) on gross 
underwriter spread observes that there is clustering at different levels in various 
countries. The fixing of gross spread amongst underwriters shows that they do not 
compete amongst themselves for underwriting business by trying to outplay each 
other. This points to a likelihood of collusion amongst underwriters. Porter (2005) 
argues that it is difficult to detect collusion in markets, but a significant indicator of 
collusion is uniform pricing by market participants. Hence, in the case of underwriters 
syndicating for collusion and price manipulation, it gives syndicate members a chance 
to earn a higher income by increasing underpricing in an IPO.  
                                                     
36 The underwriting (gross) spread is the difference between the amount paid to the 
underwriting syndicate in a new issue of securities by the issuer and the price at which 
securities are offered for sale to the public. 
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However, when underwriters often underprice IPOs at higher levels, it has an 
adverse impact on their reputation, and thus their expected future income. Consistent 
high underpricing can result in future IPO issuing firms preferring to team up with 
other underwriters to manage their IPO, to avoid the direct loss to them due to 
increased underpricing. However, when an underwriting market is highly 
concentrated, and the most reputable underwriters form a syndicate with other 
underwriters, they can maintain their market share, even with high levels of 
underpricing. This is because firms planning an IPO have a limited choice available to 
them for selecting reputable underwriters as a result of syndication.  
Hence, collusion by way of reputation-based syndication shields underwriters 
from losing market share, as it is difficult for new entrants and other underwriters to 
enter and sustain themselves in the underwriting market. A study by Pichler and 
Wilhelm (2001) observes that underwriter reputation and relationships amongst 
underwriters that form a syndicate to manage IPOs make it harder for new 
underwriters to break into the underwriting market. Underwriting business is well 
known for its high profitability. Underwriters earn high profits when the industry is 
dominated by a few underwriters that form syndicates (Fu and Li, 2007).  
Thus, reputation-based syndication by top underwriters allows them to collude 
and manipulate IPO prices for higher profits, without losing market share. 
In summary, the evidence on syndication amongst underwriters and its effect 
on IPO pricing is inconclusive. In the first case I have cited, when an IPO syndicate has 
reputable members, the outcome is better information production and sharing, hence 
lower underpricing. On the other hand, when the market is concentrated, and 
reputable underwriters form a syndicate it can lead to collusion and price 
manipulation. In this scenario, reputation-based syndication can result in an IPO being 
priced lower than a fair value and higher underpricing. However, the preferred 
outcome for long-term survival for underwriters is that reputation-based syndication 
leads to Increased information production and sharing. Thus, in this section, I 
conceptualise that reputation-based syndication by top underwriters leads to higher 
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information production and exchange, resulting in increased market welfare due to 
lower underpricing. 
This leads to the sixth hypothesis. 
H6: A lower underpricing is associated with syndication by highly reputable 
underwriters. 
3.5.3 Regulating Discretion, Reputation-based Syndication and IPO Pricing  
 
Figure 3.1 Section D: Regulating Allocation Discretion, Syndication and Effect on IPO Pricing 
In the previous sub-section, I discuss how reputation-based syndication affects 
IPO pricing. In this sub-section, as shown in Figure 3.1 Section D, and based on the 
literature discussed in the previous sub-section, I discuss how, in the absence of 
allocation discretion, the outcome of syndication can have two different possibilities 
for IPO pricing depending on underwriters’ incentive to use the information they hold, 
for either market or their own benefit. I discuss this by developing the information 
sharing and price manipulation hypotheses.  
Syndication for Market Benefit 
In the IPO market, when allocation discretion is regulated it is difficult for 
underwriters to develop and maintain information sharing relationships with regular 
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institutional investors. Hence, such restrictions result in reduced information sharing 
between underwriters and institutional investors (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002).  
However, in this situation, when a reputable underwriter is part of an IPO 
syndicate, it can result in more information production by the underwriting syndicate. 
This is because a reputable underwriter is one that has been active in the IPO market 
for an extended period of time, managing a high number of IPOs, and with a strong 
network of institutional investors from whom they can extract information related to 
IPO valuation and pricing. When this information is shared with other members of the 
IPO syndicate, that also acquire information from their own networks, this exchange of 
information benefits the issuer as it contributes to the IPO being priced at the fair 
value. Thus, in the absence of allocation discretion, reputation-based syndication 
results in lower underpricing in an IPO. 
Syndication for Underwriters Benefit 
In an unregulated market, underwriters have allocation and pricing discretion, 
encouraging them to have a higher income as a result of developing profit sharing 
relationships with institutional investors (Nimalendran et al., 2007; Reuter, 2006). This 
is possible by allocating a higher quantity of underpriced shares to friendly institutional 
investors who reciprocate by sharing with their underwriters a percentage of the 
profits they earn (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). In this situation, underwriters use a 
combination of allocation and pricing discretion to increase their total income, by 
having an acceptable level of underpricing, one which does not affect their reputation 
and allows them to survive long-term in the IPO market. Thus, when underwriters have 
allocation and pricing discretion, they can use a combination of these discretionary 
powers to have a higher income.  
However, when regulation limits allocation discretion underwriters have to rely 
on pricing strategies to maintain their share of higher income as they do not have the 
flexibility to allocate shares to regular institutional investors. In this situation, 
underwriters can increase underpricing in an IPO. This increases profits for regular 
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institutional investors for the same share allocation and, in turn, benefits underwriters 
in maintaining their share of income. Hence, in this case, underwriters depend more 
on pricing discretion than allocation discretion to have a higher income from the 
underwriting industry.  
However, when underwriters consistently underprice at unacceptable (high) 
levels, it has an adverse impact on both their reputation and expected future income. 
But when the IPO market is concentrated, and reputable underwriters form a 
syndicate, they can maintain their market share, even with a high level of underpricing. 
Collusion by way of reputation-based syndication shields an underwriter from losing 
market share. Hence, in the absence of allocation discretion, reputation-based 
syndication increases overall profits for underwriters and provides an alternative to 
sustained collusion. Thus, when the IPO market is concentrated, and underwriters do 
not have allocation discretion, reputation based-syndication can result in higher 
underpricing, without adversely affecting underwriter reputation. This also ensures that 
underwriters remain active and survive long-term in the IPO market.   
In summary, as shown in Figure 3.1 Section D, in the absence of allocation 
discretion, reputation-based syndication by reputed underwriters increases 
information production from institutional investors which is exchanged amongst 
syndicate members. Syndication and shared information results in the IPO more likely 
to be priced at fair value and hence resulting in increased market welfare due to lower 
underpricing. On the other hand, I argue that when underwriters form an IPO 
syndicate for collusion and price manipulation, it can result in higher expected 
underpricing in an IPO for higher economic benefit to underwriters. Thus, in the 
absence of allocation discretion, if reputation-based syndication is for information 
sharing then it may result in lower underpricing while on the other hand if it is for price 
manipulation, it can result in higher underpricing.  
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This leads to the seventh hypotheses. 
H7a: Based on the information sharing hypothesis, in the absence of allocation 
discretion, syndication by reputable underwriters is associated with lower 
underpricing. 
H7b: Based on the price manipulation hypothesis, in the absence of allocation 
discretion, underwriter syndication is associated with higher underpricing. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Allocation discretion that allows underwriters to form information sharing 
relationships with institutional investors has a significant impact on information 
sharing between underwriters and the institutional investors in bookbuilt IPOs. Such 
discretion facilitates underwriters to extract more price-relevant information from 
informed institutional investors and assists underwriters to price an IPO at a truer 
value, resulting in lower underpricing.  
However, allocation discretion can also be used by underwriters for pursuing 
self-interest. This is possible by favouring regular institutional investors with an 
allocation of a higher quantity of underpriced shares in return for reciprocal benefits. 
This is the down-side of allocation discretion and a negative effect on market welfare 
that results in higher underpricing. Thus, allocation discretion can adversely affect the 
efficiency of the IPO market mechanism.  
The imposition of constraints on the discretionary allocation power of 
underwriters can have contrary implications on the degree of information sharing. This 
is due to the difficulty for underwriters in maintaining truthful information sharing 
relationships with informed institutional investors, which results in higher 
underpricing. Price ambiguity increases the uncertainty associated with the 
subscription in IPOs by regular institutional investors, which further negatively affects 
IPO success. Thus, imposing constraints on allocation discretion increases the overall 
risk for underwriters. Despite extensive research that discusses the effect of granting 
allocation discretion to underwriters and the consequent effect on IPO pricing, we are 
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without clarity as to how allocation power is used by underwriters for the welfare of 
IPO participants.  
In this study, I discuss the impact of the regulation of underwriters’ allocation 
discretion and consider two different allocation mechanisms in relation to 
underwriters’ behaviour in the IPO market. I then discuss the effect of these 
behaviours on IPO pricing.  
I discuss these issues in relation to an integrated conceptual framework of 
information sharing, with and without allocation discretion. I thereby contribute to a 
better understanding of the IPO market mechanism from the welfare perspective of 
market participants.  
First, I address the conflicting literature on whether underwriting requires 
allocation discretion. Here, I examine the implications of granting allocation discretion 
to underwriters on the degree of information sharing between underwriters and 
institutional investors, together with the outcomes and implications for IPO pricing. 
Second, I apply the implications of signaling theory in the IPO market setting to 
understand how underwriters can reduce information asymmetry for uninformed 
retail investors and hence induce them to participate actively in IPOs. This is made 
possible by underwriters who use the grey market as a signaling environment. The 
proposed framework discusses how allocation discretion affects behavioural changes 
in the pattern of signaling by underwriters in the grey market depending on their 
incentive structure. In addition, I discuss the implication for retail investor 
participation. By linking signaling and information sharing theories in the presence of a 
grey market, I contribute to an understanding of the implications for information 
asymmetry in IPOs, from the perspective of IPO investors. 
Third, the proposed framework conceptualises the effectiveness of syndication 
as a mechanism for information production and risk sharing, thereby creating an 
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indirect medium of discretion for underwriters when regulators enforce constraints on 
their allocation discretion.  
Fourth, I discuss whether reputation-based syndication is motivated by higher 
information sharing or by an intention to facilitate collusion and price manipulation.  
Finally, I discuss how regulating allocation discretion influences the above 
relationship. Thereby I contribute by linking syndication theory with information 
sharing theory.  
Thus, this chapter links signaling and syndication theories with information 
sharing theory to understand underwriter behaviour in the IPO market. Moreover, 
depending on the motivation of underwriters to use the shared information with 
institutional investors for either market benefit or their own benefit, I discuss how 
such motivation influences the pricing of an IPO and, in turn, IPO underpricing. 
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Chapter 4 (Study 2)  
Allocation Discretion, Quality of Information 
Sharing and Signaling Theory 
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Abstract 
In bookbuilt IPOs, underwriters with allocation discretion have developed 
mutual information sharing relationships with institutional investors. This allows 
institutional investors to access private information about an IPO from the 
underwriters. However, underwriters prefer not to share their private information 
with small retail investors as it is a costly exercise with no clear reciprocal benefits. The 
outcome is information asymmetry between informed institutional investors and 
uninformed retail investors. Motivated by the need for retail investors to participate 
for IPO success, I apply the implications of signaling theory in the Indian market setting 
to examine how underwriters can use the grey market to reduce the information 
asymmetry for retail investors and influence them to actively participate in an IPO.  
I find that the granting of allocation discretion to underwriters does not result 
in higher information production from informed institutional investors. Furthermore, I 
find that the price signal in the grey market reduces the information asymmetry for 
uninformed retail investors and guarantees their participation in IPOs. I also find that 
the strength of the grey market price signal decreases with regulatory intervention 
aimed at regulating underwriter allocation discretion. Moreover, although I find a 
positive relationship between retail investor participation and underpricing, regulatory 
intervention appears to lead to a relationship outcome that is insignificant.  
Overall, I conclude that allocation discretion and the presence of a grey market 
motivates underwriters to pursue a rent-seeking activity for their own higher gains. 
Thus, regulating the allocation power of underwriters has positive outcomes for 
market welfare as information is similar for all IPO investors, with the outcome of 
lower underpricing. I, therefore, anticipate that regulating the grey market will result 
in regulatory intervention being more effective, as the price signal in the grey market 
positively influences the participation of uninformed retail investors. 
Keywords: Allocation Discretion, Underwriters, Information Asymmetry, Signaling 
Theory, Grey Market, IPO Underpricing.  
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Allocation Discretion, Quality of Information Sharing and Signaling 
Theory 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The Rock (1986) model argues that a successful IPO requires the participation 
of retail investors. This is in addition to the active participation of institutional 
investors. With allocation discretion, underwriters are able to develop long-term 
relationships with regular institutional investors. These relationships allow institutional 
investors access to information from underwriters as to the quality of the firm with an 
IPO and encourages them to actively participate in that IPO. However, underwriters 
prefer to avoid engagement with small retail investors as it is a costly exercise with no 
direct shared benefit. This results in information asymmetry between informed 
institutional investors and uninformed retail investors about the quality of the IPO, 
which can adversely affect the participation of retail investors and, in turn, an IPO’s 
performance. In this study, I apply the implications of signaling theory in the Indian IPO 
market so as to address the question of how underwriters can benefit from the 
presence of a grey market to influence retail investors to participate in an IPO37. 
Previous research on the grey market finds that participants of the grey market 
are sentiment-driven, uninformed retail investors (Aussenegg et al., 2006; Cornelli et 
al., 2006; Löffler et al., 2005). In India, the presence of an active grey market for IPOs 
allows underwriters to signal IPO quality to retail investors. The grey market price 
signal can result in a reduction of information asymmetry for uninformed retail 
investors, thereby inducing them to participate in the IPO market. In this research, I 
investigate the role of underwriters as an informed market player and a key participant 
in the grey market. This represents a novel contribution of the thesis. 
                                                     
37 Grey market is an unregulated pre-IPO market for IPOs where investors can trade IPO shares 
prior to their listing on any exchange. 
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To this end, I investigate how allocation discretion affects an underwriter's 
motives in the grey market and thereby an underwriter’s choice in sharing information 
with market participants. The outcome of retail investor participation and underpricing 
will be different depending on the signaling behaviour of underwriters in the grey 
market38. In the case of underwriters sharing information about the IPO pricing and 
valuation truthfully with all market participants, they will reveal true information to 
market participants, which results in increased IPO market efficiency due to lower 
underpricing.  
On the other hand, allocation discretion can induce underwriters to manipulate 
the signaling environment. They may then choose to issue a false signal of IPO quality 
that does not reflect the fundamental information about the IPO. In this case, higher 
underpricing and profit sharing relationships with regular institutional investors will 
result in higher income for the underwriters, but at a cost to small retail investors.  
As the Indian IPO market is dominated by small retail investors (Krishnamurti et 
al., 2011) and the aim of the Indian market regulator is to protect the welfare of these 
investors, it is important to examine the effect of allocation discretion on underwriters’ 
behaviour in the IPO market from the welfare perspective of these investors. Thus, this 
study on the Indian IPO market contributes to the investor welfare debate and 
discussion around the effectiveness of the regulator in controlling underwriters when 
there is the presence of a grey market for IPOs. 
The institutional framework in the Indian IPO market has two unique 
characteristics that influence the behaviour of underwriters in India during an IPO 
process. First, in 1999, when bookbuilding was introduced in India, the regulatory 
authority Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) granted discretionary power to 
underwriters to allocate shares to institutional investors. However, SEBI subsequently 
enacted a new law, in 2005, that denies underwriters an ability to allocate shares to 
                                                     
38 Underpricing (Initial Return) is defined as the percentage change in the price of the share at 
the end of the first day of trading and the IPO offer price. 
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institutional investors on a discretionary basis39. In the absence of allocation 
discretion, allocation to institutional investors must be performed on a proportionate 
basis.  
 
Figure 4.1: Information Sharing and Signaling Hypotheses 
As shown in Figure 4.1 Section A, the unique regulatory setting in the Indian IPO 
market provides an opportunity to examine whether granting allocation discretion to 
underwriters induces informed institutional investors to share their private 
information truthfully with underwriters, with a resulting lower underpricing. This is 
the first contribution of this study. 
India has an unregulated pre-IPO market, alternatively known as the grey 
market for IPOs. Academic studies of the grey market have concluded that grey market 
participants are sentiment-driven, uninformed retail investors (Cornelli et al., 2006; 
Löffler et al., 2005). Hence for my second contribution, I explore the role of the 
underwriter as an informed player, using the grey market as an environment for 
signaling IPO quality to uninformed retail investors.  
                                                     
39 SEBI Circular No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/DIP/16/2005/19/9 dated September 19, 2005. 
 http://www.sebi.gov.in/guide/DipGuidelines2009.pdf 
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Third, I apply the implications of signaling theory in the Indian IPO market 
setting to investigate whether a grey market price signal given by underwriters can 
reduce information asymmetry for retail investors and motivate them to actively 
participate in an IPO.  
Fourth, I analyse how allocation discretion to underwriters affects their 
incentives and grey market dynamics. As shown in Figure 4.1 Section B, in the presence 
of allocation discretion, I argue how such discretion can lead to two different 
outcomes for retail investor participation and IPO underpricing, depending on the 
signaling behaviour of underwriters in the grey market. In the first case, when 
underwriters share information about IPO pricing and valuation truthfully with all 
market participants the result is a true grey market price signal that reflects the fair 
value of an IPO, and hence the outcome is a lower signal cost for the underwriters.  
In the second case, allocation discretion can be advantageous for underwriters, 
in terms of higher income, as they are able to develop profit sharing relationships with 
institutional investors (Loughran and Ritter, 2003; Nimalendran et al., 2007; Reuter, 
2006). When underwriters allocate a higher quantity of more underpriced shares to 
regular institutional investors, it translates into increased income for underwriters due 
to a greater share of kickback from these investors (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm, 2002). To increase underpricing, underwriters have to increase 
participation by sentiment-driven, retail investors (Ritter and Welch, 2002). This is 
made possible by underwriters manipulating the signaling environment by giving a 
false signal that does not reflect the fundamental information about the quality of the 
IPO firm. 
By measuring the strength of the grey market signal given by underwriters in 
the presence of allocation discretion, I investigate whether the signaling environment 
is used as a tool to reduce the information asymmetry for retail investors or, 
alternatively, is exploited by underwriters for higher benefit to themselves at a cost to 
retail investors.  
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Thus, in this study, I contribute to the broad literature of financial 
intermediation in the IPO market and the growing body of literature on the grey 
market. The contribution lies in applying signaling theory in an IPO market setting 
when there is a presence of an active grey market for IPOs. In doing so, I take 
advantage of the unique institutional framework in the Indian IPO market to examine 
the use of the grey market as a signaling environment by underwriters to signal IPO 
quality to uninformed retail investors. I contribute further to an understanding of the 
effect of allocation discretion on the behavioural change in the pattern of signaling by 
underwriters in the grey market and its influence on retail investor participation and 
underpricing. My results reveal important implications for regulators worldwide in 
terms of policy making in the financial intermediation sector, consideration of the 
interests of market players and potential outcomes of any regulatory changes. 
I collect and examine 324 IPOs (issued between January 2000 and December 
2013) in the Indian market to manually construct a database for my study. I uncover 
the following significant findings. 
First, I find that, contrary to past studies, granting allocation discretion to 
underwriters does not result in lower underpricing. The inference is that allocation 
discretion to underwriters does not result in higher information revelation from 
institutional investors that aids underwriters in pricing an IPO at a fair value. 
Second, I find that the grey market price positively influences the participation 
of retail investors and that regulatory intervention does not affect this positive 
relationship. I conclude that the grey market price signal can be a dominant signal for 
retail investors to access information about the quality of an IPO, thereby reducing the 
information asymmetry for retail investors and strongly influencing their investment 
decision. 
Third, I find that when underwriters have allocation discretion, the strength of 
the grey market price signal is greater than when they do not have allocation 
discretion. The inference is that in the presence of the grey market, allocation 
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discretion encourages underwriters to engage in rent-seeking activity by developing 
profit sharing relationships with regular institutional investors. The higher income due 
to the profit sharing relationship compensates underwriters for a false signal in the 
grey market. Hence, discretion in allocation motivates underwriters to manipulate the 
grey market for higher private benefit which is detrimental to market welfare. The 
conclusion is that regulating the allocation power of underwriters is positive for market 
welfare as it restricts underwriters’ incentives to manipulate the grey market.  
Fourth, I find that higher retail investor participation results in higher 
underpricing in IPOs. However, regulatory intervention aimed at regulating 
discretionary allocation makes this relationship insignificant. The inference is that 
regulating allocation discretion is positive for the IPO market as underpricing does not 
appear to be due to the over-enthusiasm of sentiment-driven retail investors.  
Finally, in contrast to prior research, I find no relationship between grey market 
prices and underpricing in an IPO. This supports my earlier findings as the evidence 
points to the possibility of manipulation in the grey market to attract small retail 
investors to participate in an IPO. 
 Overall, the conclusion is that allocation discretion and the presence of an 
active grey market for IPOs allows underwriters to participate in rent-seeking activity. 
This situation motivates them to manipulate the grey market for higher benefits for 
themselves and their regular institutional investors. However, this is at the expense of 
small retail investors. Hence, regulating underwriters’ allocation power is beneficial for 
market welfare due to both less underpricing and also in deterring underwriters from 
manipulating the grey market for their own benefit.  
To achieve the maximum benefit of regulatory intervention aimed at curtailing 
the allocation power of underwriters, the grey market must also be regulated. This is 
because the price signal in the grey market influences retail investors’ participation. 
For the regulator, overlooking this fact has adverse consequences on the welfare of 
small retail investors as they bear the consequence of the manipulation of the grey 
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market. Moreover, in the period when allocation discretion is regulated, it results in a 
significant decrease in retail investor participation. This is because 34% of IPOs have 
negative listing returns in the period when allocation discretion is regulated as 
compared to 13%, in the period when underwriters have allocation discretion. In order 
to encourage participation in the IPO market by retail investors, the regulator must 
introduce a safety net for these investors to safeguard against the listing price falling 
below the issue price for some specified time after listing. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: The following section 
discusses certain key institutional features of the Indian IPO market. Section 4.3 
discusses the background literature and develops the related hypotheses, while 
Section 4.4 describes the sample data and their key statistics. Section 4.5 presents and 
discusses the empirical evidence, and Section 4.6 concludes the study.  
4.2 Key Institutional features of the Indian IPO market 
In this section, I  briefly describe the two key institutional features of the Indian 
IPO market40, first the regulatory intervention that curtailed the discretionary 
allocation power of the underwriters and second, the grey market. 
4.2.1 Regulation Change  
When bookbuilding was introduced to the Indian IPO market in 1999 by SEBI, 
the initial guidelines stated that the allocation of shares to retail investors and non-
institutional investors was to be on a proportionate (non-discretionary) basis, while for 
the institutional investor's category the allocation of shares would be on a 
discretionary basis. However, on Sept 19, 200541, the regulation regarding 
discretionary allocation power to the underwriters changed, hence no longer allowing 
                                                     
40 Chapter 2 gives a detailed discussion of the key institutional features of the Indian IPO 
market. 
 
41 SEBI Circular No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/DIP/16/2005/19/9 dated September 19, 2005. 
 http://www.sebi.gov.in/guide/DipGuidelines2009.pdf 
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underwriters to control the allocation of shares to institutional investors. Thus, after 
the second regulatory intervention, allocations to all investor categories is done on a 
proportionate basis. However, in both regulatory regimes42, underwriters have pricing 
discretion that allows them to set the initial offer price band and also the final offer 
price for an IPO.  
4.2.2 The Grey Market  
The most distinct feature of the Indian IPO market is the presence of an 
informal pre-IPO market, known as the grey market, where investors can trade yet-to- 
be-issued new equity shares. The grey market is an over-the-counter market that 
provides liquidity to investors before official trading on an IPO starts. Grey market 
prices start getting quoted for stocks when the offer price range is announced, and 
trades are done till the period the shares get listed on a major stock exchange.  
4.3 Background Literature and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of granting 
allocation discretion to underwriters and develop the information sharing hypothesis. 
Further, I present the literature on the effect of information asymmetry on IPO 
investors with a discussion from the perspective of signaling theory. As participation of 
retail investors is necessary for IPO success, I examine how the presence of a grey 
market for IPOs allows underwriters to use it to signal IPO quality to uninformed retail 
investors, thus reducing information asymmetry for the latter. Finally, I debate how, 
depending on the underwriter incentive, allocation discretion can influence 
underwriter signaling behaviour in the grey market and result in two different 
outcomes for retail investor participation and underpricing.  
                                                     
42 The period before Sept 2005 is the pre-regulation period and after, is the post-regulation 
period. 
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4.3.1 Allocation Discretion and Information Sharing  
In this sub-section, as shown in Figure 4.1 Section A, I discuss the literature to 
develop the information sharing hypothesis by debating the advantages and 
disadvantages of the information sharing relationship between underwriters and 
institutional investors on IPO pricing. 
The bookbuilding mechanism for the 
issue of IPO shares grants pricing and 
allocation discretion to underwriters 
and allows them to develop and 
maintain information sharing 
relationships with institutional investors 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). This 
enables underwriters to acquire price 
and demand information from 
prospective informed institutional 
investors and use this information to set the initial price band and thus improve the 
pre-market price discovery in the IPO process. This leads to the IPO being priced at fair 
value and thereby results in lower underpricing in an IPO (Benveniste and Wilhelm, 
1990). 
Allocation and pricing discretion allows underwriters to reward these investors 
with a higher allocation of shares, and also allows some degree of underpricing 
(Hanley, 1993). This leads to an increase in investment returns for these investors, as a 
reward for sharing their private positive information about IPO pricing with 
underwriters. Thus, when underwriters have allocation discretion, it leads to an honest 
exchange of information between underwriters and informed institutional investors, 
and the outcome is lower underpricing in an IPO. 
Sherman and Titman (2002) and Sherman (2005) support the Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) study by finding that when underwriters have pricing and allocation 
discretion, they are able to influence informed investors to share higher positive 
 
Figure 4.1 Section A: Information Sharing 
Hypothesis 
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information about the IPO. Also, a study by Spatt and Srivastava (1991) supports 
granting allocation discretion to underwriters by arguing that it motivates informed 
institutional investors to share their private information with underwriters and that 
results in better price discovery in the IPO process.  
However, academic studies are critical of the bookbuilding mechanism, 
whereby underwriters use their discretionary allocation power to benefit themselves 
more by way of rent-seeking activity. when they have allocation discretion and when 
underpricing in an IPO is high, underwriters can favour regular institutional investors 
by giving them a higher allocation of underpriced shares (Aggarwal et al., 2002; 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). This increases the profits for regular institutional 
investors, and with a profit-sharing relationship with these investors, the outcome is a 
higher share of income for underwriters from these investors. Studies by Nimalendran 
et al. (2007) and Loughran and Ritter (2002) support this profit sharing relationship by 
finding that significant commissions were given to underwriters by institutional 
investors in return for favourable IPO allocations. A study by Bubna and Prabhala 
(2011) of Indian IPOs finds that the identity of the bidder in an IPO is a significant 
measure of the allocation of shares to them by underwriters, as compared to the other 
information contained in the bid application.  
Regulatory investigations by the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC)43 in the year 2000 indicated that underwriters allocate IPO shares partly on the 
basis of trading commissions generated by investors (Aggarwal et al., 2002). Hence, 
granting allocation discretion to underwriters can encourage them to use the 
information they hold about the firm to underprice an IPO more than required, to 
obtain a higher return for themselves and their friendly institutional investors. 
However, this is at the expense of the issuer and other IPO investors and thus 
negatively affects the welfare of IPO market participants. 
                                                     
43 http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/csfbipo.htm 
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The bookbuilding mechanism for the issue of IPO shares is successful in most of 
the markets where it has been introduced (Jagannathan et al., 2010). Given academic 
research, such as by (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), I expect that the bookbuilding 
mechanism, which provides allocation and pricing discretion to underwriters, is 
beneficial for the IPO market. This is because it assists underwriters to extract 
favourable pricing information from informed institutional investors. This stimulates 
price discovery in the IPO process and hence results in lower underpricing. Thus, as 
shown in Figure 4.1 Section A, I conceptualise that allocation discretion to underwriters 
results in lower underpricing in an IPO. 
These arguments lead to the first hypothesis. 
H1:  When underwriters have allocation discretion, underpricing will be lower in 
an IPO. 
4.3.2 Allocation Discretion and Quality of Information Sharing 
In the previous sub-section, I develop the information sharing hypothesis by 
debating the positive and negative aspects of granting allocation discretion to 
underwriters and its effect on IPO pricing. In this sub-section, I discuss how different 
levels of information available to institutional and retail investors increases the 
information asymmetry between them about the fair price and quality of an IPO.  
In the IPO market, investors are generally classified into two categories, 
informed and uninformed, depending on the information they hold about the issuing 
firm. As discussed in the previous sub-section, in bookbuilt IPOs underwriters develop 
information sharing relationships with institutional investors. This motivates both 
participant groups to share their own information about firm valuation and pricing 
with each other (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). Underwriters use this information to 
set the initial price band in an IPO. This relationship gives institutional investors access 
to superior information about the IPO, adding to their own information about the IPO 
firm. The research of  Field and Lowry (2009) and Chiang et al. (2010) shows that 
institutional investors have the required resources and analytical skills to interpret the 
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information that is made available to them. Hence, the outcome for institutional 
investors is that they have an increased ability to fundamentally value the quality of an 
IPO and make a more educated investment decision.  
However, when it comes to small retail investors, they have no market 
intelligence on the IPO to offer underwriters, so underwriters have no collective 
benefit, by way of higher price and demand information sharing, from them and so 
prefer not to share their private information about the IPO firm with retail investors. 
Hence, retail investors only have access to public information, while institutional 
investors have access to both public and private information.  
Additionally, Field and Lowry (2009) show that retail investors do not pay 
attention to the information made available to them and, moreover, lack the skills to 
interpret the available information.  
As there is no past price-related information available, it is challenging for retail 
investors to assess the fair value of an IPO. Chiang et al. (2010) find that the decision of 
retail investors to invest in an IPO is linked to market sentiment. Therefore, when 
compared to institutional investors who come under the category of informed 
investors, retail investors come under the category of sentiment-driven uninformed 
investors because of the limited information made available to them and their lack of 
requisite skills and tools to interpret the available information to price an IPO. 
Stiglitz (2002) explains that when players have access to different information, 
it leads to information asymmetry between them. In an IPO, private information is only 
made available to institutional investors and therefore results in information 
asymmetry between institutional investors and retail investors about the fair price and 
quality of the IPO.  
Rock (1986) argues that the information asymmetry between informed 
institutional investors and uninformed retail investors imposes a ‘winners curse’ on 
uninformed investors. In IPOs that are overpriced and where institutional subscription 
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is less, retail investors will receive all the shares they have subscribed for. On the other 
hand, in IPOs that are priced attractively, retail investors will receive fewer shares 
because of strong participation from institutional investors.  
Using IPO data from Singapore, Koh and Walter (1989) investigate Rock’s model 
and find that after adjusting for allocations, uninformed retail investors get returns 
that are not significantly different from zero. In support of this study, the evidence on 
IPOs in Israel by Amihud et al. (2003) is that uninformed retail investors earn negative 
allocation weighted returns on their investment. Hence, when overall investment 
returns for retail investors are near zero, they may prefer not to remain active in the 
IPO market. 
However, for an IPO to be successful, Rock (1986) argues that along with the 
participation of informed institutional investors, the participation of uninformed retail 
investors is necessary. The author further argues that even in offers where 
underwriters price an IPO attractively to increase demand from potential investors, the 
participation of informed institutional investors alone cannot guarantee the success of 
an IPO. Thus, in this study, my central focus is to address the question of how 
underwriters can reduce the information asymmetry for uninformed retail investors 
and influence them to participate in the IPO market, for IPOs to succeed. 
4.3.3 Signaling Theory and the Key constructs for an IPO market  
In the previous sub-section, I discuss how retail investors are at a disadvantage 
while taking an investment decision because they have limited information made 
available, when compared to institutional investors. In this sub-section, I discuss how 
underwriters can use the grey market as a signaling environment to reduce the 
information asymmetry for uninformed retail investors and hence influence 
uninformed retail investors to actively participate in IPOs. I apply the implications of 
signaling theory in the Indian IPO market setting and discuss the role of each IPO 
market participant. 
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Spence (2002) states that signaling theory can be used to understand and 
explain the issue of information asymmetry between players who have different levels 
of information amongst themselves. Signaling theory explains the behaviour of each 
player in an environment where there is information asymmetry and describes how 
each player can use a signal to maximise their individual benefits. The key players in 
signaling theory, as discussed by Connelly et al. (2011) are signaler, receiver, signal and 
feedback from the receiver. The authors also discuss that the signaling environment 
and cost of the signal to the signaler play a crucial role in understanding signaling 
theory.  
Signalers 
According to Ross (1977), the main assumption of signaling theory is that 
signalers are insiders who have access to information about a firm that is not available 
to outsiders. While conducting a detailed fundamental analysis and forecast for an IPO, 
underwriters gather substantial qualitative and quantitative data about the firm to 
supplement their in-depth information about the condition of the financial market and 
the current investment environment. Also, as they have information sharing 
relationships with informed institutional investors, they have access to demand and 
pricing information from the perspective of the informed investors. The study by Baron 
(1982) concludes that underwriters are more informed about an IPO than any other 
market participant. Therefore, as the most informed player in the IPO market, 
underwriters can act as signalers to reduce information asymmetry for uninformed 
retail investors.    
Receivers 
According to signaling theory, receivers are defined as outsiders who do not 
have access to private information but are interested in having this information. This 
information can assist them in making more informed decisions. In the context of IPOs, 
uninformed retail investors are the outsiders, wanting private information about the 
quality of a firm, before making a decision to invest in an IPO. As a consequence of 
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receiving positive private information, retail investors, as receivers, can better assess 
the true value of an IPO and make an informed investment decision.  
Institutional investors are already informed about the true value and quality of 
the IPO, so a signaler may not be able to influence their investment decision, especially 
as  they are less prone to market sentiment than uninformed retail investors (Cornelli 
et al., 2006). 
Signals and the signaling environment  
The information sent by the signaler to the receiver, communicating the 
information that is otherwise unobservable to the receiver, is called the signal. 
Signaling theory focusses on the deliberate communication of positive information by 
the signaler to the receiver by way of a signal. Signaling will only take place when the 
signaler expects a benefit from some action by the receiver as a consequence of, or 
influenced by, the signal. Rynes et al. (1991) and Lester et al. (2006) find that to reduce 
information asymmetry, a signaling environment plays a critical role for effective 
communication of information.  
The presence of an active grey market offers an ideal signaling environment to 
underwriters for effective communication of information about IPO quality. For retail 
investors, this signal explicitly reduces uncertainty about pricing and valuing an IPO. 
Therefore, a grey market price signal will decrease the information differential for 
uninformed retail investors and interest them in participating in an IPO. While acting 
as a signaler, underwriters should be able to signal the unobservable quality of an IPO 
to uninformed retail investors with honesty. Moreover, the signaling environment, or 
any other external factor, should not distort the signal, resulting in a disadvantage to 
any IPO market participant categories. 
Feedback 
The effectiveness of the signal is measured by the feedback that a signaler 
receives from a receiver as counter signals. This information is important for signalers 
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as they come to know whether receivers are paying attention to the signal and how 
the signal is interpreted by them. This evidence assists the signaler to improve the 
effectiveness of future signaling. In the case of an IPO, when underwriters signal 
through the grey market price, feedback from retail investors is by way of increased 
participation in the IPO. To reduce information asymmetry, underwriters have to signal 
repeatedly through the grey market (Janney and Folta, 2003, 2006; Park and Mezias, 
2005).  
Signal cost and benefit to the Signaler 
The cost of the signal to the signaler plays a very vital role in understanding 
signaling theory (BliegeBird et al., 2005). In the context of signaling theory, the notion 
of cost is that some signalers are in an advantageous position to absorb the signaling 
cost because of the benefit the signalers have as a consequence of the existing 
regulatory environment or of being in a dominant position in the signaling process. 
When signalers are in an advantageous position to absorb a higher signaling cost, they 
may be motivated to attempt false signaling. False signaling is when a signaler does 
not have the underlying quality associated with the signal, and moreover, the cost of 
producing a costly false signal will directly result in a higher benefit to the signaler. This 
higher benefit to the signaler as a result of successful deceit resulting from a false 
signal will be at the expense of the receiver (BliegeBird et al., 2005). In the case of an 
IPO, underwriters, as signalers, may be motivated to give a false grey market signal as 
it can result in higher income for themselves and their friendly institutional investors, 
at the expense of uninformed retail investors. 
4.3.4 Grey Market Price Signal, Retail Subscription and Underpricing 
In the previous sub-section, I apply the implications of signaling theory in the  
IPO market setting and discuss the role of each IPO market participant category. In this 
sub-section, I discuss how a grey market signal can be a dominant signal of IPO quality 
for retail investors and influence them to actively participate in an IPO. I further discuss 
the influence of retail investor participation on IPO underpricing. 
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As there are multiple signals available to a receiver, signaling models focus on 
whether the signal being examined is going to dominate all other available signals. In 
the case of an IPO, Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) find that the most 
dominant signal to potential investors about IPO quality is underpricing, signaled 
through the offer price of an IPO. Other common variables that act as signals for IPO 
quality that are discussed in the signaling literature include a firm’s choice of 
underwriters to manage the IPO (Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990; 
Michaely and Shaw, 1994), the choice of auditor (Titman and Trueman, 1986), IPO 
grade (Deb and Marisetty, 2010), the participation of venture capitalists as 
shareholders (Lee and Wahal, 2004; Megginson and Weiss, 1991), insider retention 
rate (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989), the membership of the board of directors (Wei and 
Tan, 2012) and group affiliation (Marisetty and Subrahmanyam, 2010). 
Investors may assess the reliability of the signals that are available to them 
before making an investment decision. As underpricing benefits IPO investors directly, 
past research on IPOs considers that underpricing will dominate any other signal that 
gives information about a firm’s quality and its fair price (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; 
Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989). However, as the underpricing signal is only 
observed by investors once the issue gets listed on a stock exchange, this signal does 
not reduce information asymmetry for uninformed retail investors, as it is ex post 
facto.  
I propose that the grey market price signal may be more informative for 
uninformed retail investors in making a subscription decision, thereby reducing 
information asymmetry for them. This is because there is a positive relationship 
between grey market and listing prices (Aussenegg et al., 2006; Cornelli et al., 2006; 
Löffler et al., 2005). Also, a more recent study on Indian IPOs by Neupane et al. (2014) 
suggests that grey market price is a strong determining factor of the listing price of an 
IPO, and hence the listing returns to the investors. 
Thus, by observing the grey market price that contains fundamental and private 
information about an IPO, any disadvantage from information asymmetry can be 
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reduced for retail investors and assist them to make a more informed investment 
decision. By using the grey market price signal as a proxy of listing price, retail 
investors can estimate the notional profits they may get if they go ahead with investing 
in the IPO. As retail investors cannot observe the listing price and hence cannot 
estimate underpricing in an IPO, while making an investment decision, the grey market 
price signal can become a more dominant signal than all other available signals that 
represent the fundamental value of a firm’s IPO.  
As the uninformed retail investors’ participation is strongly influenced by grey 
market price (Neupane et al., 2014), when the grey market signal indicates higher 
potential profits, it will result in increased participation from retail investors. 
Underwriters, as signalers, benefit from the signal by way of higher participation of 
retail investors, and thus an improved performance of the IPO.  
The Ritter and Welch (2002) study in emerging markets finds that higher 
participation from sentiment-driven retail investors leads to higher underpricing. 
Moreover, a model developed by Derrien (2005) from a sample of French IPOs finds 
that retail investor subscription in an IPO has a positive influence on underpricing. The 
study by Brooks et al. (2014) of Indian IPOs finds that when the grey market price is 
high, it results in a higher subscription from investors and thereby results in higher 
underpricing. In summary, when the grey market price signal is strong, it will result in 
higher participation from retail investors, and this will lead to higher underpricing in an 
IPO. 
These arguments lead to the second and third hypotheses that are  
H2: Grey market price signal is positively linked to participation in an IPO by 
retail investors. 
H3: Retail investor participation is positively linked to underpricing in an IPO. 
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4.3.5 Allocation Discretion and Underwriter Signaling  
In the previous sub-section, I discuss how the grey market price signal can be a 
dominant signal of IPO quality for uninformed retail investors while making an 
investment decision. I further examine the relationship between the strength of the 
grey market price signal and participation from retail investors. I also discuss the 
relationship between retail investor participation and underpricing in an IPO. In this 
sub-section, based on the literature discussed in the previous sub-section and as 
shown in the conceptual framework in Figure 4.1 Section B, I debate how allocation 
discretion can influence underwriters’ signaling behaviour in the grey market and lead 
to two different outcomes for retail investor participation and IPO underpricing. 
Figure 4.1 Section B: Signaling Hypotheses 
True Grey Market Price Signal for Market Benefit 
In the presence of allocation discretion, underwriters share with institutional 
investors truthful information that can encourage them to participate in the IPO. 
However, to ensure the success of an IPO, underwriters also need the participation of 
retail investors. This is important for underwriters because they will be paid an 
underwriting fee only when the IPO is successful. Hence, the main incentive for 
underwriters is to make sure the IPO is successful by communicating information 
truthfully to market participants and securing their participation. Hence, in this case, 
the participation of underwriters in the grey market will be with a true grey market 
price signal to retail investors and will be close to the fair value of an IPO. In this 
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condition, the grey market price signal will be low and result in a lower signaling cost 
to underwriters. Signaling cost here is defined as the difference between the grey 
market price signal and the issue price. Thus, when underwriters participate in the grey 
market for the benefit of all market participants, it will be with a true signal and hence 
result in a lower signaling cost to underwriters. 
False Grey Market Price Signal for Underwriter Benefit 
On the other hand, I present a case where there is a possibility that 
underwriters are motivated not to share information truthfully with all market 
participants. In this condition, to get a higher income, underwriters communicate a 
false signal in the grey market, a signal that does not represent the underlying 
fundamental value of the IPO and hence results in a higher signaling cost to 
underwriters. 
A favourable regulatory environment that has discretion in allocation, has as a 
consequence that underwriters are in an advantageous position to absorb higher 
signaling costs. Hence, they are motivated to attempt false signaling. False signaling is 
made possible by underwriters when the cost of producing a costly false signal will 
directly result in a higher benefit to them. When the signaling cost is high, 
underwriters will have a higher grey market participation loss. The condition for loss is 
that there is a high likelihood that the grey market price signal is greater than the issue 
price.  
The trade-off for underwriters to mitigate this higher loss resulting from a false 
signal is to have higher underpricing. When the underpricing is high, it will increase 
profits for regular institutional investors. As they have a profit sharing relationship with 
institutional investors, this will result in a higher share of income that underwriters 
receive from institutional investors (Nimalendran et al., 2007; Reuter, 2006).  
Hence, to have higher underpricing, underwriters manipulate the grey market.  
Under this condition, they give a strong false signal about the quality of an IPO to 
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increase participation from retail investors. This results in more subscriptions from 
retail investors, as their subscription depends on the strength of the grey market price 
signal (Neupane et al., 2014). When participation from uninformed retail investors is 
high, it results in higher underpricing in an IPO (Ritter and Welch, 2002). In this case, 
the outcome is increased loss to underwriters, compared to when they participate for 
the benefit of all market participants. Allocation discretion allows underwriters to bear 
the higher cost of a false grey market signal as they can develop profit sharing 
relationships with regular institutional investors. Thus, when underwriters have 
allocation discretion, and they participate in the grey market for their own benefit, it 
will be with a false grey market price signal and result in a higher signaling cost for 
them. 
In summary, when the aim of underwriters is higher market welfare, they will 
share information truthfully with all IPO investors. This will result in a true grey market 
price signal and a lower signaling cost for underwriters. Alternatively, when 
underwriters are motivated not to truthfully share information with all investors, it will 
result in a false grey market price signal and a higher signaling cost for underwriters.  
These arguments lead to the fourth hypothesis that is  
H4: With allocation discretion, a true (false) grey market price signal is 
associated with a lower (higher) signaling cost. 
4.4 Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
In this section, I list the data sources, variables used in the study and present 
the summary statistics of the sample of IPOs.  
4.4.1 Data Sources  
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) websites  
The dataset used in this study consists of firms that went public through the 
bookbuilding mechanism between January 2000 and December 2013 and for which I 
103 
 
have the grey market price and subscription details. The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
and National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) websites are the primary sources of 
identifying the IPOs that I use in the study. These websites also provided me with the 
listing date and closing price on the Exchange as of the first day of trading for each IPO. 
I use this price for computing underpricing.  
IPO Prospectus 
Data on offer and characteristics of firms were hand-collected from company 
prospectuses obtained from the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) website. 
Data on offer characteristics include offer open and close dates, offer price, offer price 
range, underwriters managing the issue, total shares offered, issue size and promoter’s 
holdings before and after the offer. Data on firm characteristics include earnings per 
share (EPS), return on net worth (RONW), book value and age of the firm at the time of 
its IPO. 
 Capital Market Website 
To supplement what is available from the BSE and NSE websites I use Capital 
Market, one of the top finance portals in India, to I get the basis of allotment 
documents. This the basis of allotment document gives the details of demand in each 
investor category and the number of shares allocated to each category.  
Smart Investment Newspaper 
Grey market price/premium is the most critical data required for this research. I 
source the grey market premium from Smart Investment, a weekly newspaper 
published in a regional Indian language. To access this price data for my research 
study, it had to be translated into English.  
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4.4.2 Description of Variables used in the Study 
Table 4.1 describes the variables I use in this study. 
Table 4.1: Description of Variables used in Study 2 
Variable Description 
Age of firm at IPO  The difference between a firm’s IPO year and the founding year expressed in 
number of years. 
Final Issue/Offer 
Price  
The final issuing price of the IPO shares (INR). 
Final Issue Size  Total final proceeds raised in the IPO, and is the multiple of final issue price 
and the number of shares offered (million INR). 
Underwriter 
Reputation Dummy 
This variable is a proxy for the reputation of the underwriter. Underwriter 
reputation dummy takes a value of 1 if the underwriter has raised proceeds of 
more than 1% of the total proceeds raised by all IPOs during the sample 
period.  
Regulation Dummy This dummy variable is a proxy for the regulatory change that altered the 
allocation power of underwriters from discretionary to proportionate. The 
regulation dummy takes a value of 1 for the proportionate allocation regime 
which represents the post-regulation period and 0, for the discretionary 
allocation regime which represents the pre-regulation period. 
Retail Subscription Total number of shares subscribed by retail investors as a proportion of the 
total shares available to them for allocation. Measured after the issue has 
closed for subscription. 
QIB Subscription Total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a 
proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. Measured after 
the issue has closed. 
Total Subscription Total number of shares subscribed by investors as a proportion of the total 
number of shares offered. Measured after the issue has closed for 
subscription. 
Underpricing Simple return calculated between the closing price of an IPO at the end of the 
first day of trading and final issue price. Initial return or first-day return are 
interchangeably used to represent underpricing in an IPO. 
Grey Market Price  The average of the weekly average grey market price quoted for an IPO during 
the grey market trading period (INR). 
Grey Market 
Premium  
The difference between the grey market price and final issue price of an IPO 
(INR). 
Market Volatility Measured by the standard deviation, estimated using continuously 
compounded daily returns of the market returns one month prior to the issue 
opening date. 
Pre 90 MR The market return on index between the IPO open date and the preceding 90 
days. The simple return calculated between the index value on the day the IPO 
opens for subscription and the previous 90 days. I use NSE Nifty as the index to 
calculate the market return. 
RONW Return on net worth based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the 
IPO. 
Book Value Based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. 
Promoters Pre 
Holding 
The percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters before the IPO. 
Promoters Post 
Holding 
The percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters after the IPO. 
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Calculation of Underwriter Reputation 
I use the study by Megginson and Weiss (1991) to construct the measure of 
underwriter reputation, based on an underwriter’s relative market share. The ranking 
of underwriters is based on the proceeds raised by them during the sample period 
(January 2000 and December 2013), details are provided in Appendix 1.  
Overall, 74 underwriters manage at least one IPO during the sample period. 
Whenever there is more than one underwriter managing an IPO, I divide the proceeds 
of the offering equally amongst the participating underwriters. I consider reputed 
underwriters as those who raise more than 1% of the total proceeds in the sample 
period, hence, the sample comprises 19 top ranked (reputed), and 57 lower ranked 
(unreputed) underwriters who raise less than 1% of the total proceeds in the sample 
period.  
During the sample period, the highly reputed underwriters manage 70% of the 
IPOs and raise 89.48% of the total proceeds. On the other hand, the other 
underwriters manage 30% of the total IPOs and raise 10.52% of the total proceeds. The 
reputed underwriters category includes well-known underwriters, who have been 
active in the IPO market for an extended period of time in my sample period of 2000-
2010. They undertake significant IPOs while the less reputed underwriters generally 
manage small issues.  
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics  
This section discusses the descriptive statistics of the sample of IPOs. Table 4.2 
presents the annual descriptive statistics. The sample comprises 324 IPOs issued 
through the bookbuilding mechanism and listed on the BSE and/or NSE over a 14-year 
period from January 2000 to Dec 2013. The sample excludes issues that were already 
listed on the stock exchange but raised capital through follow-on issues using the 
bookbuilding mechanism. From Table 4.2, the inference is that there has been a 
considerable variation in the number of IPOs each year, but on average the trend 
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shows that issues using the bookbuilding route to raise funds from an IPO have been 
increasing over time. 
The statistics show that the mean (median) age of a firm at the time of an IPO is 
about 15.67 (13). The mean (median) of final issue price and final issue size of the 
overall sample is INR 206 (136) and INR 4946 (1085) million. The mean (median) of the 
underwriter reputation dummy is 0.58 (1).  
The mean (median) retail and QIB subscription are 11.63 (5.70), and 24.16 
(8.37) times respectively. The subscription is calculated by dividing the total number of 
shares bid by the total number of shared offered. A subscription value of 11.63 means 
that for an IPO that is offering 100 shares to investors, the bids received are for 1163 
shares. The overall subscriptions for IPOs are captured by the total demand multiple. 
The mean (median) overall subscription multiple is 20.66 (8.40) times. The subscription 
figures suggest that there is a favourable demand by investors for IPOs in Indian 
markets. 
The mean (median) underpricing for the period is 25% (13%). This is similar to 
initial returns reported in other emerging markets but much higher than those 
reported by studies using IPO data from the US and other developed markets (Cornelli 
and Goldreich, 2001). The mean (median) grey market price is INR 257.90 (173.06) 
while the mean (median) grey market premium is INR 51.88 (20.48). The mean 
(median) market volatility is 19.60 (16.46) and the market return 90 days before IPO 
open date is 0.08 (0.10). The mean (median) RONW and book value are 25.90 (23.51) 
and INR 45.84 (32.37) respectively. The mean (median) pre- and post-promoters IPO 
holdings are 81.81% (88.68) and 59.82% (59.87%). The evidence suggests relatively 
high promoters’ shareholding even after the IPO. Overall, there are 225 IPOs with 
positive underpricing as compared to 99 IPOs that get listed at a price lower than the 
IPO offer price on the first day of trading. Thus, about one-third of the IPOs in the 
sample have negative returns on the first day of trading, suggesting that underwriters 
overprice quite a number of IPOs. 
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Correlation Matrix  
Pearson’s correlation coefficients are presented in Table 4.3, and variables in the 
correlation matrix are defined in the list of variables in Table 4.1. The correlation 
between underpricing and the individual subscription variables, namely retail and 
institutional, and overall subscription is positive and significant. A positive correlation 
is also found between retail and institutional subscriptions. The grey market premium 
is significant and highly positively correlated with the retail, institutional and total 
subscription figures. The grey market premium is also significant and positively 
correlated with underpricing in an IPO and past returns on the stock market.  
However, no significant relationship is found between grey market premium 
and market volatility. A significant and positive correlation is found between 
underwriter reputation and grey market premium, pointing to the fact that issues 
managed by reputed underwriters have a high grey market premium. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics by Year of IPO 
Particulars 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total/Mean Median SD 
Number of IPOs 5 1 2 10 34 58 76 25 20 57 29 6 1 324   
Average Age of firm at IPO (Yrs.) 6.60 13.00 17.50 18.90 11.44 14.62 16.99 13.20 17.80 19.28 12.76 17.50 20.00 15.67 13.00 13.38 
Average Final Issue Price (INR) 164 530 133 183 208 215 236 174 183 212 99 389 530 206 136 202 
Average Issue Size (Million INR) 798 2100 4740 8952 2774 4421 4782 6586 9595 6019 1807 3697 9191 4946 1085 14686 
Average Underwriter Reputation Dummy 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.66 0.58 0.28 0.50 0.60 0.21 1.00 1.00 0.58 1.00 0.49 
Average Retail Subscription 4.32 2.16 5.24 27.31 22.18 10.32 17.29 4.63 2.27 7.98 4.69 6.51 3.48 11.63 5.70 19.14 
Average QIB Subscription 9.71 2.63 11.92 12.68 26.39 26.54 44.68 8.10 13.85 19.68 2.33 19.10 9.78 24.16 8.37 34.01 
Average Total Subscription 10.53 2.50 11.99 27.07 25.97 20.54 35.99 7.34 8.43 16.93 3.87 16.16 9.08 20.66 8.40 26.15 
Average Underpricing 0.26 -0.05 0.29 0.36 0.38 0.29 0.34 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.24 0.14 0.47 
Average Grey Market Price (INR) 235.18 590 162.58 274.24 273.21 265.46 330.05 188.52 192.89 243.80 105.07 483.19 544.11 257.90 173.06 261.48 
Average Grey Market Premium (INR) 71.18 60.00 30.08 91.44 65.41 50.15 94.04 14.88 10.09 31.78 6.00 94.36 14.11 51.88 20.48 86.58 
Market Volatility 32.39 22.67 14.30 17.00 15.77 16.46 20.34 36.38 26.60 14.49 19.41 14.20 15.07 19.60 16.46 9.52 
Average Pre 90 MR -0.05 -0.11 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.14 -0.09 0.17 0.06 -0.05 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.12 
Average RONW 43.06 24.79 18.91 25.46 33.00 24.79 26.91 25.16 21.31 25.43 20.30 18.36 51.09 25.90 23.51 30.86 
Average Book Value (INR) 34.19 143.00 108.97 35.13 39.42 39.26 47.73 53.55 52.37 52.15 25.58 94.28 57.51 45.84 32.37 52.50 
Average Promoters Pre Holding 86.58 47.47 79.98 82.33 76.53 85.92 79.87 81.23 83.49 82.44 87.41 69.13 37.15 81.81 88.68 18.98 
Average Promoters Post Holding 74.27 43.19 64.51 59.37 55.85 63.03 58.57 59.39 63.34 60.45 58.25 53.33 33.13 59.82 59.87 15.19 
IPOs with Positive Underpricing 4 0 2 10 30 40 53 14 14 39 14 4 1 225   
IPOs with Negative Underpricing 1 1 0 0 4 18 23 11 6 18 15 2 0 99   
 
Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics of firm and issue-specific variables by year for 324 Indian IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and /or National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) between January 2000 and December 
2013, excluding firms that came to the market with follow-on issues. Number of IPOs is a count of all successful IPOs for that year, i.e. those that raised capital from the IPO market. Age of firm at IPO is the difference between a firm’s 
IPO year and the founding year, expressed in number of years. Final Issue price is the final offer price of the IPO (INR). Issue size is the final proceeds of the offer and is multiple of final issue price and the number of shares offered 
respectively (In million INR). Underwriter Reputation is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for IPOs managed by reputed underwriters, and 0 otherwise. Retail Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed 
by retail investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. QIB Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares 
available to them for allocation. Total Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by investors as a proportion to the total number of shares offered. Underpricing (Initial Return) is the simple return calculated 
between the closing price at the end of the first day of trading and IPO issue price (percent). Grey Market Price is the average of the weekly grey market price quoted for an IPO during the grey market trading period (INR). Grey Market 
Premium is the difference between the grey market price and final issue price of an IPO (INR). Market Volatility is measured by the standard deviation which is estimated using continuously compounded daily returns of the market 
returns, one month prior to the issue opening date. Pre 90 MR is the market return for the preceding 90 days respectively before the IPO open date (percent). Return on Net Worth (RONW) is based on the most recent fiscal year ending 
prior to the IPO. Book Value is the book value of the firm in INR. Promoters Pre- and Post-holding is the percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters before and after the IPO respectively. IPOs with Positive (Negative) Underpricing 
are the number of IPOs in a year that are listed at a price higher (lower) than the offer price. (1 US$ is approximately equal to 68 Indian rupees). 
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Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Age of firm at IPO 1.00              
2 Final Issue Price  0.02 1.00             
3 Issue Size  0.11 0.16* 1.00            
4 Underwriter Reputation Dummy 0.06 0.36* 0.24* 1.00           
5 Retail Subscription 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 0.05 1.00          
6 QIB Subscription 0.06 0.34* 0.10 0.36* 0.41* 1.00         
7 Underpricing 0.21 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.56* 0.39* 1.00        
8 Grey Market Premium -0.03 0.57* 0.01 0.26* 0.40* 0.71* 0.36* 1.00       
9 Grey Market Price 0.01 0.96* 0.13* 0.36* 0.12* 0.50* 0.14* 0.77* 1.00      
10 Market Volatility -0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.048 1.00     
11 Pre 90 MR 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.17* 0.18* 0.26* 0.09 0.29* 0.16* -0.16* 1.00    
12 RONW -0.04 0.31* -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.03 0.17* 0.29* 0.03 -0.01 1.00   
13 Book Value 0.15* 0.55* -0.01 0.15* 0.01 0.16* 0.03 0.29* 0.52* 0.04 0.01 -0.02 1.00  
14 Promoters Post Holding 0.18* 0.14* 0.32* 0.18* -0.11* 0.09 -0.08 -0.02 0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.18* -0.03 1.00 
 
Table 4.3 reports the correlation matrix of firm and issue-specific variables by year of 324 Indian IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and /or National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) between 
January 2000 and December 2013. Age of firm at IPO is the difference between a firm’s IPO year and its founding year, expressed in number of years. Final Issue price is the final offer price of the IPO (INR). 
Issue size is the final proceeds of the offer and is multiple of final issue price and the number of shares offered respectively (In million INR). Underwriter Reputation is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 for IPOs managed by reputed underwriters, and 0 otherwise. Retail Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by retail investors as a proportion of the total shares available to 
them for allocation. QIB Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. Underpricing 
(Initial Return) is the simple return calculated between the closing price at the end of the first day of trading and IPO issue price (in percent). Grey Market Premium is the difference between the grey market 
price and final issue price of an IPO (INR). Grey Market Price is the average of the weekly grey market price quoted for an IPO during the grey market trading period (INR). Market Volatility is measured by the 
standard deviation which is estimated using continuously compounded daily returns of the market returns, one month prior to the issue opening date. Pre 90 MR is the market return for the preceding 90 
days respectively before the IPO open date (in percent). Return on Net Worth (RONW) is based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. Book Value is the book value of the firm in INR. 
Promoters Post Holding is the percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters after the IPO. Correlations significant at the 5% level are denoted by *. 
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Descriptive Statistics by Pre- and Post-regulation regime and High-Low Grey Market 
Premium  
Summary statistics of the pre- and post-regulation regime sample firms as well 
as high-low grey market premium sample firms are given in Table 4.4.  
Pre- and post- regulation regime 
The pre- and post-regulatory regime firms are grouped depending on the 
underwriter's power to allocate shares44. The pre-regulation sample consists of firms 
that issued shares in the period when underwriters had discretionary power to allocate 
shares to institutional investors. On the other hand, the post-regulation sample 
consists of firms wherein shares to institutional investors were allocated on a 
proportionate (non-discretionary) basis.  
It is apparent from Table 4.4 that there is no significant difference in offer and 
issue characteristics between the two regimes, except that discussed. Regarding offer 
characteristics, I find that more IPOs are managed by reputed underwriters in the pre-
regulation period compared to the post-regulation period. What is interesting in this 
data is that there is a significant reduction in participation by retail investors in the 
period when underwriters do not have allocation discretion. This result differs from 
that reported by Neupane and Poshakwale (2012) who do not find any significant 
difference in retail investor participation.  
However, I find that underpricing of IPOs in the pre-regulation sample is higher 
than underpricing of the post-regulation IPOs, but is statistically insignificant. These 
results are consistent with Neupane and Poshakwale (2012) who use a large sample of 
306 observations over a longer period of time from January 2001 to December 2010. 
However, the results differ from the one reported by Bubna and Prabhala (2011) who 
                                                     
44IPOs issued during the period before the regulation change in Sept 2005, that regulated the 
discretionary allocation power of the underwriters are the pre-regulation period sample IPOs 
while the IPOs issued after the regulation change are the post-regulation period sample IPOs. 
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use a narrow period from November 2004 to November 2006 and a smaller sample 
size of 124 observations for their analysis. The Bubna and Prabhala (2011) study 
attributes the difference in initial returns to the allocation discretion that underwriters 
had in the pre-regulation period. In my sample, 87% of firms have a positive listing 
return in the pre-regulation period, compared to 66% firms in the post-regulation 
period. I interpret this difference in positive listing returns as meaning that a significant 
number of firms are priced incorrectly in the post-regulation period, compared to the 
pre-regulation period. 
Regarding firm characteristics, a higher number of recently incorporated firms 
have used the bookbuilding mechanism in the pre-regulation period, compared to 
post-regulation. Also, the RONW is higher for firms that have issued shares in the pre-
regulation period than in the post-regulation period. 
High-Low Grey Market Premium  
In Table 4.4, I compare IPOs by high-low grey market premium (GMP). This 
variable is the difference of average grey market price and issue price normalised by 
the log of issue size. I divide the sample into two sub-groups, depending on whether 
the premium is higher than the median, the High GMP group, and the group that has a 
lower premium than the median, the Low GMP group. 
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Table 4.4: IPO details as per Regulation Period and Grey Market Premium 
Variables Pre- and Post-Regulation Low-high Grey Market Premium Full 
Sample 
  Pre-Reg Post-Reg t-stat Low GMP  High GMP t-stat  
Number of IPOs 46 278  162 162   
Age of firm at IPO (Yrs.) 12.3 16.23 -1.85* 14.99 16.35 -0.91 15.67 
Issue Price (INR) 190.2 208.64 -0.57 114.17 297.87 -9.17*** 206 
Issue Size (Million INR) 4075 5091 -0.43 6068 3825 1.38 4946 
Underwriter Reputation Dummy 0.87 0.54 4.36*** 0.46 0.7 -4.51*** 0.58 
Retail Subscription 21.42 10.01 3.82*** 4.66 18.6 -7.03*** 11.63 
QIB Subscription  20.19 24.82 -0.86 8.18 40.14 -9.57*** 24.16 
Total Subscription  23.66 20.17 0.84 6.93 34.39 -11.1*** 20.66 
Underpricing 0.34 0.22 1.52 0.12 0.37 -4.99*** 0.14 
Grey Market Price (INR) 257.81 257.92 -0.01 121.92 393.88 -10.95 257.90 
Grey Market Premium (INR) 67.61 49.28 1.33 7.75 96.01 -10.65 51.88 
Market Volatility 17.83 19.89 -1.36 19.91 19.28 0.6 19.60 
Pre 90 MR 0.07 0.085 -1.02 0.06 0.11 -4.14*** 0.08 
RONW 33.04 24.72 1.7* 19.08 32.73 -4.08*** 25.90 
Book Value (INR) 37.84 47.16 -1.12 30.5 61.17 -5.49*** 45.84 
Promoters Pre Holding 78.22 82.4 -1.39 84.34 79.28 2.42** 81.81 
Promoters Post Holding 58.31 60.07 -0.73 58.17 61.48 -1.96** 59.82 
Pre-post Regulation Dummy     0.92 0.8 3.22***  
IPOs with Positive Underpricing 40 185  89 136  225 
IPOs with Negative Underpricing 6 93  73 26  99 
Table 4.4 reports the descriptive statistics of pre- and post-regulation IPOs and High and Low Grey Market Premium (GMP) IPOs of 324 Indian IPOs listed on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and/or National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) between January 2000 and December 2013, excluding firms that have come to the market 
with follow-on issues. The pre- and post-regulatory regime firms are grouped depending on whether underwriters have discretionary or proportionate allocation power. 
The pre-regulation sample consists of firms that issued shares when underwriters had the discretionary power to allocate shares to institutional investors, and the post-
regulation sample consists of firms whose shares to institutional investors are allocated on a proportionate basis. The high-low grey market premium sample consists of 
firms that have a grey market premium higher than the median, which is the High GMP sample. The IPOs that have a premium lower than the median, are the Low 
GMP sample. Age of firm at IPO is the difference between a firm’s IPO year and the founding year expressed in number of years. Final Issue price is the final offer price 
of the IPO (INR). The issue size is the final proceeds of the offer and is a multiple of final issue price and the number of shares offered respectively (In million INR). 
Underwriter Reputation is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs managed by underwriters with a good reputation, and 0 otherwise. Retail Subscription is 
a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by retail investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. QIB Subscription is a measure 
of the total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. Total Subscription is a 
measure of the total number of shares subscribed by investors as a proportion of the total number of shares offered. Underpricing (Initial Return) is the simple return 
calculated between the closing price at the end of the first day of trading and IPO issue price (in percent). Grey Market Price is the average of the weekly grey market 
price quoted for an IPO during the grey market trading period (INR). Grey Market Premium is the difference between the grey market price and final issue price of an 
IPO (INR). Market Volatility is measured by the standard deviation estimated using continuously compounded daily returns of the market returns, one month prior to 
the issue opening date. Pre 90 MR is the market return for the preceding 90 days respectively before the IPO open date (in percent). Return on Net Worth (RONW) is 
based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. Book Value is the book value of the firm in INR. Promoters Pre- and Post-holding is the percentage of 
shares held by the firm’s promoters before and after the IPO respectively. IPOs with Positive (Negative) Underpricing are the number of IPOs in a year that are listed at 
a price higher (lower) than the offer price . (1 US$ is approximately equal to 68 Indian rupees (INR)). ***, **, and * denote the difference is significance at less than 1, 5 
and 10 percent level respectively. 
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Reputed underwriters, with a good reputation, attract a higher grey market 
premium than other underwriters. The difference in subscription from different 
categories of investors between the two subsamples is significant, with the High GMP 
group having high subscription rates from each category of investors. It is noticeable 
that firms with a high issue price have high grey market premiums while firms with 
large issue size have low grey market premiums. More profitable firms have a high 
grey market premium. The underpricing for the Low GMP group is just 11% compared 
to 37% for the High GMP group. This indicates that having a high grey market premium 
will lead to higher underpricing in IPOs. There are 84% of firms with positive initial 
returns in the High GMP group and 55% of firms in the Low GMP group. It is also 
apparent in Table 4.4 that there are more firms in the post-regulation period that have 
a low grey market premium than in the pre-regulation period. 
4.5 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
4.5.1 Grey Market Price Signal and Retail Subscription  
In this section, I test the hypothesis (H2) on the influence of the grey market 
price signal on participation from retail investors in an IPO. Using an OLS regression 
framework, I test this by regressing retail subscription against grey market premium 
and a set of control variables, as described in Equation 1.  
Equation 1 
Retail Sub = β0 + β1 Grey Market Premium + β2 UW Reputation + β3 QIB Subscription + β4 Log 
Age + β5 RONW + β6 Book Value + β7 Market Volatility + β8 Pre 90 MR + β9 Promoters Post 
Holding + β10 Reg Dummy + β11  HighLowGMPD*RegDummy + ε 
The dependent variable is the subscription from retail investors (Retail Sub) and 
is measured in terms of the total number of shares subscribed by retail investors as a 
proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. The main explanatory 
variable is grey market premium and is measured by the difference of average grey 
market price and issue price, normalised by the log of the issue size.  
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Further, to examine how the relationship between retail investor participation 
and grey market premium is affected by the regulatory change, I extend the equation 
by including an interactive dummy, the multiple of the high-low grey market premium 
dummy and regulation dummy (HighLowGMPD*RegDummy). The variable high-low 
grey market premium dummy takes a value of 1 when the ratio of the grey market 
premium is normalised by log issue size at higher than the median, and 0 otherwise. 
Regulation dummy (RegDummy) is a proxy for the regulatory change that moved the 
allocation power of underwriters from discretionary to proportionate. The regulation 
dummy takes a value of 1 for the proportionate allocation regime (the post-regulation 
period) and 0 for the discretionary allocation regime (the pre-regulation period).  
I include a number of control variables in the model: underwriter reputation 
(UW Reputation), a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the underwriter has 
raised proceeds of more than 1% of the total proceeds raised by all IPOs during the 
sample period, and 0 otherwise; institutional subscription (QIB Subscription) measured 
in terms of the total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as 
a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation, age of the IPO firm 
(Log Age), measured by the log of difference between a firm’s IPO year and its 
founding year; return on net worth (RONW) and book value (Book Value) of the firm, 
based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. I also include recent 
market volatility (Market Volatility) measured by the standard deviation of the 
estimation of continuously compounded daily returns of the market returns one 
month prior to the issue opening date, recent market returns (Pre 90 MR) is the return 
of the market index for the preceding 90 days before the IPO open date. Promoters’ 
holdings post-IPO (Promoters Post Holding) is the percentage of shares owned by the 
firm's promoters after the IPO. The estimated parameters of the model are reported in 
Table 4.5 along with t statistics, which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 4.5: Grey Market Price Signal and Retail Investor Participation 
Variable Retail Subscription 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Grey Market Premium 0.750*** 0.626** 0.579** 
 (2.89) (2.42) (2.26) 
UW Reputation -2.951 -5.841*** -5.845*** 
 (-1.49) (-3.80) (-3.85) 
QIB Subscription 0.090** 0.134*** 0.112** 
 (2.14) (3.06) (2.58) 
Log Age 1.581 2.298** 2.16** 
 (1.60) (2.30) (2.19) 
RONW -0.040** -0.048** -0.058** 
 (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.55) 
Book Value -0.051** -0.041** -0.050*** 
 (-2.34) (-2.11) (-2.69) 
Market Volatility -0.173** -0.128 -0.124 
 (-2.01) (-1.55) (-1.49) 
Pre 90 MR 1.853 5.667 3.24 
 (0.34) (1.02) (0.57) 
Promoters Post Holding -0.112** -0.095* -0.103** 
 (-2.23) (-1.90) (-2.07) 
Reg Dummy   -12.829** -15.345*** 
  (-2.57) (-3.06) 
HighLowGMPD*RegDummy   5.603*** 
   (3.06) 
Constant 15.349*** 23.627*** 26.053*** 
 (3.53) (4.35) (4.72) 
 Observations 324 324 324 
F – Statistic 6.422 6.216 10.57 
Adj R2 0.266 0.311 0.321 
t statistics in parentheses   
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01   
 
In Table 4.5 the retail investors’ subscription is regressed against a set of explanatory and control variables as noted in Eq(1), using an 
OLS regression framework. This table also gives White heteroskedasticity consistent t statistics in parentheses. It gives the number of 
observations, F-statistics and Adj R-square values of the models. The models are estimated from a sample of 324 Indian IPOs over the 
period of Jan 2000 to Dec 2013, excluding firms that have come to the market with follow-on issues. Retail Subscription is the total 
number of shares subscribed by retail investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. Grey Market 
Premium is the difference between the average grey market price and final issue price of an IPO normalised by log of issue size. 
Underwriter Reputation is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs managed by reputed underwriters, and 0 otherwise. QIB 
Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares 
available to them for allocation. Age of firm at IPO (Log Age) is the log of difference between a firm’s IPO year and its founding year. 
Return on Net Worth (RONW) is based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. Book Value (Book Value) is based on the 
most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. Market Volatility (Market Volatility) is measured by the standard deviation which is 
estimated using continuously compounded daily returns of the market returns, one month prior to the issue opening date. Pre 90 MR is 
the market return for the preceding 90 days before the IPO opening date. Promoters Post Holding is the percentage of shares held by 
the firms promoters after the IPO. The Regulation Dummy (Reg Dummy) variable is a proxy for the regulatory change that shifted the 
allocation power of underwriters from discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy variable takes a value of 1 for the 
proportionate allocation regime, which is the post-regulation period and 0, for the discretionary allocation regime which is the pre-
regulation period. ***, *, and * denote the significance of the estimated parameters at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
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In Model 1, I examine the relationship between participation of retail investors 
and the grey market signal (Hypothesis H2). Based on my conceptual framework, 
discussed in Section 4.3.4, a strong grey market signal will increase participation from 
the retail investors and hence the grey market premium will be positively related to 
retail investor participation. The results from Model 1 show that the grey market 
premium (Grey Market Premium) variable, as predicted, has a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with the retail subscription (Retail Subscription) at the 1% 
significance level. 
The Indian market allows me to test the results more robustly, by controlling 
for the institutional setting that affects underwriters’ behaviour in the grey market. In 
models 2 and 3, after controlling for the regulatory change, I find that the grey market 
premium variable is positive and statistically significant, as in model 1, however, at the 
5% significance level. Thus, the evidence is that when the ratio of the grey market 
premium normalised by the log of the issue size increases by one unit, it results in 
retail investor participation increasing, on average, by a multiple of 0.58 to 0.75. 
Further, to test how regulation change affects the relationship between retail 
investor participation and grey market premium, I interact the grey market premium 
variable with the regulation dummy. The expectation is that the change in regulation 
will not affect the positive relationship between retail investor participation and grey 
market premium, and hence I expect the interactive variable to be positive. As 
expected, in Model 3 I find that the coefficient of the interactive variable 
(HighLowGMPD*RegDummy) is positive and statistically significant, supporting the 
earlier results that there is a positive relationship between retail investor participation 
and grey market signal. Hence, I can infer that in the post-regulation period, when the 
grey market premium normalised by log issue size is higher than the median, and 
therefore when the GMP Dummy takes a value of 1, it results in retail investor 
participation increasing by a multiple of 5.6 times. Therefore, consistent with the 
prediction of hypothesis 2, and the findings of previous studies (Cornelli et al., 2006; 
Neupane et al., 2014), the evidence from the results is that the stronger the grey 
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market signal given by underwriters, the higher will be the participation by retail 
investors in an IPO.  
Among the control variables, I find that in Models 2 and 3 the regulation 
dummy is negative and statistically significant. This shows that when underwriters do 
not have allocation discretion, participation from retail investors is lower by a multiple 
of 12.83 to 15.35 times. This is probably due to the grey market premium in the post-
regulation period being lower than in the pre-regulation period45, which negatively 
affects the participation of retail investors in an IPO. Thus, the overall evidence 
supports the argument that retail investor participation is dependent on grey market 
signals and when a signal is weak, it negatively affects their participation. 
I find that the coefficient of underwriter reputation (UW Reputation) is 
negative in all models and statistically significant in Models 2 and 3. The inference is 
that when underwriters with a good reputation manage an IPO, participation from 
retail investors is lower by a multiple of 2.9 to 5.8 times. The reason could be that 
reputed underwriters manage large IPOs and retail investors have an investment 
threshold, and hence the overall retail subscription is lower when the IPO is large. 
However, the evidence is in contrast to the study by Neupane et al. (2014) of Indian 
IPOs that finds no significant relationship between underwriter reputation and retail 
investor participation. 
Among the other factors that can shape the confidence of retail investors, 
institutional participation (QIB Subscription) has a statistically significant positive 
relationship with retail subscription. The results show that when the participation of 
institutional investors increases by a multiple of 1, the participation of retail investors 
increases by a multiple of around 0.09 to 0.13 times, thus depicting that retail 
investors tend to follow the subscription pattern of institutional investors. The positive 
influence of institutional subscription on retail investor participation supports the 
                                                     
45 From Summary Statistics, Table 4.4. 
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Welch (1992) informational cascades theory. Also, my finding is similar to those of 
Neupane et al. (2014) and Khurshed et al. (2009) in regard to Indian IPOs. 
Moreover, the evidence from the results relating to age of IPO firm (Log Age) 
has a statistically significant positive influence on retail investor participation. Hence, 
older firms that issue an IPO has a positive effect on the optimism of retail investors’ 
subscription resulting in an increased participation from this group of investors by a 
multiple of around 1.5 to 2.3 times. This is because retail investors have a better 
awareness of the firm’s history if it is operating for a long time and, therefore, have 
increased confidence to invest in it. However, this result is in contrast to the evidence 
by Neupane et al. (2014) who find an insignificant relationship between the age of an 
IPO firm and retail investor participation.  
The statistically significant negative coefficient of book value (Book Value) and 
return on net worth (RONW) shows that retail investor subscription is lower in firms 
that are large and operationally efficient. The possible explanation for this is that firms 
that are large and highly efficient will have IPOs that will raise higher amounts and 
therefore the relative participation of retail investors appears to be lower. The 
evidence of my study does not support the findings of Deb and Marisetty (2010) who 
find no relationship between RONW and retail investor participation. 
Promoters’ holdings in the equity capital after the IPO (Promoters Post Holding) 
has a negative relationship with retail investor participation and is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Also, past returns in the equity market (Pre 90 MR) 
do not affect retail investor participation while recent market volatility (Market 
Volatility) is negative but is statistically significant in only one of the models at the 5% 
significance level. Thus, the negative and statistically significant coefficient of market 
volatility suggests that retail investors stay away from IPOs during periods of high 
market volatility as it can result in a higher risk on their investment returns. The 
evidence on recent market volatility is similar to the findings of the Indian market by 
Neupane and Poshakwale (2012). However, my findings on recent market returns are 
not supported by Neupane and Poshakwale (2012) who find a positive relationship 
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between recent market returns and retail investor participation. Also, my results are 
different to the findings on French IPOs where Derrien (2005) finds a positive 
relationship between retail investor participation and current market conditions. 
4.5.2 Allocation Discretion and Effect on Grey Market Premium 
In this section, I investigate how the change in regulation influences the 
behavioural change in the signaling pattern of underwriters in the grey market 
(Hypothesis H4). This is done by measuring how the change in regulation affects the 
strength of the grey market signal given by underwriters. Using an OLS regression 
framework, I test this by regressing grey market premium against the measure of 
regulation change and a set of control variables, as described in Equation 2. 
Equation 2 
Grey Market Premium = β0 + β1 Log Age + β2 UW Reputation + β3 QIB Subscription + β4 RONW 
+ β5 Book Value + β6  Promoters Post Holding + β7  Pre 90 MR + β8  Reg Dummy + ε 
The dependent variable is the grey market premium (Grey Market Premium) in 
an IPO, measured in terms of the difference in average grey market price and issue 
price, normalised by the log of issue size, and the main explanatory variable is the 
regulation dummy (RegDummy). This dummy variable is a proxy for the regulatory 
change that shifted the allocation power of underwriters from discretionary to 
proportionate. The regulation dummy takes a value of 1 for the proportionate 
allocation regime, which represents the post-regulation period, and 0 for the 
discretionary allocation regime, which represents the pre-regulation period. 
I include a number of control variables: the age of the firm (Log Age) at the time of IPO, 
measured by the log of difference between a firm’s IPO year and its founding year; 
underwriter reputation (UW Reputation), a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
the underwriter has raised proceeds of more than 1% of the total proceeds raised by 
all IPOs during the sample period and 0 otherwise; participation from institutional 
investors (QIB Subscription), measured as the total number of shares subscribed by 
qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for  
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Table 4.6: Allocation Discretion and Grey Market Price Signal 
 
 
In Table 4.6 the grey market premium is regressed against a set of explanatory and control variables, as noted in Eq(2), using an OLS 
regression framework. This table also reports the White heteroskedasticity consistent t statistics in parentheses. It gives the number 
of observations, F-statistics and Adj R-square value of the model. The model is estimated over a sample of 324 IPOs over the period of 
Jan 2000 to Dec 2013, excluding firms that have come to the market with follow-on issues. The dependent variable is the Grey 
Market Premium, the difference between the average grey market price and final issue price of an IPO normalised by log of the issue 
size. Age of the firm at IPO (Log Age) is the log of difference between a firm’s IPO year and its founding year. Underwriter Reputation 
(UW Reputation) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs managed by reputed underwriters, and 0 otherwise. QIB 
Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total 
shares available to them for allocation. Return on Net Worth (RONW) is based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. 
Book Value (Book Value) is based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. Promoters Post Holding is the percentage of 
shares held by the firms promoters after the IPO. Pre 90 MR is the market return for the preceding 90 days before the IPO open date. 
Regulation Dummy (Reg Dummy) variable is a proxy for the regulatory change that altered the allocation power of underwriters from 
discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy takes a value of 1 for the proportionate allocation regime, which is the post-
regulation period and 0, for the discretionary allocation regime which is the pre-regulation period.  ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated parameters at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
 121 
 
allocation; return on net worth (RONW) and book value (Book Value), that are based 
on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. I also include promoters’ 
holdings after the IPO (Promoters Post Holding) that represent insider ownership, the 
percentage of shares held by the firm's promoters after the IPO; and recent market 
returns (Pre 90 MR) that measure the market return on index between the IPO open 
date and the preceding 90 days. The estimated parameters of the model are reported 
in Table 4.6 along with t statistics, which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
I investigate the effect of granting allocation discretion to underwriters on their 
signaling behaviour in the grey market (Hypothesis H4). The institutional setting that 
first gave discretionary allocation power to underwriters and then regulated it allows 
me to test this hypothesis by measuring the effect of the regulatory change on the 
grey market price signal.  
Based on my conceptual framework, discussed in Section 4.3.5, in the presence 
of allocation discretion, the signaling cost, as measured by the grey market premium, 
will be positively related to the regulation dummy variable, if underwriters pursue the 
objective of market benefit. In this case, underwriters communicate IPO information 
truthfully to all market participants by participating in the grey market with a true 
price signal that represents the fair value of the IPO firm.  
Alternatively, when underwriters use allocation discretion to benefit 
themselves, they are motivated to send a false grey market signal, and in this case, the 
signaling cost will be higher due to an increased grey market premium. Thus, when 
underwriters pursue the objective of their own benefit, I expect a negative relationship 
between grey market premium and the regulation dummy variable. As shown in Model 
1, I find that the grey market premium and regulation dummy (RegDummy) have a 
statistically significant negative relationship at the 1% significance level. I find that in 
the post-regulation period, the grey market premium, normalised by log issue size, 
decreases by 4.3 units. Hence, the results are consistent with the prediction of the 
rent-seeking hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter, 2003; Nimalendran et al., 2007; Reuter, 
2006), and I interpret from the estimates that underwriters use the grey market signal 
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as a tool to pursue their own interests. Thus, the evidence from the results points 
towards the possibility that underwriters use allocation discretion to form profit 
sharing relationships with institutional investors. This compensates them for higher 
signal costs that result from a false grey market price signal, hence supporting the rent-
seeking hypothesis. 
Amongst the control variables that determine the strength of the grey market 
signal, I find that underwriter reputation (UW Reputation) has a negative relationship 
with grey market premium, significant at the 5% significance level. Hence, when a 
reputed underwriter manages an IPO, the ratio of the grey market premium 
normalised by log issue size is lower by 1.8 units, compared to when the IPO is 
managed by a less reputed underwriter. This could possibly be due to reputation 
acting as a signal of IPO quality for potential retail investors, and decreasing the 
participation of reputed underwriters in the grey market. The evidence from my study, 
however, is in contrast to the findings by Brooks et al. (2014) and Krishnamurti et al. 
(2011) who do not find a significant relationship between underwriter reputation and 
grey market premium. 
When the interest shown by institutional investors (QIB Subscription) is high, 
the grey market premium increases, as demonstrated by the statistically significant 
positive sign of the coefficient. The evidence is similar to that of Brooks et al. (2014) 
and Krishnamurti et al. (2011) who find a positive relationship between institutional 
participation and grey market premium.  
Return on net worth (RONW) and book value (Book Value) are both positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. This is because efficient and 
large firms have a higher grey market premium. The variable representing promoters’ 
holdings after the IPO (Promoters Post Holding) is negative and statistically significant 
at the 10% significance level, thus representing the fact that when promoters sell a 
higher number of shares, this can result in higher liquidity and hence put pressure on 
the grey market price.  
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I also find that when the returns in the market for the past 90 days (Pre 90 MR) 
are positive, this has a positive influence on grey market premium. However, my 
results on RONW, promoters’ holdings after the IPO and returns in the market for the 
past 90 days are in contrast to the findings of Krishnamurti et al. (2011) who find no 
relationship between these variables and grey market premium. 
4.5.3 Allocation Discretion, Retail Investor Participation and IPO Underpricing 
In this section, I examine the relationships between retail investor 
participation, the grey market price signal and IPO underpricing. I also investigate how 
allocation discretion affects these relationships (Hypotheses H1 and H3). Using OLS 
regression, I model underpricing as a function of retail investor participation, grey 
market premium and regulation dummy, as explanatory variables and a number of 
control factors that are known to affect underpricing in IPOs as shown in Equation 3.  
Equation 3 
Underpricing = β0 + β1 Retail Subscription + β2 QIB Subscription + β3 UW Reputation + β4 
Log Age + β5 Log Issue size + β6  Promoters Post Holding + β7  Pre 90 MR + β8  Reg Dummy 
+ β9 Grey Market Premium + β10 RetailSub Dummy*RegDummy + β11 GMPDummy*Reg 
Dummy + ε 
I estimate four regressions, as shown in Table 4.7, for different sets of 
independent and interactive variables to assess the incremental impact of each set of 
variables on the degree of underpricing in an IPO. The dependent variable underpricing 
(Underpricing) is measured in terms of the simple return, calculated on the closing 
price of an IPO at the end of the first day of trading and IPO issue price. The 
explanatory variables are participation of retail investors (Retail Subscription), which is 
measured as the total number of shares subscribed by retail investors as a proportion 
of the total shares available to them for allocation and regulation dummy 
(RegDummy), a proxy for the regulatory change that altered the allocation power of 
underwriters from discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy takes a value 
of 1 for the proportionate allocation regime, which represents the post-regulation 
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period, and 0 for the discretionary allocation regime, which represents the pre-
regulation period. 
I include a number of control variables in the model: underwriter reputation 
(UW Reputation), a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the underwriter has 
raised proceeds of more than 1% of the total proceeds raised by all IPOs during the 
sample period, and 0 otherwise; age of the IPO firm (Log Age) which is the log of 
difference between a firm’s IPO year and the its year; the size of the issue (Log Issue 
size) which is the log of total final proceeds raised in the IPO, and is measured in terms 
of the multiple of the final issue price and the number of shares offered.  
As past research has found a relationship between grey market premium and 
underpricing, in the equation I include grey market premium as a control variable, 
measured in terms of the difference between the average grey market price and final 
issue price of an IPO. I also include recent market returns (Pre 90 MR), being the 
returns on the market index for the preceding 90 days before the IPO open date and 
promoters’ holdings in the firm after the IPO (Promoters Post Holding) that represent 
insider ownership, measured as the percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters 
after the IPO. 
To examine how regulation change affects the relationship between retail 
investor participation and underpricing, I extend Equation 3 to include interactive 
variables. First, I interact the regulation dummy with the high-low retail investor 
participation dummy (RetailSubDummy), where the variable high-low retail investor 
participation dummy takes a value of 1 for retail investor participation greater than the 
median, and 0 otherwise. Second, I interact regulation dummy with grey market 
premium dummy (GMPDummy), where the variable grey market premium dummy 
takes a value of 1 when grey market premium normalised by the log of issue size is 
higher than the median, and 0 otherwise.  
First, I test the information sharing hypothesis (Hypothesis H1). Based on my 
conceptual framework discussed in Section 4.3.1, in the presence of allocation 
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discretion to underwriters, underpricing will be positively related to the regulatory 
change dummy, if the aim of underwriters is to use the exchange of information with 
regular institutional investors to price an IPO at the fair value. However, if the 
underwriters’ objective is to pursue allocation discretion for their own benefit, 
underwriters are encouraged to use the information extracted from institutional 
investors to increase underpricing in an IPO, and I expect the relationship between 
underpricing and the regulatory change dummy to be negative. 
In Models 1 to 4, I find that underpricing has a negative relationship with the 
regulatory change dummy. However, it is statistically insignificant in all the 
specifications. This indicates that neither giving allocation discretion nor regulating it 
has any impact on the information sharing relationship between underwriters and 
institutional investors. Thus, the estimates do not support the prediction of hypothesis 
H1, and current academic literature on the bookbuilding theory, that granting 
allocation discretion results in lower underpricing in an IPO (Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990). The evidence also does not support the finding in 
the Indian IPO market by Bubna and Prabhala (2011) that concludes that when 
underwriters have allocation discretion, it results in lower underpricing in an IPO. 
Second, I investigate the relationship between retail investor participation and 
underpricing in an IPO (Hypothesis H3). Based on my conceptual framework, discussed 
in Section 4.3.4, the expectation is that participation from retail investors will have a 
positive influence on IPO underpricing. Consistent with the prediction of hypothesis H3, 
and the findings of the prior studies by Ritter and Welch (2002), Derrien (2005) and 
Neupane et al. (2014), in Models 1 to 4, I find a positive and statistically significant 
relationship, at the 1% significance level, between participation from retail investors 
(Retail Subscription) and underpricing in an IPO. I find that when the demand from 
retail investors increases on average, by a multiple of one, underpricing in an IPO 
increases by 1.1%. 
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Table 4.7: Allocation Discretion, Retail Participation and IPO Underpricing 
Variable Underpricing 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Retail Subscription 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (3.23) (3.17) (3.22) (3.21) 
QIB Subscription 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.91) (3.79) (3.37) (3.38) 
UW Reputation -0.087* -0.086* -0.086* -0.085* 
 (-1.88) (-1.86) (-1.86) (-1.88) 
Log Age 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.014 
 (0.55) (0.53) (0.58) (0.59) 
Log Issue size -0.029 -0.027 -0.030 -0.030 
 (-1.33) (-1.19) (-1.35) (-1.34) 
Promoters Post Holding -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.32) (-0.33) (-0.20) (-0.19) 
Pre 90 MR -0.136 -0.153 -0.166 -0.165 
 (-0.80) (-0.89) (-0.97) (-0.98) 
Reg Dummy -0.035 -0.053 -0.026 -0.027 
 (-0.64) (-0.86) (-0.47) (-0.47) 
RetailSubDummy*RegD  0.039   
  (0.68)   
Grey Market Premium   0.001 0.001 
   (1.22) (1.19) 
GMPDummy*RegD    -0.002 
    (-0.06) 
Constant 0.319* 0.311* 0.305* 0.306* 
 (1.76) (1.72) (1.72) (1.69) 
Observations 324 324 324 324 
F - Statistic 17.431 15.809 15.564 13.964 
Adj R2 0.350 0.349 0.350 0.348 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
 
In Table 4.7, I report the estimated parameters of the model for determinants of underpricing in IPOs by regressing it against a set of 
explanatory and control variables as noted in Eq(3), using an OLS regression framework. This table also reports the White heteroskedasticity 
consistent t statistics in parentheses. It gives the number of observations, F-statistics and Adj R-square value of the models. The models are 
estimated over a sample of 324 IPOs over the period of Jan 2000 to Dec 2013, excluding firms that have come to the market with follow-on 
issues. The dependent variable is Underpricing and is the simple return calculated between the closing price at the end of the first day of 
trading and IPO offer price (in percent). Retail Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by retail investors as a 
proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. QIB Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by 
qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. Age of firm at IPO (Log Age) is the log of 
difference between a firm’s IPO year and its founding year. The issue size is the final proceeds of the offer and is the log of a multiple of final 
issue price and the number of shares offered. Promoters Post Holding is the percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters after the IPO. 
Pre 90 MR is the market return for the preceding 90 days before the IPO open date. Regulation Dummy (Reg Dummy) variable is a proxy for 
the regulatory change that shifted the allocation power of underwriters from discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy takes a 
value of 1 for the proportionate allocation regime, which is the post-regulation period, and 0 for the discretionary allocation regime, s the 
pre-regulation period. Grey Market Premium is the difference between the average grey market price and the final issue price of an IPO 
normalised by the log of the issue size. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated parameters at 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
respectively. 
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Third, I examine the effect of the change to regulations on the relationship 
between underpricing and retail investor participation. The expectation is that the 
change will not affect the positive relationship between retail investor participation 
and underpricing and hence I expect the interactive dummy variable to be positive. In 
Model 2, the coefficient of the interactive dummy variable (RetailSubDummy*RegD), 
while being positive, is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
Hence, the inference is that in the absence of allocation discretion, the 
participation of retail investors does not influence underpricing, which is positive for 
the IPO market. This is a very significant finding. However, further research has to be 
done to understand why sentiment-driven retail investors’ participation does not have 
an effect on IPO underpricing when allocation discretion is regulated. 
Finally, I examine the relationship between the grey market price signal and 
underpricing. From past research on the grey market, the expectation is that there will 
be a positive relationship between underpricing and the grey market price signal 
(Aussenegg et al., 2006; Cornelli et al., 2006). In Model 3, I find that the coefficient of 
the grey market premium (Grey Market Premium) variable is positive, as predicted, 
however statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Hence, the results are not 
consistent with the findings of previous literature that estimate a positive relationship 
between grey market premium and underpricing of an IPO (Aussenegg et al., 2006; 
Cornelli et al., 2006; Neupane et al., 2014). This can possibly be explained by the fact 
that retail investor participation may have reduced the significance of the impact of 
the grey market premium in the model. Further, to test how the change in regulation 
affects this relationship, I introduce the interactive dummy variable in Model 4, and I 
find that the interactive dummy variable (GMPDummy*RegD) is also statistically 
insignificant. The inference is that, in contrast to past literature, I do find no statistically 
significant relationship between IPO underpricing and grey market premium.  
Amongst the control variables that affect underpricing, I find a statistically 
significant positive relationship at the 1% significance level between institutional 
participation and IPO underpricing. This evidence is in support of the findings by 
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Neupane and Thapa (2013) in regard to Indian IPOs but inconsistent with the evidence 
from Neupane et al. (2014). I find that when the demand from institutional investors 
(QIB Subscription) increases by a multiple of one, underpricing increases by 0.3% to 
0.4%. The results show that the coefficient of retail subscription is higher than that of 
the institutional subscription, pointing to the fact that retail investor participation has 
a higher influence on IPO underpricing than institutional participation does. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest that the higher the ex-ante uncertainty for an 
IPO, the higher will be the underpricing. On this basis, I expect that firms that are big in 
size, and hence come out with a large IPO, will have lower underpricing as more 
information for potential IPO investors is available in the public domain. Similarly, 
firms that have been around for longer will have lower underpricing, as more 
information is available for investors when making an investment decision. Thus, I 
expect that issue size and age of a firm will negatively influence IPO underpricing.  
However, I find that offer size (Log Issue size) and age of firm at the time of IPO 
(Log Age) are statistically insignificant in all models. The evidence is that there is no 
difference in underpricing for large or small IPOs. This result supports the conclusion of 
Bubna and Prabhala (2011) and Neupane et al. (2014) who find no relationship 
between the size of an IPO and underpricing. Moreover, my findings do not support 
the results of Krishnamurti et al. (2011) and Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010) who 
find a statistically significant negative relationship between issue size and IPO 
underpricing.  
As firm age is also insignificant in all the models in my study, I can infer that 
older firms that raise an IPO do not have less information asymmetry than younger 
firms. This result supports the evidence of Deb and Marisetty (2010) and Neupane et 
al. (2014). However, my findings are in contrast to the evidence of Bubna and Prabhala 
(2011) who find a positive relationship between age of firm and IPO underpricing. 
I find that underwriter reputation (UW Reputation) has a negative relationship 
with IPO underpricing, significant at the 10% significance level only. I can, therefore, 
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infer that when a reputed underwriter manages an IPO, it results in a reduction in 
underpricing by 8.5% to 8.7%. This indicates that underwriters with a good reputation 
are associated with pricing an IPO more correctly than other underwriters. This 
evidence supports that of Neupane and Thapa (2013) who find a negative relationship 
between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing but in contrast to the finding by 
Bubna and Prabhala (2011), who find a positive relationship between underwriter 
reputation and IPO underpricing  
In addition, I find a statistically insignificant relationship between IPO 
underpricing and recent market returns (Pre 90 MR) and also with promoters’ holdings 
after the IPO (Promoters Post Holding). The insignificant coefficient on recent market 
returns is probably because participation from investors in the IPO incorporates 
current market conditions. This evidence is in line with the findings of Neupane et al. 
(2014) on Indian IPOs. Moreover, as Indian promoters hold a controlling stake in a firm 
even after its IPO, this does not increase the uncertainty in an IPO for potential 
investors, and hence has no effect on IPO underpricing. This evidence is similar to the 
finding by Deb and Marisetty (2010). 
4.5.4 Discussion 
Contrary to expectations, the evidence from this study does not support the 
information sharing hypothesis, that giving allocation discretion to underwriters results 
in increased pre-market IPO price discovery.  
I conclude that the grey market price signal positively influences the 
investment decision of unsophisticated retail investors, who are less likely to study the 
financial soundness of firms undertaking IPOs. Therefore, the grey market price signal 
can become a dominant signal of IPO quality to attract uninformed retail investors to 
actively participate in an IPO, which results in its success.  
As the strength of the grey market price signal is higher in the pre-regulation 
period than in the post-regulation period, the evidence shows that underwriters’ 
incentives to participate in the grey market are reduced by the regulatory change. This 
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shows that the regulatory intervention minimises underwriters’ the rent-seeking 
activity. This is because underwriters cannot maintain profit sharing relationships with 
institutional investors when they lose the discretionary power to allocate shares. 
Hence, in the post-regulation regime, underwriters have fewer incentives to 
participate in the grey market, and the strength of the signal in the grey market 
becomes weak. This, in turn, has negatively affected the participation of sentiment-
driven retail investors as they are positively influenced by the grey market price signal. 
I find that underpricing is dependent on retail investor participation in an IPO 
but regulatory intervention in regard to underwriter discretion makes this relationship 
statistically insignificant. This finding is unexpected and suggests that when 
underwriters choose to provide a true signal in the post-regulation period, the grey 
market price is lower, the participation of sentiment-driven retail investors is more 
rational, and hence does not impact underpricing.  
Contrary to past research on the grey market, I find no relationship between 
grey market price and underpricing in an IPO. This finding is unexpected as previous 
academic studies have found a positive relationship between the grey market price 
and underpricing in an IPO (Aussenegg et al., 2006; Cornelli et al., 2006; Löffler et al., 
2005). In the Indian market, the possible explanation is that there is a high possibility 
that the grey market price does not reflect the fair price of an IPO. Hence, there is a 
more likelihood that the grey market price represents the participation of informed 
participants.  
However, an important observation is that when allocation discretion is 
regulated, participation from retail investors in an IPO is substantially lower. This is not 
positive for the IPO market and does not serve the objective of the regulator to 
introduce the retail investors savings to the stock market. Retail investors who do not 
invest in IPOs and equity market prefer to invest in gold46. However, I suggest that the 
                                                     
46 As a country, India is a net importer of gold, and the consequence is a significant economic 
cost to the country. 
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other possibility to explain the lower retail investor participation in IPOs could be the 
growth of the mutual fund industry in India, and a preference amongst retail investors 
to invest their savings through mutual funds.  
Overall, allocation discretion and the presence of a grey market encourages 
underwriters to increase their income by rent-seeking behaviour and establishing 
profit sharing relationships with institutional investors. Hence they are motivated to 
manipulate the grey market price signal, at the expense of the uninformed retail 
investors. Moreover, in the absence of allocation discretion, the outcome is increased 
market welfare as information is the same for all IPO investors and thereby results in 
reduced underpricing in an IPO.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The bookbuilding mechanism that provides allocation and pricing discretion to 
underwriters assists them to develop information sharing relationships with 
institutional investors. This allows both participants to share their private information 
about a firm’s valuation and pricing with each other. As institutional investors have the 
skills and resources to analyse the information made available to them, such sharing 
allows them to make more informed investment decisions. For the underwriters, the 
sharing of institutional investor’s private information assists them in setting the initial 
price band for an IPO. 
However, when setting the initial price band, underwriters may prefer not to 
engage and share their private information with small retail investors. This is because 
it is a costly exercise with no direct shared benefit. Small retail investors lack private 
information and have inadequate resources and skills to value an IPO firm. This results 
in information asymmetry between uninformed retail investors and informed 
institutional investors and can negatively affect the participation of the retail investors 
in the IPO market. For IPO success, in addition to the participation of institutional 
investors, underwriters also require the participation of retail investors. To induce 
retail investors to participate in the IPO market it is, therefore, necessary that 
underwriters reduce the information asymmetry for these investors.  
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Against this background, I contribute by applying signaling theory in the Indian 
IPO market setting to investigate how underwriters can reduce the information 
asymmetry for the uninformed retail investors and attract them to actively participate 
in IPOs. The Indian IPO market has a unique institutional framework as the market that 
first granted allocation discretion power to underwriters and then regulated it, and 
importantly, has the presence of an active grey market for IPOs. 
Using OLS regression, and information from 324 IPOs issued in the Indian IPO 
market, I investigate whether granting allocation discretion to underwriters in the 
bookbuilding mechanism facilitates higher information extraction from institutional 
investors with lower underpricing in an IPO. I also address the issue of whether 
underwriters can use the grey market as a signaling environment to signal IPO quality 
to uninformed retail investors and influence them to actively participate in an IPO. 
Additionally, by measuring the strength of the grey market price signal, I investigate 
whether allocation discretion affects the signaling behaviour of the underwriters in the 
grey market as a function of their choice to share information with IPO investors. 
Finally, I examine the influence of retail investor participation on IPO underpricing and 
the effect of the regulatory intervention on this relationship. 
The following conclusions emerge.  
First, I find no support for the argument that granting allocation discretion to 
underwriters results in higher information production from institutional investors, with 
a consequent fair value pricing for an IPO.  
Second, in deciding their participation, retail investors are positively influenced 
by a price signal from the grey market. The outcome is reduced information 
asymmetry for these investors about an IPO firm. This finding supports the conclusion 
that the grey market price signal can be a dominant signal of IPO quality for retail 
investors, thereby influencing retail investors to actively participate in an IPO, which 
influences its success. This represents a significant contribution to the literature. 
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The third conclusion is that regulating the allocation power of underwriters 
reduces their incentive to remain active in the grey market. Thus, in a setting where 
there is a presence of an active grey market for IPOs, this research supports previous 
findings that underwriters use allocation discretion to attain higher benefits by way of 
rent-seeking activity. This is an important and significant contribution to the literature.  
Fourth, the evidence suggests a positive relationship between retail investor 
participation and underpricing in IPOs. However, when regulatory intervention 
withdraws allocation power, the relationship is statistically insignificant. This finding 
has implications for the IPO market where underpricing of an IPO does not appear to 
be the outcome of the participation of sentiment-driven retail investors. Finally, in 
contrast to past research on the grey market, the evidence finds no relationship 
between grey market price and underpricing in an IPO. This is an important 
contribution to the literature as the first study that is in disagreement with previous 
grey market studies. 
Overall, I do not support the information sharing hypothesis that allocation 
discretion to underwriters is beneficial to the IPO market. On the contrary, I find 
significant evidence that granting allocation discretion to underwriters, and the 
presence of a grey market, encourages underwriters to manipulate the grey market for 
their own benefit. This is at the expense of uninformed retail investors. Therefore, the 
results support the hypothesis of rent-seeking behaviour by underwriters, facilitated 
by the presence of an active grey market for IPOs. In the absence of underwriter 
allocation discretion, the outcome is that all IPO investors share similar information 
about an IPO firm. This results in less underpricing in an IPO and benefits all market 
participants. 
My results generate important policy implications. Regulating the allocation 
power of underwriters is generally positive from the welfare perspective of market 
participants. An outcome recommendation is that regulatory intervention will be more 
effective when a regulator simultaneously regulates the grey market. This is the case in 
India where there are high numbers of retail investors with a low level of financial 
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literacy, and manipulation of the grey market has the potential to affect the savings 
return of these small investors.  
As participation from retail investors is negatively affected by the regulatory 
change from discretionary to proportionate, the regulator can introduce a safety net in 
IPOs for these investors, thereby encouraging their participation in the IPO market. To 
increase participation, the regulator might consider introducing the online submission 
of bids in an IPO from mobile devices. This can increase the involvement of small retail 
investors, given the high subscriber base of mobile users in India (as shown in Figure 
4.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Indian Mobile Subscribers 
Source : http://trak.in/tags/business/2017/01/10/new-mobile-connections-stat-reliance-jio-
record/ 
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Appendix 1 
Table 4.8: List of Underwriters and Underwriter Reputation (Study 2) 
No Name of Underwriter No. of 
Deals 
Proceeds 
raised (INR) 
% of Total 
Sum raised 
UW 
Reputation 
1 Kotak Mahindra Cap. Co. Ltd  65 242254 15.12 1 
2 Enam Financial Cons. Pvt. Ltd.  75 213184 13.30 1 
3 Citigroup Global Capital Markets India Pvt. 
Ltd 
22 131350 8.20 1 
4 DSP Merill Lynch Ltd 32 131271 8.19 1 
5 ICICI Securities 45 111836 6.98 1 
6 SBI Capital Market Ltd. 40 94092 5.87 1 
7 JM Morgan Stanley Ltd 26 82462 5.15 1 
8 Deutsche Equities (India) Pvt. Ltd 9 72391 4.52 1 
9 Morgan Stanley Company India Pvt. Ltd 10 69935 4.36 1 
10 JM Financial Cons. Pvt. Ltd 21 53859 3.36 1 
11 UBS Securities India Pvt. Ltd 10 51238 3.20 1 
12 J P Morgan India Pvt. Ltd 10 48842 3.05 1 
13 ABN AMRO Securities (India) Pvt. Ltd 4 30498 1.90 1 
14 IDFC - SSKI Ltd 12 24861 1.55 1 
15 Edelweiss Capital Ltd 22 24689 1.54 1 
16 HSBC Securities & Capital Markets (India) 
Pvt. Ltd 
6 23136 1.44 1 
17 IDBI Capital Market Services Limited 16 18548 1.16 1 
18 Lehman Brothers Sec. Pvt. Ltd 2 13791 0.86 0 
19 Macquarie India Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd 2 12621 0.79 0 
20 Axis Bank Ltd 23 12265 0.77 0 
21 IL & FS Investmart Ltd. 19 11656 0.73 0 
22 Anand Rathi Advisors Ltd. 18 10903 0.68 0 
23 Almondz Global Securities Ltd. 11 9024 0.56 0 
24 INDIA INFOLINE Ltd. 5 8434 0.53 0 
25 Credit Suisse Securities (India) Pvt. Ltd 2 7372 0.46 0 
26 Karvy Investor Services India Ltd. 21 7258 0.45 0 
27 Keynote Corporate Service Ltd. 15 6773 0.42 0 
28 Saffron Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd. 6 5339 0.33 0 
29 Chartered Capital and Investment Ltd. 10 5072 0.32 0 
30 CENTRUM CAPITAL Ltd. 10 4831 0.30 0 
31 Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Pvt. Ltd 2 4743 0.30 0 
32 Nomura Financial Advisory and Securities 
(India) Pvt. Ltd 
2 4678 0.29 0 
33 SREI Capital Markets Ltd. 9 4322 0.27 0 
34 RBS Equities (India) Ltd. 2 4154 0.26 0 
35 Allianz Securities Ltd. 8 4119 0.26 0 
36 Motilal Oswal Investment Advisors Pvt. Ltd 5 3926 0.24 0 
37 SPA MERCHANT BANKERS Ltd 4 3108 0.19 0 
38 COLLINS STEWART INGA Pvt. Ltd. 6 2970 0.19 0 
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39 Equirus Capital Pvt. Ltd. 2 2616 0.16 0 
40 D & A Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. 3 2119 0.13 0 
41 Intensive Fiscal Services Pvt. Ltd. 3 2117 0.13 0 
42 Ashika Capital Ltd. 6 2035 0.13 0 
43 Barclays Securities (India) Pvt. Ltd. 1 1859 0.12 0 
44 Vivro Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. 2 1431 0.09 0 
45 COMFORT SECURITIES Pvt. Ltd. 2 1374 0.09 0 
46 YES Bank Ltd.  2 1365 0.09 0 
47 BOB Capital Markets Ltd. 2 1245 0.08 0 
48 PL Capital Markets Pvt. Ltd. 4 1235 0.08 0 
49 CLSA India Ltd. 1 1096 0.07 0 
50 Avendus Capital Pvt. Ltd. 1 1087 0.07 0 
51 PNB Investment Services Ltd. 2 967 0.06 0 
52 Corporate Strategic Allianz Ltd. 3 935 0.06 0 
53 Microsec Capital Ltd. 3 785 0.05 0 
54 Antique Capital Markets Pvt. Ltd 1 757 0.05 0 
55 Arihant Capital Markets Ltd. 2 716 0.04 0 
56 Aryaman Financial Services Ltd. 1 600 0.04 0 
57 Atherstone Capital Markets Ltd. 1 599 0.04 0 
58 Allbank Finance Ltd. 2 544 0.03 0 
59 Solomon Smith Barney India Pvt. Ltd. 1 525 0.03 0 
60 VC Corporate Advisors Pvt. Ltd 1 488 0.03 0 
61 Onelife Capital Advisors Ltd. 1 458 0.03 0 
62 India Capital Markets Pvt. Ltd. 1 380 0.02 0 
63 NEXGEN Capitals Ltd. 1 375 0.02 0 
64 Elara Capital (India) Pvt. Ltd. 1 356 0.02 0 
65 Ambit Corporate Finance Pvt. Ltd. 1 346 0.02 0 
66 Bajaj Capital Ltd. 2 341 0.02 0 
67 Fortune Financial Services (India) Ltd. 1 335 0.02 0 
68 Indian Overseas Bank 1 300 0.02 0 
69 Sobhagya Capital Options Ltd. 2 297 0.02 0 
70 RR Financial Consultants Ltd. 1 295 0.02 0 
71 IndBank Merchant Banking Services Ltd. 1 295 0.02 0 
72 Darashaw & Company Pvt. Ltd. 1 254 0.02 0 
73 Canara Bank- Merchant Banking Division 1 190 0.01 0 
74 A.K. Capital Services Ltd. 1 142 0.01 0 
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Abstract 
The competitiveness of the IPO underwriting market suffers from the 
concentration of restricted mandates in the hands of a limited number of underwriters 
with good reputations. Academic research has focused extensively on the relationship 
between underpricing and the influence of an individual underwriter. However, we 
have only scant research on the effect of IPO syndication on underpricing. 
Nevertheless, most IPOs are managed by underwriters operating as an IPO syndicate. 
Here, I contribute to an analysis of underwriting syndicates by examining 329 IPOs 
issued in the Indian IPO market in the period 2000-10 that were made subject to either 
a discretionary or a proportionate allocation regime. 
I find that the underwriting market in India is highly concentrated and is 
dominated by a few large and reputable underwriters who have ongoing relationships 
amongst themselves to manage IPOs. This highlights a potential entry barrier for new 
underwriters. I find that for underwriters that form large syndicates when they do not 
have a high reputation, participation from investors is weak, and the issue size is large. 
Also, I do not find any evidence that the motivation for underwriters to form a 
syndicate is due to market risk sharing or price manipulation. I conclude that 
underwriters syndicate to share the inventory risk of an IPO.  
When allocation discretion is regulated, and the risk of managing an IPO is high, 
I observe that the size of an underwriting syndicate is smaller. However, the results 
support the role of institutional subscription acting as a mediating factor for reputable 
underwriters to syndicate. Able to share the risk in this way, the syndicate partnership 
benefits the issuer with lower underpricing. Overall, I conclude that regulatory 
intervention is positive for market welfare due to lower underpricing. I also find that in 
the absence of allocation discretion, syndication by reputable underwriters acts as an 
effective medium of discretion for higher information and risk sharing.  
Keywords: Allocation Discretion, IPO Syndicate, Institutional Investors, Underwriter 
Reputation, Reputation-based Syndication, IPO Underpricing. 
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Allocation Discretion, Information Sharing and Underwriting 
Syndicate 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Academic research on underpricing in initial public offers (IPOs) finds that even 
in a competitive industry, where a significant number of underwriters compete 
aggressively amongst themselves for business, many IPOs are underpriced (Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986; Ritter, 1991)47. Moreover, Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that with high 
levels of underpricing, reputable underwriters are not losing business to other 
underwriters. This suggests that the IPO underwriting industry is inefficient. In a 
flourishing market with many active underwriters, we might have anticipated that 
underpricing should not exist.  
Prior research has focused on discussing underpricing in relation to how an 
individual underwriter operates in the IPO market. However, in the literature, less 
attention has been given to discussing how underpricing is affected from the viewpoint 
of an underwriting syndicate. This is despite the fact that most successful IPOs have 
been managed by underwriters as an underwriting syndicate (Corwin and Schultz, 
2005).  
Syndication plays an important financial intermediation role for the 
underwriters in the security underwriting market. It influences the functions that the 
individual underwriter performs, such as information production, certification, 
marketing and placement of shares to potential investors. Thus, the primary objective 
of this study is to contribute to the academic literature by developing a better 
understanding of underwriter syndication in the IPO market by exploring questions 
that have to date not been closely examined in the IPO literature.  
                                                     
47 Underpricing (Initial Return) is defined as the percentage change in the price of the share at 
the end of the first day of trading and the IPO offer price. 
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Past studies have investigated the relationship between the size of an 
underwriting syndicate and the risk of an IPO. However, the literature has not explored 
the implications of syndication for price manipulation. Here, I investigate whether 
syndication is motivated by risk mitigation or price manipulation.   
The academic literature identifies the risk of an IPO as the external market 
specific risk (IPO Risk) that the underwriter faces when managing an IPO. In this study, 
I propose an additional risk that underwriters face, namely, the underwriter’s specific 
internal risk (inventory risk). This risk refers to whether underwriters can successfully 
sell an IPO. Thus, I examine whether forming an IPO syndicate is likely to be motivated 
by market risk and/or inventory risk sharing.  
The academic literature has investigated the influence of underwriter 
reputation on IPO underpricing. However, only scant research, at most, has explored 
how syndication by a reputable underwriter affects IPO underpricing. I address this by 
investigating the effect of reputation-based syndication on IPO underpricing.  
In this study, I address these questions related to underwriter syndication by 
taking advantage of the unique institutional framework in the Indian IPO market. This 
market first granted discretionary power to underwriters to allocate shares to 
institutional investors and then regulated such discretion.  
In this context, I make the following contributions to the academic literature.  
First, I identify the objectives of an underwriter syndicate. Traditional risk 
sharing theory states that syndication acts as a tool to reduce the risk of managing an 
IPO for syndicate members (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; Mandelker and Raviv, 1977). 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) and Corwin and Schultz (2005) define IPO risk as the 
external market-specific risk (IPO Risk) that underwriters face while managing an IPO. 
Here, I recognise, as an additional risk for underwriters, the internal underwriter-
specific risk (inventory risk). This risk refers to whether underwriters can successfully 
sell an IPO and is a function of the underwriter's ability to price an IPO correctly, the 
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size of an IPO, participation from the investing community and the reputation of the 
underwriter managing the IPO. These issues remain undeveloped in the academic 
literature. However, they represent important issues, as inventory risk represents an 
underwriter’s ability to sell an IPO successfully. Such ability flows from an 
underwriter’s characteristics and relationships with a network of investors, key to 
determining IPO success in a relationship-intensive business. In this study, I contribute 
to the literature by investigating whether the size of an underwriting syndicate is a 
function of IPO risk and/or inventory risk. 
Second, traditional risk sharing theory holds that underwriters form a syndicate 
for market risk sharing, but later findings find no relationship between market risk 
sharing and the number of underwriters in a syndicate (Corwin and Schultz, 2005; 
Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). Fu and Li (2007) find there is a higher economic benefit for 
underwriters to work in syndicates when they seek to achieve rent-seeking outcomes.  
In this study, I propose that a motivation for underwriters to form an IPO 
syndicate can be price manipulation. The study by Corwin and Schultz (2005) measures 
syndication from the perspective of market risk sharing only. I contribute to the 
literature by extending their study and exploring the extent to which underwriters 
appear to be forming an IPO syndicate for price manipulation. Thus, I investigate 
whether syndication is motivated by risk sharing or, alternatively, by price 
manipulation. 
Third, research has established that the granting of allocation discretion to 
underwriters in the bookbuilding mechanism allows them to extract private positive 
information relating to the pricing of an IPO from informed institutional investors 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 
2002). It follows that when regulators disallow allocation discretion and impose 
proportionate allocation on institutional investors, this can have adverse implications 
on the information sharing relationship between underwriters and institutional 
investors. This is because the mutually beneficial relationship can no longer be 
sustained as underwriters cannot favour institutional investors by way of higher 
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allocation of underpriced shares as a reward for sharing private price related 
information (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). The likely outcome is that the IPO is less 
well priced in relation to a fair value. Thus, as shown in Figure 5.1 Section A, I 
investigate the effect of granting allocation discretion to underwriters on IPO 
underpricing and thereafter regulating such discretion.  
Fourth, when underwriters lack allocation discretion, in addition to having 
reduced information sharing with regular informed institutional investors, there is an 
increased uncertainty associated with subscription from institutional investors in IPOs 
(Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995). This has adverse implications for underwriters in 
managing an IPO, and their overall higher risk can adversely affect IPO performance. 
Thus, as shown in Figure 5.1 Section C, when regulators enforce constraints on the 
discretionary allocation power of the underwriters, I examine the effectiveness of 
syndication as a substitute mechanism for information and risk sharing, by creating an 
indirect medium of discretion for the underwriters.  
 
Figure 5.1: Information Sharing and Syndication Hypotheses 
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Finally, I investigate the relationship between reputation-based syndication and 
IPO pricing, Also, as shown in Figure 5.1 Section D, I examine whether the motive for 
reputation-based syndication is information sharing or price manipulation when 
underwriters do not have allocation discretion. 
This study contributes to the wide-ranging literature on IPOs and financial 
intermediation and the growing body of literature on IPO syndication. The contribution 
lies in the investigation of the formation of underwriting syndicates and the 
explanation of the role of syndicates in the pricing of IPOs. To this end, I take 
advantage of the distinct institutional setting that is the Indian IPO market to examine 
the effectiveness of syndication as a substitute mechanism for information and risk 
sharing when the discretionary allocation power of the underwriters is regulated.  
I examine 329 IPOs issued during the period January 2000 to December 2010 in 
the Indian IPO market. The following findings emerge. First, I find that the underwriting 
market in India is highly concentrated with long-standing relationships amongst top 
well-performing underwriters who manage IPOs. For this reason, it is difficult for new 
underwriters to break into the business in a sustained manner. The data reveals that 
underwriters who do not have a high reputation, and hence a restricted network of 
regular investors, find it challenging to obtain regular business to enhance their 
sustainability in the underwriting industry.  
Second, I find that when participation from investors is low, issue size is large 
and underwriters are more likely to form a syndicate with other underwriters. By doing 
so, they aim to share inventory risk and gain higher certification from investors.  
Third, my results do not support the hypothesis that underwriters form large 
syndicates for the purpose of either risk sharing or price manipulation. 
Fourth, I find that the evidence does not support the information sharing 
hypothesis that discretion in allocation leads to a higher exchange of information 
between underwriters and institutional investors. The inference is that allowing 
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allocation discretion to underwriters does not improve the efficiency of price discovery 
in the IPO process. I also infer that there is no evidence to support rent-seeking activity 
by underwriters when they have allocation discretion. Thus, my findings do not 
support the contention that underwriters exploit allocation power for their private 
material benefit.  
Fifth, I find that in the absence of allocation discretion, underwriters are less 
likely to form a syndicate when the overall risk of managing an IPO has increased. This 
is counter-intuitive to my hypothesis. The explanation may be that when the risk of 
managing an IPO is high, it is less lucrative for underwriters to remain active in the 
business when measured from the perspective of a risk-return trade-off. Hence, 
underwriters without allocation discretion are less likely to remain active in forming an 
IPO syndicate with their peers. 
Sixth, I find no relationship between syndication of reputable underwriters and 
participation from institutional investors. However, when allocation discretion is 
regulated, and reputable underwriters form a syndicate, reputation has a positive 
influence on  participation by institutional investors. Thus, reputation-based 
syndication can mitigate higher risk for underwriters, due to an additional certification 
from institutional investors. Moreover, I find evidence that in the absence of allocation 
discretion, reputation-based syndication results in higher information production, and 
thereby lower underpricing.  
Taken together, the evidence reveals that the motivation for underwriters to 
syndicate is neither market risk sharing nor price manipulation. Rather, the findings 
support the intuitive conclusion that syndication occurs in order to reduce the 
inventory risk of underwriters. This is an indirect risk mitigation strategy. When 
underwriters do not have a high reputation, subscription from potential investors will 
be unpredictable, for which situation, syndication can mitigate risk. Thus, risk 
mitigation is supported, while contradicting traditional risk sharing theory that 
measures risk from the perspective of market-specific IPO risk only. 
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The results suggest that in the absence of allocation discretion, reputation-
based syndication is conducted by underwriters to gain higher certification. This 
influences institutional investors to participate in an IPO, with an overall positive effect 
on market welfare due to less underpricing. These results also partially support the risk 
mitigation hypothesis. The implication is that when allocation discretion is regulated, 
syndication by a reputable underwriter is likely to provide an indirect form of 
discretion by way of higher information production and risk sharing. The negative 
aspect of regulating allocation discretion is that many small and non-reputable 
underwriters leave the IPO market. The outcome is then likely to be lower competition 
in the underwriting industry, with a negative effect on the efficiency of the IPO market. 
The structure of this study takes the form of eight sections, including this 
introductory section. Section 5.2 begins by discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of allocation discretion on IPO pricing and develops the information 
sharing hypothesis. Section 5.3 details the regulatory intervention that controls the 
discretionary allocation power of underwriters, while Section 5.4 examines the 
academic literature related to underwriter syndication and develops the related 
hypothesis. Section 5.5 describes the data sources and variables used in this study. 
Section 5.6 summarises the descriptive statistics and introduces syndication in the 
context of the Indian IPO market setting. Section 5.7 presents the empirical findings of 
the research, and Section 5.8 concludes.  
5.2 Information Sharing Hypothesis and Related Literature 
In this section, I debate the positive and negative effects on IPO pricing of 
granting allocation discretion to underwriters and develop the information sharing 
hypothesis. In Section 4.3.1 I examined the information sharing hypothesis when there 
is a presence of a grey market for IPOs. In this study, I again test the information 
sharing hypothesis, but in a different setting. 
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5.2.1 Allocation Discretion, Information Sharing and IPO Pricing 
One of the key tasks for underwriters when taking a firm to the share market is 
to price its IPO correctly, at the fair value. To achieve this, underwriters have to 
acquire pricing information from prospective informed investors that adds to the 
information they hold about the IPO firm.  
The bookbuilding mechanism, which grants flexibility to underwriters over 
share allocation and pricing of an IPO, provides them with an efficient way to motivate 
informed institutional investors to share their truthful information with underwriters. 
By developing a theoretical model that discusses information sharing and underpricing, 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) find that bookbuilding allows underwriters to extract 
pricing-relevant information from informed institutional investors. This favourable 
private information extracted from informed institutional investors assists 
underwriters to price the IPO correctly, at the fair value. Thus, this results in lower 
underpricing in an IPO and maximises the issuer's expected proceeds.  
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) and Spatt and Srivastava (1991) support the 
findings of the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) study by concluding that bookbuilding 
assists underwriters in acquiring more information from informed institutional 
investors and hence results in an IPO being priced at a fair value. Moreover, a study by 
Sherman and Titman (2002) shows that when underwriters are given allocation and 
pricing discretion, they can influence informed investors to reveal their private 
information about an IPO’s pricing and demand. Thus, the bookbuilding mechanism 
that grants allocation and pricing discretion to underwriters allows them to obtain 
information from informed institutional investors that assists them to set the 
preliminary offer price range and arrive at the final offer price in an IPO. 
In contrast to the argument that granting discretionary allocation power to 
underwriters improves price discovery in the IPO mechanism, the academic literature 
finds that underwriters use allocation and pricing discretion to enrich themselves and 
their friendly institutional investors (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). This is possible by 
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increasing underpricing in an IPO and simultaneously developing profit sharing 
relationships with regular institutional investors. This allows underwriters to boost 
their income and achieve higher compensation by way of the underwriting fee they 
receive from the issuer on successful completion of the IPO. Thus, when underwriters 
collude with friendly institutional investors by pursuing rent-seeking activity and 
increasing underpricing in an IPO, it can result in them having higher profits. However, 
this is to the potential detriment of the IPO firm and other IPO investors. 
Aggarwal et al. (2002) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) support this view by 
finding that when underwriters have allocation discretion, regular institutional 
investors are given higher share allocations in IPOs that are more underpriced, in 
comparison to IPOs that have been less underpriced. This points to the fact that higher 
profits to friendly institutional investors in this wealth transferring mechanism are 
dependent on the discretionary allocation power of underwriters.  
Goldstein et al. (2011) find that paying commissions to an underwriter’s 
brokerage arm is an easy way to return the higher profits received by institutional 
investors. The commission is generated through trading high volume liquid stocks and 
is a reward to underwriters from regular institutional investors for giving favourable 
allocations in underpriced IPOs to them (Nimalendran et al., 2007). Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2002) also support these findings by reasoning that there is a strong positive 
correlation between IPO allocations and the commission business of underwriters.  
Reuter (2006), who investigated the number of shares allocated to mutual fund 
schemes in firms that have come out with an IPO, finds that the strength of the 
business relationship between the mutual fund house and the underwriter is a 
significant determinant for receiving the allocation of underpriced shares. 
Furthermore, the study by Jenkinson and Jones (2009) supports the argument that the 
broking relationship between underwriters and institutional investors is the most 
important factor influencing the allocation of shares by underwriters.  
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In support of the academic research regarding the relationship between IPO 
allocations and commissions paid by institutional investors, regulatory investigations in 
the US market by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2002 indicate that 
underwriters allocate shares to institutional investors depending on the basis of the 
trading commissions generated by these investors. Taken together, academic studies 
and regulatory investigations provide valuable insights into the downside of giving 
allocation power to underwriters. Thus, when underwriters have allocation discretion, 
they serve their own interests and the interests of their regular institutional investors 
by underpricing the IPO more than required (Loughran and Ritter, 2002).This negatively 
affects the efficiency of the IPO market. 
According to academic studies 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Sherman and 
Titman, 2002) and the success of the 
bookbuilding mechanism for issuing IPO 
shares (Jagannathan et al., 2010), I expect 
that underwriters use allocation discretion to 
price an IPO at the fair value, and the 
outcome is increased market welfare from 
less underpricing. Thus, as shown in Figure 
5.1 Section A, I conceptualise that giving allocation discretion to underwriters leads to 
lower underpricing in an IPO.  
These arguments lead to the first hypothesis. 
H1:  When underwriters have allocation discretion, it will result in lower 
underpricing in an IPO.  
5.3 Regulatory Intervention in Allocation Discretion  
In the previous section, I discuss the positive and negative effects of giving 
allocation discretion to underwriters, and its influence on IPO pricing. In this section, I 
 
Figure 5.1 Section A: Information 
Sharing Hypothesis 
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discuss the allocation mechanisms in the Indian IPO market for the issue of IPO shares 
through the bookbuilding mechanism48. 
When bookbuilding was introduced in the Indian market in 1999, it did not 
exactly replicate the allocation processes followed in most other IPO markets in the 
world. According to the initial guidelines issued by the regulatory authority, Securities 
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)49, the allocation of shares to institutional investors 
was done on a discretionary basis. However, allocation of shares to retail investors and 
non-institutional investors (high net worth individual investors), was done on a non-
discretionary (proportionate) basis.  
To ensure that the discretion granted to underwriters was not exploited, in 
Sept 2005, through its Disclosure and Investor Protection (DIP) guidelines50, SEBI 
regulated the discretionary allocation power of underwriters to allocate shares to 
institutional investors. In the new regulation regime, allocation of shares to 
institutional investors is done on a proportionate basis, and underwriters have no 
control over who gets how many shares. Hence, after this regulatory intervention, 
allocation of shares to all categories of investors is done on a proportionate basis. 
However, during both regimes51, one common factor is that underwriters still retain 
discretion in regard to pricing flexibility. This gives them the power to set the initial 
price band and the final offer price in an IPO.  
5.4 Underwriter Syndication and Related Literature 
In this section, I discuss the effect of regulating allocation discretion on the risk to 
underwriters managing an IPO and argue that forming an IPO syndicate can create an 
                                                     
48 Chapter 2 gives a detailed discussion of key institutional features of the Indian IPO market. 
 
49 SEBI (DIP) guidelines 2000 Chapter XI clause 11.3.2(iv) 
 
50 SEBI Circular No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/DIP/16/2005/19/9 dated September 19, 2005. 
 http://www.sebi.gov.in/guide/DipGuidelines2009.pdf 
 
51 The period before Sept 2005 is the pre-regulation period and after, is the post regulation 
period. 
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indirect discretion for the underwriters. Further, I introduce the literature related to 
the factors that affect the formation of underwriting syndicates. I explore the 
motivation for underwriters to form an IPO syndicate by investigating whether it is due 
to risk mitigation or price manipulation. Finally, I examine the outcome of reputation-
based syndication on IPO underpricing and the effect of the Indian regulatory 
intervention on this relationship. 
5.4.1 Regulating Allocation Discretion and Underwriter Syndication 
In this sub-section, I concentrate on discussing the disadvantages to 
underwriters when allocation discretion is regulated and explore whether syndication 
can create an indirect discretion for the underwriters and develop the syndication 
hypothesis. 
 
 Figure 5.1 Section C: Syndication Hypothesis 
The overall risk of managing an IPO increases for underwriters when regulators 
enforce constraints on underwriters in the allocation of shares to institutional 
investors by changing the allocation process from discretionary to proportionate. This 
increased risk is a result of their inability in developing long-term information sharing 
relationships with regular institutional investors. This leads to reduced information 
gathering from regular institutional investors and can negatively affect the 
underwriter's ability to price an IPO correctly at the fair value (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 
2002). The argument is that in this environment regular institutional investors do not 
gain any benefit from sharing private price and demand information with 
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underwriters. This is because underwriters cannot compensate these investors with a 
larger allocation of underpriced shares, as they do not control allocations. Hence, such 
restrictions have the potential to increase the risk for underwriters managing an IPO.  
Also, regulating allocation discretion has an undesirable influence on all future 
IPOs managed by these underwriters, as regular institutional investors may not act 
support them by participating in overpriced and undersubscribed IPOs (Hanley and 
Wilhelm, 1995). This leads to more unpredictability in subscriptions from regular 
institutional investors.  
These factors increase the likelihood of failure of an IPO. Hence, when 
allocation discretion is regulated, lower information sharing with regular institutional 
investors, and higher uncertainty in participation from these investors, results in 
increased overall risk for underwriters. Thus, imposing constraints on the discretionary 
allocation power of underwriters can interfere with the efficiency of the IPO market 
mechanism. 
Under these conditions, underwriters need an alternative mechanism that 
stimulates information sharing between themselves and regular institutional investors. 
This mechanism should also reduce the uncertainty associated with the subscription 
from institutional investors, thus lowering the risk for underwriters managing an IPO. 
Syndication: A Substitution Mechanism in the Absence of Allocation Discretion   
In this study, I suggest that forming an underwriting syndicate can act as a 
substitute mechanism for stimulating information production between underwriters 
and institutional investors (Corwin and Schultz, 2005). Wilson (1968) defines a 
syndicate as a group of individuals who come together to make a joint decision under 
uncertainty that is expected to result in a payoff to be jointly shared among the group 
members.  
The early work on underwriting syndicates in the IPO market suggests that 
large syndicates are formed as a tool for risk sharing (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; 
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Mandelker and Raviv, 1977). When there are more underwriters in a syndicate, the 
outcome is a lower risk of exposure for each syndicate member as the risk is shared. 
This is because a higher number of underwriters in a syndicate can result in enhanced 
information production and sharing, from underwriters’ individual networks of regular 
institutional investors. Also, a syndicate with a higher number of members can 
facilitate wider access to investors with its broader distribution network (Pichler and 
Wilhelm, 2001). This, in turn, reduces the uncertainty associated with participation for 
investors, resulting in a lower risk for the syndicate members. 
Hence, when allocation discretion is regulated, syndication can stimulate 
information sharing and create an indirect form of discretion for underwriters to 
manage the increased overall risk of managing an IPO. This also gives underwriters the 
opportunity to maintain their income, and the ability to enhance their sustainability in 
the IPO underwriting industry. Thus, as shown in Figure 5.1 Section C, when the 
allocation power of underwriters is regulated, resulting in a potentially higher overall 
risk in managing an IPO, the size of an underwriting syndicate will be large. 
This leads to the second hypothesis. 
H2: In the absence of allocation discretion to underwriters, there is more 
likelihood of a large underwriting syndicate. 
5.4.2 Determinants of Underwriting Syndicate   
In the previous sub-section, I discuss how in the absence of allocation 
discretion the overall risk of managing an IPO increases for underwriters, and there is 
more likelihood of a large underwriting syndicate. In this sub-section, I discuss the 
factors that influence the size of the underwriting syndicate and investigate whether 
underwriters form a large syndicate for market risk and/or inventory risk sharing. 
The traditional risk sharing theory on underwriter syndication is that 
syndication acts as a tool to reduce the risk of managing an IPO for syndicate members 
(Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; Mandelker and Raviv, 1977). The literature defines risk as 
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the external environment market-specific risk (IPO Risk) which is measured by the 
volatility in the IPO price after listing. Hence, the traditional risk sharing theory is that 
underwriters form a syndicate to mitigate the market-specific IPO risk, over which they 
have no control. 
In this research, I propose that the risk for the underwriters managing an IPO 
can be of two types. First, as discussed in the previous paragraph, is the market-
specific IPO risk. The second type of risk is the internal, underwriter-specific inventory 
risk, one that has not been explored in the academic literature. Inventory risk refers to 
whether an underwriter can successfully sell an IPO. This risk may depend on the 
market risk of an IPO and on the characteristics of the underwriters managing the IPO. 
As the market risk of an IPO is the same for any underwriter who manages an IPO, in 
this study, I focus on the theory of inventory risk, which is a function of underwriter-
specific characteristics. Inventory risk depends on underwriter reputation, the size of 
an IPO and participation from investors. For underwriters to lower inventory risk, they 
have to price an IPO correctly, at the fair value, so that potential investors are induced 
to participate in the IPO. In addition, underwriters must have a strong distribution 
network that gives them access to potential investors to whom they can successfully 
market the IPO.  
Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) claim that when underwriters form a syndicate, it 
promotes the development of information and distribution networks. This view is 
supported by Corwin and Schultz (2005), who find strong evidence of information 
production by individual syndicate members, which is then exchanged amongst them. 
Hence, when a syndicate size is large, there is more information extraction as each 
underwriter has access to a different set of institutional investors. This information is 
then exchanged amongst the syndicate members to price an IPO at the fair value. 
Moreover, when there is a high number of members in a syndicate, it leads to sharing 
of marketing effort. This is beneficial to all syndicate members as each takes advantage 
of their own distribution network to increase participation from investors, and this is 
crucial when the IPO is large in size. 
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A significant benefit of having more members in the underwriting syndicate is 
that they can share expertise and skills. Finally, when an underwriter lacks a strong 
reputation, it can still form a syndicate with other underwriters. This will result in 
reduced risk as more syndicate members increases the endorsement (certification) of 
IPO quality and hence reduces the uncertainty of potential investors.  
Thus, when there are more underwriters in a syndicate, they share IPO risk 
amongst themselves and reduce inventory risk because of better information 
gathering, increased access to potential investors, and exchange of underwriting 
expertise and skills. Hence, the expectation is that when an IPO is risky, large in size, 
the underwriter managing it does not have a high reputation, and participation from 
investors is low, the size of the underwriting syndicate will be large. 
These arguments lead to the following sub-hypotheses 
H3a: The likelihood of syndication increases with an increase in the market risk 
associated with IPO issue. 
H3b: Underwriters with a lower reputation will form larger syndicates for 
managing IPOs. 
H3c: Lower investor demand for IPOs leads to higher underwriter syndicate size. 
H3d: IPOs that are large in size will have a more concentrated IPO syndicate. 
5.4.3 Motivation for Syndication: Risk Mitigation or Price Manipulation  
In the previous sub-section, I investigate the determinants of an underwriting 
syndicate. In this sub-section, I debate the motivation of underwriters to form an IPO 
syndicate by extending the Corwin and Schultz (2005) study by investigating whether 
syndication is for risk mitigation or price manipulation. 
Traditional theory on risk sharing is that underwriters form a large syndicate to 
mitigate market-specific IPO risk (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; Mandelker and Raviv, 
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1977). In contrast to traditional IPO risk sharing theory, a more recent study, by Corwin 
and Schultz (2005), on American IPOs claims no relationship between the number of 
underwriters in a syndicate and IPO risk sharing.  
Similarly, research evidence by Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) finds that 
underwriters do not form large syndicates with the aim of sharing IPO risk. Therefore, 
the question is, if risk sharing does not explain the formation of an underwriting 
syndicate, what motivates underwriters to form a syndicate?  
In this study, I propose an alternative explanation for the motivation of 
underwriters to form an IPO syndicate. I suggest that the motivation of underwriters to 
form an IPO syndicate is to improve their income by way of price manipulation. When 
an underwriter forms a syndicate with other underwriters there can be an economic 
benefit (Fu and Li, 2007). In the IPO market, the economic benefit that the underwriter 
receives is by way of the underwriting fee received from the issuer on successful 
completion of an IPO. However, if underwriters manipulate the IPO price by setting an 
IPO offer price lower than the fundamental value of an IPO, and engage in the rent-
seeking behaviour, they can have more benefit as this income adds to their income 
from the underwriting fee.  
For the purpose of investigating this suggestion, I use the grey market price as a 
measure of price manipulation. When the size of an underwriting syndicate is large, 
and the syndicate takes advantage of the information they hold together to price an 
IPO at the fair value, the grey market price will be close to the offer price. In this 
condition, the grey market premium underpricing (GMP underpricing), measured by 
the simple return calculated between the grey market price and IPO offer price, will be 
low. However, when the intention of having more syndicate members is to manipulate 
the IPO price, the offer price of an IPO will be below its fundamental value and hence 
result in a higher grey market price. In this case, it will lead to a higher GMP 
underpricing, thus representing price manipulation in the IPO.  
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In summary, traditional risk sharing theory on the formation of underwriting 
syndicates claims that underwriters form syndicates to share IPO risk. However, more 
recent studies infer that underwriters do not necessarily form a large syndicate to 
reduce IPO risk. The study by Corwin and Schultz (2005) investigates the relationship 
between the size of an underwriting syndicate and IPO risk. I extend their research by 
examining whether the purpose of forming a large underwriting syndicate is price 
manipulation.  
This leads to the fourth hypothesis. 
H4: The syndicate formed by underwriters is larger when the IPO risk is higher, 
or the price manipulation is higher. 
5.4.4 Reputation-based Syndication and IPO Pricing 
In the previous sub-section, I examine the motivation of underwriters to form 
an IPO syndicate. In this sub-section, I propose that when the IPO market is 
concentrated, and a very reputable underwriter forms a syndicate, it can result in 
higher information sharing or price manipulation in an IPO.  
Positive effect of Underwriting Syndicate on IPO Pricing  
In the IPO market, a strong reputation allows underwriters to develop and 
maintain continuing relationships with a network of institutional investors. Top-ranked 
syndicate membership provides incremental ratification (certification) of the IPO 
quality. The strong reputation is the result of the respect earnt by being active in the 
IPO market for an extended time and managing a large number of IPOs. Hence, when 
top-ranked reputed underwriters are part of an IPO syndicate, it can result in higher 
information production through their strong networking with informed institutional 
clients. When this information is exchanged with other members of the syndicate, who 
also acquire information from their own networks, the outcome is that the IPO is 
priced at the fair value. Hence, when there is a reputable underwriter in an IPO 
syndicate due to higher information production, it results in lower underpricing. 
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Negative Effect of Underwriting Syndicate on IPO Pricing  
However, an alternative possibility is that when the market is concentrated, 
and a reputable underwriter forms an IPO syndicate, it can result in collusion and price 
manipulation and hence lead to increased underpricing in an IPO. The outcome, in this 
case, is higher overall profits for the underwriting syndicate members. 
When researching IPO underpricing Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Ritter (1991) 
find that, in many countries, although many active underwriters aggressively compete 
for IPO business, a large number of IPOs are underpriced. Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
argue that, in this situation, high-quality underwriters are able to retain their 
underwriting business and market share in the industry. This points to the fact that in a 
highly competitive market with high levels of underpricing when reputed underwriters 
do not lose business to other underwriters, the IPO market is inefficient. 
Underwriters can take advantage of this inefficiency in the IPO market to gain 
benefit for themselves. This is possible by developing profit sharing relationships with 
regular institutional investors and manipulating IPO price to increase underpricing. 
However, when an underwriter underprices IPOs quite frequently, it can negatively 
affect current and future business. This is because future IPO issuers may prefer to 
team up with other underwriters to manage their IPO, as underpricing is a direct loss 
for them. Hence, increasing underpricing in an IPO negatively impacts underwriter 
reputation. This also affects underwriters’ income if they are unable to remain active in 
the IPO market, as reputation is the most important capital for underwriters in the IPO 
business. 
However, when the market is concentrated, and underwriters have a monopoly 
of power, they can collude by way of syndication without adversely affecting their 
market share and current, and future, expected income. The US Department of Justice 
states that market concentration is one important measure of a monopoly (Fu and Li, 
2007). Also, a study by  Scherer and Ross (1990) indicate that when it is difficult for 
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new players to enter and sustain a place in a market, it indicates that the market is 
concentrated and monopolised.  
A study by Scherer and Ross (1990) finds that monopolised markets are highly 
concentrated in comparison to competitive markets which are less concentrated. 
Hence, it can be inferred that high concentration in a market is an indicator of, and 
contributor to, collusion amongst market participants. 
In conditions where the IPO market is highly competitive with few restrictions 
for new players, the operating environment is anticipated to be efficient. This makes it 
difficult for underwriters to collude amongst themselves. However, collusion is highly 
possible when the IPO market is dominated by a handful of major underwriters, and 
there are significant barriers for new players trying for entry. The evidence from the Fu 
and Li (2007) study is that underwriter collusion is highly possible when the market is 
concentrated. Fu and Li (2007) point out that in the US market there is a significant 
barrier for new players to enter and sustain their position, and this situation is due to 
the market being highly concentrated and dominated by a few big players. Fu and Li 
consider it important that underwriters in the US do not compete for IPO business by 
negotiating underwriting spread and underpricing with the issuer52.  
Chen and Ritter (2000) support this view by reporting that in the US IPO market 
the gross spread for underwriters is clustered around 7%. Similarly, in a study of 27 
countries by Torstila (2003), the author observes a pattern that IPO gross spreads are 
clustered, however, at different levels. Chen and Ritter (2000) postulate that clustering 
points towards the possibility of collusion amongst underwriters. Porter (2005) argues 
that it is difficult to detect collusion in markets, but uniform pricing by market 
participants is an important indicator.  
                                                     
52 The underwriting spread is the difference between the amount paid to the underwriting 
syndicate in a new issue of securities by the issuer and the price at which securities are offered 
for sale to the public. 
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Collectively, these studies provide evidence of the likelihood of collusion 
amongst underwriters. Thus, it can be observed that the fixing of gross spreads by 
underwriters indicates that they do not compete for underwriting business by trying to 
outclass each other.  
In the IPO market, when underwriting syndicate members collude they have 
the power to set a lower IPO offer price. If higher underpricing is sustainable and does 
not affect their current and future market share, underwriters prefer to collude with 
other underwriters for higher income.  
However, the question is, why do underwriters have to syndicate for price 
manipulation when they can manage the IPO by themselves? When the most 
reputable underwriters form a syndicate with other underwriters in a concentrated 
market, they can maintain their market share and income with continuous 
underpricing of IPOs. This is a consequence of the limited options available to new 
issuers to select underwriters to manage their IPO.  
However, if reputed underwriters do not form a syndicate, an issuer can 
engage other underwriters in the industry to manage their IPO, and this negatively 
affects the market share of the underwriters who underprice IPOs frequently. 
Moreover, a study by Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) observes that reputation and 
relationships in underwriting make it harder for new players to enter and sustain 
business. 
Hence, when an underwriter with an excellent reputation forms an IPO 
syndicate with the aim of collusion and price manipulation, it can shield them from 
losing market share to other underwriters. Underwriting business is well known for its 
high profitability, which is dominated by a few underwriters who form syndicates 
amongst themselves (Fu and Li, 2007).   
In summary, when an underwriting syndicate has highly reputed underwriter 
membership, it can result in higher information production and sharing and hence 
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result in lower underpricing. On the other hand, when the market is concentrated, and 
these reputed underwriters form a syndicate for collusion and price manipulation, it 
can result in higher underpricing. However, based on current academic research, I 
expect that when highly reputed underwriters form an IPO syndicate, it will result in 
lower underpricing. 
This leads to the fifth hypothesis. 
H5: A lower underpricing is associated with syndication by a highly reputed 
underwriter. 
5.4.5 Regulating Discretion, Reputation-based Syndication and IPO Pricing 
In the previous sub-section, I investigate the relationship between syndication 
by a top ranked reputed underwriter and IPO underpricing. In this sub-section, as 
shown in Figure 5.1 Section D, based on the literature discussed in the previous sub-
section, I develop the information sharing and price manipulation hypotheses by 
examining how, in the absence of allocation discretion, the outcome of reputation-
based syndication can have two different scenarios based on the underwriters’ 
incentive to use the information they hold, for either market benefit or their own 
profit.  
Syndication for Market Benefit 
In the IPO market, when allocation discretion is regulated, it is difficult for 
underwriters to develop and maintain long-term information sharing relationships 
with regular institutional investors. Hence, such restrictions reduce information 
sharing between underwriters and institutional investors (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 
2002). In this case, when a top-ranked reputed underwriter forms an underwriting 
syndicate, then this member not only acquires information from its own investor 
network but also information is exchanged with other syndicate members. The 
outcome is more information production and exchange, resulting in the IPO being 
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priced at the fair value. Thus, in the absence of allocation discretion, when a reputable 
underwriter forms an IPO syndicate it can result in lower underpricing.  
Figure 5.1 Section D: Underwriting Syndicate and Effect on IPO Pricing 
 
Syndication for Underwriter Benefit 
When underwriters have allocation and pricing discretion, they can use a 
combination of these powers to increase their total income by pursuing rent-seeking 
activity (Nimalendran et al., 2007; Reuter, 2006). In this case, underwriters limit 
underpricing to moderate levels that do not affect their reputation and hence allow 
them to sustain a long-term position in the IPO market. Thus, when underwriters have 
allocation and pricing discretion, they can use a combination of these discretionary 
powers to increase their income from the IPO underwriting business. 
On the other hand, in the absence of allocation discretion, underwriters have 
to rely more on pricing discretion to maintain their share of income as they do not 
have the flexibility to allocate shares to regular institutional investors. Hence, for the 
underwriters, it is possible to maintain their profit margins by deliberately 
underpricing an IPO more than the acceptable level.  
However, if underwriters often underprice IPOs at a greater than acceptable 
level, it will have an adverse impact on their reputation, and hence affect their 
expected future business and income. But when the IPO market is concentrated, and a 
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highly reputed underwriter forms an IPO syndicate, the underwriter can maintain 
market share, even with high levels of underpricing because new issuers have limited 
options available in choosing underwriters to manage their IPO.  
Hence, collusion and price manipulation, by way of reputation-based 
syndication, allow underwriters to deliberately underprice an IPO by more than 
acceptable levels and shields them from any adverse impact on their future 
underwriting business. Therefore, in the absence of allocation discretion, syndication 
increases overall profits for underwriters and provides an alternative to sustain 
collusion. Thus, in a concentrated market, when underwriters do not have allocation 
discretion, and the aim of reputation-based syndication is collusion and price 
manipulation, it will result in higher underpricing in an IPO. 
In summary, as shown in Figure 5.1 Section D, in the absence of allocation 
discretion, when a highly reputable underwriter forms an IPO syndicate, it can lead to 
more information sharing and increase market welfare due to lower underpricing. On 
the other hand, when the IPO underwriting market is highly concentrated, and a highly 
reputable underwriter forms an IPO syndicate for their own higher benefit, it can lead 
to the IPO being underpriced by more than acceptable levels. Thus, in the absence of 
allocation discretion, when reputation-based syndication occurs, more information 
sharing will result in lower underpricing. On the other hand, if syndication is for 
collusion and price manipulation, the outcome is higher underpricing.  
This leads to the sixth hypothesis. 
H6a: Based on the information sharing hypothesis, in the absence of allocation 
discretion syndication by a highly reputed underwriter is associated with lower 
underpricing. 
H6b: Based on the price manipulation hypothesis, in the absence of allocation 
discretion, syndication by a highly reputed underwriter is associated with higher 
underpricing. 
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5.5 Data Sources and Description of Variables 
In this section, I list the data sources and the variables used in this study.  
5.5.1 Data Sources 
The initial sample of 329 IPOs used in this study consists of firms that went 
public in the Indian IPO market through the bookbuilding mechanism between January 
2000 and December 2010. The data comes from a number of different sources, and I 
list below the main sources from which I obtain the data. 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) Websites 
In this study, I use the IPO list provided by the BSE and NSE websites as the 
basis for the IPO sample. The websites also provide me with the listing date and listing 
price on the exchange, which I used for computation of underpricing (initial return) of 
the IPO firms. I use the aftermarket price of an IPO from the NSE site, for days 21-125 
from the listing date, to calculate aftermarket standard deviation, a measure of IPO 
risk. I use NSE Nifty, as the index value to calculate the market return for the preceding 
30 days of an IPO open date. 
Prospectuses 
The prospectus for each IPO has data on offer characteristics, including the 
expected and final issue size, offer open and close dates, final offer/issue price, offer 
price range, total shares offered, book value and promoter’s holding before and after 
the offer. The prospectus also provides the founding year of the IPO firm, which is used 
to calculate the age of the firm at the time of the IPO. The prospectus is also the main 
source of data for establishing which underwriter/underwriters managed the issue.  
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Capital Market website 
I obtain the basis of allotment document from Capital Market53, which is one of 
the top finance and investment portals in India. This site gives the details of 
subscription of each individual investor category and the total subscription for an IPO.  
Smart Investment Newspaper 
I source the data on grey market premiums (GMP) from Smart Investment, a 
weekly newspaper published in an Indian regional language. This data had to be 
translated into English for use in my research study.  
5.5.2 Description of Variables used in the Study 
Table 5.1 describes the variables used in this research study. 
Table 5.1: Description of Variables used in Study 3 
Variable Description 
Total Proceeds raised 
(Million INR) 
The total amount of proceeds raised by all IPOs in a year.  
Age of Firm at IPO 
(Yrs.) 
The difference between a firm's IPO year and its founding year expressed in years. 
Final Issue/Offer Price 
(INR) 
The final issuing price of the IPO shares. 
Expected Issue Size 
(Million INR) 
The total expected proceeds of the offer, as the multiple of the midpoint of initial price 
band and the number of shares offered. 
Final Issue Size  
(Million INR) 
The total final proceeds raised in the IPO, as the multiple of final issue price and the 
number of shares offered. 
IPO Upper Price Band 
Dummy 
A dummy variable, a proxy for IPO being priced at the upper price of the initial price 
band. IPO Upper Price Band Dummy takes a value of 1 if the issue is priced at the upper 
price of the initial price band and 0, otherwise. 
No of Active 
Underwriters  
A count of all underwriters that have participated in at least one IPO during a given year. 
No of Underwriters A count of all underwriters that have participated in an underwriting syndicate for a given 
IPO.  
Underwriter 
Reputation Dummy 
A proxy for the reputation of the underwriter. Underwriter Reputation Dummy takes a 
value of 1 if the underwriter has raised proceeds of more than 1% of the total proceeds 
raised by all IPOs during the sample period.  
Total UW Syndicate 
Effort 
The sum of the ratios of the expected issue size of an IPO per underwriter (UW) to the 
total amount of proceeds raised by the underwriter during that year. This gives the 
                                                     
53 http://cmlinks.com/moneypore/ipo/ba.asp 
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percentage cumulative effort by the underwriting syndicate members. 
UW Syndicate Effort The ratio of Total UW Syndicate Effort to the total number of underwriters in a syndicate 
for a given IPO. 
Top UW Syndicate 
Dummy 
A dummy variable representing a proxy for reputation-based syndication by the top 13 
underwriters in the IPO sample. The Top UW Syndicate dummy takes the value of 1 if the 
underwriter is amongst the top underwriters who cumulatively raise more than 80% of 
the total proceeds raised by all IPO firms in the sample period and forms a syndicate with 
other underwriters and 0, otherwise. 
Regulation Dummy This dummy variable is a proxy for the regulatory change that altered the allocation 
power of underwriters from discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy takes 
a value of 1 for the proportionate allocation regime, which represents the post-regulation 
period, and 0 for the discretionary allocation regime, which represents the pre-regulation 
period. 
Retail Subscription A measure of the total number of shares subscribed by retail investors as a proportion of 
the total shares available to them for allocation. This is measured after the issue has 
closed for subscription. 
QIB Subscription A measure of the total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as 
a proportion of the total shares available to them. This is measured after the issue has 
closed for subscription. 
Total Subscription A measure of the total number of shares subscribed by investors as a proportion to the 
total number of shares offered. This is measured after the issue has closed for 
subscription. 
Underpricing (Initial 
Return) 
The simple return calculated between the closing price of an IPO at the end of the first 
day of trading and IPO issue price. 
Grey Market Price 
(INR) 
A measure of the average of the weekly grey market price quoted for an IPO during the 
grey market trading period. 
GMP (INR) A measure of the difference between the grey market price and final issue price of an 
IPO. 
GMP Underpricing Price manipulation in an IPO measured by the simple return calculated between the grey 
market price of an IPO and IPO issue price. 
IPO Risk  The risk of an IPO is measured as the aftermarket standard deviation, which is estimated 
using continuously compounded daily returns from day 21 through to 125 days after the 
IPO is listed on the stock exchange 
Pre 30 MR This measures the market return (MR) on index between the IPO open date and the 
preceding 30 days and is the simple return calculated between the index value on the day 
the IPO opens for subscription and the preceding 30 days. I use NSE Nifty as the index to 
calculate the market return. 
Book Value (INR) This is based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. 
Promoters Pre 
Holding 
A measure of the percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters before the IPO. 
Promoters Post 
Holding 
A measure of the percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters after the IPO. 
CR4 The four-firm concentration ratio that measures the total market share of the four largest 
firms in the underwriting industry for that year. 
CR8 The eight-firm concentration ratio that measures the total market share of the eight 
largest firms in the underwriting industry for that year. 
CR10 The ten-firm concentration ratio that measures the total market share of the ten largest 
firms in the underwriting industry for that year. 
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Calculation of Underwriter Syndicate Effort  
I calculate Total UW Syndicate Effort for each IPO in the sample. Total UW 
Syndicate Effort is the sum of the ratios of the expected issue size of an IPO per 
underwriter to the total amount of proceeds raised by the underwriter during that 
year. This gives the percentage cumulative effort by the underwriting syndicate. This 
measure represents the total effort exerted by all the syndicate members. Further, I 
calculate the average UW Syndicate Effort by calculating the ratio of Total UW 
Syndicate Effort to the total number of underwriters in a syndicate for a given IPO.  
Table 5.2 Part 1: IPO Details for the Year 2001 
 
No Firm Underwriters (UWs) Year Issue 
Size 
No of 
UWs 
Issue size 
per UW 
1 Mid-day Multimedia 
Ltd 
(1) IL&FS, (2) Triumph 
and (3) Prebone 
2001 500 3 166 
2 D-Link (India) Ltd (1) Tata Finance and  
(2) Prebone 
2001 457 2 228 
 
Table 5.2 Part 2: Amount raised by each underwriter for the Year 2001 
 
Table 5.2 Part 3: Underwriter Syndicate Effort for the Year 2001 
 
Issue 
Name 
UW1 Effort 
 
UW2 Effort 
 
UW3 Effort 
 
UW4  Effort 
 
Total UW 
Syndicate 
Effort 
UW 
Syndicate 
Effort 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 IL&FS Triumph Prebone Tata Finance   
Mid-day 166/166 =1 166/395= 0.42 166/166=1 0 2.42 2.42/3=0.81 
D-Link 0 228/395=0.58 0 228/228=1 1.58 1.58/2=0.79 
No. 
 
(1) 
 
Underwriter (UW) 
(2) 
Total No. of  
Issues Managed 
(3) 
Total Amount  
Raised 
(4) 
1 IL&FS (UW1) 1 166 
2 Prebone (UW2) 2 395 
3 Triumph (UW3) 1 166 
4 Tata Finance (UW4) 1 228 
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I demonstrate the computation process of UW Syndicate Effort by using the 
IPOs that were issued in 2001, as an example year. Table 5.2 Part 1 gives the name of 
the firm and expected issue size of the two IPOs that raised capital in 2001. The Mid-
day Multimedia Limited IPO was managed by three underwriters, while the D-Link 
(India) Limited IPO was managed by two underwriters. As shown in Table 5.2 Part 2, I 
calculate the number of issues managed by each underwriter and total proceeds raised 
by each of the four active underwriters in 2001. In Table 5.2 Part 3, I calculate the 
individual underwriter weight for each IPO, as shown in columns 2 to 5. The sixth 
column sums up the individual UW effort, which is the Total UW syndicate effort. In 
column 7 I divide the Total UW syndicate effort by the number of underwriters in the 
syndicate to calculate average UW Syndicate effort. I use this as a proxy for the 
number of underwriters in a syndicate for a given IPO. 
Calculation of Underwriter Ranking 
I use the Megginson and Weiss (1991) study to construct the measure of 
underwriter reputation, which is based on an underwriter’s relative market share. The 
ranking of underwriters is based on the amount of proceeds raised by them during the 
sample period, and details are provided in Appendix 2. Overall, 76 underwriters 
manage at least one IPO over the entire sample period. Whenever there is more than 
one underwriter, I divide the proceeds of the offering equally amongst the 
participating underwriters. Reputed underwriters are those who raise more than 1% of 
the total proceeds in the sample period, so the sample comprises 19 high reputation, 
and 57 low reputation underwriters. During the sample period, the reputed 
underwriters manage 70% of the IPOs and raise 89.48% of the total proceeds, as 
against the other underwriters who manage 30% of the total IPOs and raise 10.52% of 
the total proceeds. The reputed underwriters’ category includes well-known firms that 
undertake important and large issues while the other underwriters mainly manage 
small issues.  
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5.6 Summary Statistics  
In this section, I present the summary statistics of the sample data. I also 
discuss the participation characteristics of the underwriters in the Indian IPO market. 
5.6.1 Annual Descriptive Statistics 
This section discusses the descriptive statistics of the sample of IPOs. Table 5.3 
presents the yearly IPO descriptive statistics. The sample comprises 329 IPOs issued 
through the bookbuilding mechanism listed on the BSE and/or NSE over an 11-year 
period from January 2000 to December 2010. The sample excludes issues that were 
already listed on the stock exchange but raised capital through follow-on issues using 
the bookbuilding mechanism.  
There was a considerable variation in the number of IPOs in each year during 
the sample period. But on average, the total number of IPOs and proceeds raised in 
each year through the bookbuilding mechanism has increased over time. The only 
exception being in the years 2008 and 2011, when IPO activity decreased. In 2008, 
IPOs decreased due to the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and in 2011 
IPOs were less because the Indian equity market lost around 25% of its value due to 
high inflation and interest rates, depreciating local currency, slowing domestic growth 
and global uncertainties54. This indicates that overall, in the Indian IPO market, the 
bookbuilding mechanism is slowly gaining popularity as a way to raise funds through 
an IPO.  
The mean (median) number of underwriters that are active in each year are 21 
(23), and over time, more underwriters have become active in the IPO market while 
using the bookbuilding mechanism to raise funds. The average number of underwriters 
for each issue is 2.28, and the median is 2. This is quite a lot less than for American 
IPOs, where on average 15.9 underwriters form a syndicate (Corwin and Schultz, 
2005).  
                                                     
54http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-stock-market-plunges-24-per-cent-in-
2011/1/166609.html 
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It is worth noting that in the Indian market around one-third of the IPOs are 
managed by a single underwriter, while the maximum number of underwriters in a 
syndicate is 10. The mean (median) for Total UW Syndicate effort for an IPO is 0.71 
(0.36) and for UW Syndicate effort per underwriter is 0.30 (0.21). The mean (median) 
of underwriter reputation and Top UW syndicate dummy are 0.61 (1) and 0.33 (1) 
respectively. 
The statistics show that the mean (median) age of a firm at the time of an IPO is 
about 15.57 (13) and IPO risk is 0.0353 (0.0342). The mean (median) of final issue price 
and expected issue size of the overall sample is INR 210 (148) and INR 4621 (1087) 
million. The mean (median) of final issue size and final issue size per underwriter are 
INR 4760 (1102) and INR 1445 (724) million.  
Although there are significant differences in the characteristics of IPOs over 
time, the characteristics of underwriter syndicates remain quite consistent. The mean 
(median) retail and QIB subscription are 11.69 (5.32), and 24.33 (8.36) times 
respectively. The subscription is calculated by dividing the total number of shares bid 
by the total number of shares offered. A subscription value of 11.69 means that for an 
IPO that is offering 1000 shares to investors the bids received are for 11690 shares. 
The overall subscription for IPOs is captured by the total demand multiple. The mean 
(median) overall subscription multiple is 20.85 (8.27) times. The descriptive statistics 
suggest there is an excess demand for shares in all categories of investors. This 
suggests that Indian IPOs are well subscribed by all classes of investors. 
The mean (median) of underpricing is 0.25% (0.13%) while that of GMP 
underpricing is 0.25% (0.15%), and there is little difference between the two measures. 
The overall underpricing in the Indian IPOs for most years is quite high, compared to 
the US market. The average grey market premium is positive for all years, except 2001, 
with a mean (median) grey market premium of INR 55.27 (22.33). The mean (median) 
market return for the 30 days prior to the IPO open date is 0.029 (0.040). The mean 
(median) pre- and post-promoters IPO holdings are 81.68% (87.9%) and 59.98% 
(60.04%) respectively. The evidence suggests relatively high promoters’ shareholdings  
 170 
 
Table 5.3 reports the summary statistics of firm and issue specific variables by year for 329 Indian IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and/or National Stock exchange (NSE) between January 2000 and December 2010, excluding firms that have come to the market with follow-on issues. No. of IPOs is a 
count of all successful IPOs for that year which raised capital from the IPO market. Total Proceeds raised is the total amount of capital raised by all IPOs in that year. No of Active Underwriters is a count of all underwriters that have participated in at least one IPO in a given year. No of Underwriters per issue is a count 
of all underwriters that participate in an underwriting syndicate for a given IPO. Total UW Syndicate Effort is the sum of the ratios of issue size of an IPO per underwriter to the total amount of proceeds raised by the underwriter during that year. This gives the percentage cumulative effort by the underwriting syndicate. 
UW Syndicate Effort per underwriter is the ratio of Total UW Syndicate Effort to the total number of underwriters in a syndicate for a given IPO. Underwriter Reputation is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for IPOs managed by reputed underwriters, and 0 otherwise. Top UW Syndicate Dummy is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the underwriter is amongst the top underwriters who cumulatively raise more than 80% of the total proceeds raised by all IPO firms in the sample period and forms a syndicate with other underwriters, and 0 otherwise. Age of the Firm at IPO is the difference between a firm’s IPO 
year and the founding year expressed in years. IPO Risk is aftermarket standard deviation of the IPO price and is estimated using continuously compounded daily returns from day 21 through 125 after listing of the IPO. Final  Issue Price is the final offer price of the IPO (INR). Expected Issue Size/Final Issue Size are the 
expected proceeds/final proceeds of the offer and is the multiple of the midpoint of issue price band/final issue price and the number of shares offered respectively (In million INR). Final Issue Size per UW is the ratio of final issue size by no of underwriters in the underwriting syndicate. Retail Subscription is a measure of 
the total number of shares subscribed by retail investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. QIB Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. Total Subscription is 
a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by investors as a proportion to the total number of shares offered. Book Value is the book value of the firm in INR. Promoters Pre- and Post-holding is the percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters before and after the IPO respectively. Underpricing (Initial 
Return) is the simple return calculated between the closing price at the end of the first day of trading and IPO issue price (in percent). Grey Market Price is the average of the weekly grey market price quoted for an IPO during the grey market trading period (INR). Grey Market Premium is the difference between the grey 
market price and final issue price of an IPO (INR). GMP Underpricing represents price manipulation in an IPO and is the simple return calculated between the grey market price of an IPO and IPO offer price (in percent). Pre 30 MR is the market return for the 30 days before the IPO open date (in percent). Issues priced at 
upper price band are the count of number of issues that are priced at the upper price of the IPO price band. IPOs with Positive (Negative) Underpricing are the number of IPOs in a year that are listed at a price higher (lower) than the offer price. (1 US$ is approximately equal to 68 Indian rupees).
Table 5.3: Year-wise IPO details 
 
Particulars 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
Total/ 
Sample 
Mean 
 
Median 
Number of IPOs 8 2 2 5 13 38 58 86 33 21 63 329  
Total Proceeds Raised (Million INR) 8,601 957 10,440 13,048 94,205 97,983 256,444 325,709 184,438 195,547 378,585 1,565,957  
No of Active Underwriters 10 4 6 6 13 23 31 43 38 27 36 21 23 
Average Number of Underwriters 2.00 2.50 4.00 2.60 2.84 2.32 2.24 2.04 2.27 2.91 2.24 2.28 2.00 
Average Total UW Syndicate Effort 1.25 2.00 3.00 1.20 1.00 0.61 0.53 0.46 1.15 1.29 0.57 0.71 0.36 
Average UW Syndicate Effort per 
Underwriter 
0.54 0.80 0.75 0.40 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.44 0.55 0.29 0.30 0.21 
Average Underwriter Reputation Dummy 0.88 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.66 0.55 0.33 0.52 0.63 0.61 1.00 
Average Top UW Syndicate Dummy 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.62 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.43 0.33 0.33 1.00 
Average Age of the firm at IPO (Yrs.) 7.63 14.00 10.00 11.40 18.54 11.32 14.62 16.91 14.24 17.05 18.35 15.57 13.00 
Average IPO Risk 0.0467 0.0594 0.0215 0.0327 0.0262 0.0307 0.0409 0.0378 0.0437 0.0278 0.0283 0.0353 0.0342 
Average Final Issue Price (INR) 165 185 288 84 180 206 215 236.65 198 183 206 210 148 
Average Expected Issue Size (Million INR) 1187 479 5220 2654 7042 2411 4354 3644 5399 8947 5888 4621 1087 
Average Final Issue Size (Million INR) 1075 479 5220 2610 7247 2579 4421 3787 5589 9312 6009 4760 1102 
Average Final Issue size per UW 558 198 1305 770 1522 940 1261 1288 1236 3264 1832 1445 724 
Average Retail subscription 3.56 0.35 1.17 13.16 26.22 21.39 10.32 15.33 5.26 2.17 7.28 11.69 5.32 
Average QIB subscription 7.37 1.06 2.91 11.74 16.83 24.65 26.54 39.33 11.96 13.24 17.94 24.33 8.36 
Average Total subscription 7.85 1.2 2.34 19.13 29.56 24.24 20.54 31.74 9.88 8.07 15.43 20.85 8.27 
Average Underpricing 0.11 -0.41 -0.03 0.62 0.61 0.35 0.29 0.30 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.25 0.13 
Average Grey Market Price (INR) 203.21 139.69 590.00 162.58 273.10 273.21 265.45 324.52 225.08 192.89 234.45 267.48 177.12 
Average Grey Market Premium (INR) 38.21 -45.31 60.00 30.08 91.01 65.41 50.15 90.83 32.16 10.09 31.78 55.27 22.33 
Average GMP Underpricing 0.40 -0.27 0.11 0.23 0.54 0.36 0.26 0.35 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.25 0.15 
Average Pre 30 MR 0.024 0.058 -0.011 0.067 0.036 0.042 0.044 0.041 -0.053 0.035 0.026 0.029 0.040 
Average Promoters Pre Holding 91.61 88.34 58.38 78.59 80.38 75.56 85.92 80.23 81.52 82.5 83.07 81.68 87.9 
Average Promoters Post Holding 74.54 63.02 52.77 58.67 58.68 54.82 63.03 58.46 58.96 62.89 60.59 59.98 60.04 
Average Book Value (INR) 28.30 29.20 79.41 51.40 36.03 42.13 39.26 48.92 52.05 55.49 50.74 46.61 32.91 
Issues priced at Upper Price Band 5 2 2 5 11 31 42 72 21 16 45 252  
IPOs with Positive Underpricing 5 0 0 5 13 32 40 56 18 14 40 223  
IPOs with Negative Underpricing 3 2 2 0 0 6 18 30 15 7 23 106  
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Table 5.4: Low-High UW Syndicate Effort and Pre-Post Regulation sample 
Variables 
 
UW Syndicate Effort pre Underwriter 
 
Pre- and Post-Regulation Full Sample 
 Low Effort High Effort t stat Pre-Reg Post-Reg t stat  
Number of IPOs 164 165  62 267  329 
Regulation Dummy 0.82 0.81 0.25     
No of Underwriters per IPO 2.17 2.38 -1.30 2.50 2.22 1.33 2.28 
Total UW Syndicate Effort 0.22 1.20 -11.61*** 0.97 0.65 2.48** 0.71 
UW Syndicate Effort 0.10 0.50 -21.87*** 0.34 0.29 1.14 0.30 
Underwriter Reputation 0.82 0.41 8.57*** 0.84 0.56 4.12*** 0.61 
Top UW Syndicate dummy  0.43 0.23 3.87*** 0.387 0.314 1.09 0.33 
Age of the Firm at IPO 16.52 14.62 1.25 12.00 16.4 -2.28** 15.57 
IPO Risk 0.034 0.036 -1.52 0.032 0.036 -2.36** 0.035 
Final Issue Price (INR) 227 192 1.62 179 217 -1.37 210 
Expected Issue Size (Millions 
INR) 
2600 6629 -2.68*** 3324 4921 -0.82 4621 
Retail subscription 14.66 8.73 2.81*** 18.95 10.00 3.33*** 11.69 
QIB subscription 33.38 15.33 4.89*** 17.9 25.82 -1.62 24.33 
Total Subscription 27.62 14.11 4.73*** 21.39 20.72 0.18 20.85 
Underpricing 0.30 0.19 2.13** 0.34 0.22 1.81* 0.25 
Grey Market Price (INR) 303.97 229.76 2.45** 247 271 -0.61 267.48 
Grey Market Premium (INR)  72.50 37.45 3.37*** 58.77 54.53 0.30 55.27 
GMP Underpricing 0.30 0.21 2.50** 0.38 0.23 3.31*** 0.25 
Pre 30 MR 0.036 0.021 2.05** 0.034 0.027 0.69 0.029 
Promoters Pre Holding 79.03 84.32 -2.56** 78.51 82.42 -1.47 81.68 
Promoters Post Holding 58.95 61.01 -1.24 58.28 60.38 -0.99 59.98 
Book Value (INR) 47.62 45.60 0.35 36.89 48.86 -1.63 46.61 
IPOs at Upper Band 0.75 0.78 -0.68 0.82 0.75 1.17 0.76 
IPOs with Positive 
Underpricing 
118 (72%) 105 (64%)  49 (79%) 174 (65%)  223 
IPOs with Negative 
Underpricing 
46 (28%) 60 (36%)  13(21%) 93 (35%)  106 
IPOs priced at Upper Band 123 (75%) 129 (78%)  51(82%) 201 (75%)  252 
IPOs priced at Lower Band 41 (25%) 36 (22%)  11(18%) 66 (25%)  77 
Table 5.4 compares the summary statistics of Indian IPOs by UW Syndicate Effort per Underwriter and Pre- and Post-regulation period and for the full sample. Low UW Syndicate Effort by underwriter 
sample consists of IPOs where UW Syndicate Effort is less than the median UW Syndicate Effort and high UW Syndicate Effort otherwise. Pre-regulation sample consists of IPOs where underwriters 
have discretion in the allocation of shares to institutional investors and post regulation sample consists of IPOs where their discretionary allocation power is withdrawn. The regulation dummy 
variable is a proxy for the regulatory change that shifted the allocation power of underwriters from discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy takes a value of 1 for the proportionate 
allocation regime and a value of 0 for the discretionary allocation regime. No. of Underwriters per IPO is a count of all underwriters that participate in an underwriting syndicate for a given IPO. Total 
UW syndicate Effort is the sum of the ratios of issue size of an IPO per underwriter to the total amount of proceeds raised by the underwriter during that year. This gives the percentage cumulative 
effort by the underwriting syndicate. UW Syndicate Effort per Underwriter is the ratio of Total UW Syndicate Effort to the total number of underwriters in a syndicate for a given IPO. Underwriter 
Reputation Dummy takes the value of 1 for IPOs managed by reputed underwriters, and 0 otherwise. Top UW Syndicate Dummy takes the value of 1 if the underwriter is amongst the top 
underwriters who cumulatively raise more than 80% of the total proceeds raised by all IPO firms in the sample period and forms a syndicate with other underwriters to manage an IPO and 0, 
otherwise. Age of the firm at IPO is the difference between a firm's IPO year and its founding year, expressed in years. IPO Risk is aftermarket standard deviation for the IPO and is estimated using 
continuously compounded daily returns from day 21 through to 125 days after listing of the IPO. Final Issue Price is the final offer price of the IPO (INR). Expected Issue Size is the expected proceeds of 
the offer and is multiple of the midpoint of issue price band and number of shares offered (In million INR). Retail Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by retail investors 
as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. QIB Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the 
total shares available to them for allocation. Total Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by all category of investors as a proportion to the total number of shares offered. 
Underpricing (Initial Return) is the simple return calculated between the closing price at the end of the first day of trading and IPO issue price (in percent). Grey Market Price is the average of the 
weekly grey market price quoted for an IPO during the grey market trading period (INR). Grey Market Premium (GMP) is the difference between the grey market price and final issue price of an IPO 
(INR). GMP Underpricing represents price manipulation in an IPO and is the simple return calculated between the grey market price of an IPO and IPO offer price (in percent). Pre-30 MR is the market 
return for the preceding 30 days respectively before the IPO open date (in percent). Promoters Pre-Holding is the percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters before the IPO (in percentage). 
Promoters Post Holding is the percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters after the IPO (in percentage). IPOs priced at Upper Price Band are the number of IPOs that are priced at the upper 
price of the initial price range and 0 otherwise. IPOs with Positive (Negative) Underpricing are the number of IPOs that were listed at a price higher (lower) than the offer price. (1 US$ is 
approximately equal to 68 Indian rupees). 
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in the post-IPO period. The mean (median) Book Value of IPO firms is INR 46.61 
(32.91). Overall, 252 IPOs were priced at the upper price of the initial price band, out 
of the total of 329 IPOs. There are 223 IPOs with positive underpricing as compared to 
106 IPOs traded at a price lower than the IPO offer price on listing.  
5.6.2 Low-High UW Syndicate Effort and Pre-Post Regulation sample 
Table 5.4 compares the descriptive statistics of the Indian IPOs by UW 
Syndicate Effort for the overall sample as well as the pre- and post-regulation periods. 
Low UW Syndicate Effort IPOs sample consists of IPOs where UW Syndicate Effort is 
less than the median UW Syndicate Effort, and high UW Syndicate Effort otherwise. 
The pre-regulation sample consists of IPOs where underwriters have discretion in the 
allocation of shares to institutional investors, and the post-regulation sample consists 
of firms where the discretionary allocation power of underwriters is regulated. 
Low and High UW Syndicate Effort 
There is no significant difference between the number of underwriters per IPO 
and IPO market risk for low-high UW syndicate effort sample. However, the differences 
in institutional subscription and total subscription are statistically significant between 
the two samples.  
When there is high participation from QIB investors, an underwriting syndicate 
has to put in less effort. On the other hand, when participation is low, they have to put 
in more effort. In the low effort sample, reputation-based syndication is high when 
compared to the high effort sample because when reputed underwriters come 
together, they have to put in less effort for IPO success.  
Underpricing and GMP underpricing are both higher in the low effort sample 
compared to the high effort sample. The low UW syndicate effort sample has a higher 
number of IPOs that are underpriced when compared to the high UW syndicate effort 
sample. The difference is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The low 
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UW syndicate effort sample has 72% of IPOs with positive underpricing compared to 
64% for the high UW syndicate effort sample.  
Pre- and Post-Regulation sample  
There is no significant difference in the average number of underwriters per 
issue and UW syndicate effort in the pre- and post-regulation periods. The market risk 
of an IPO for the underwriters is considerably lower in the pre-regulation period 
compared to the post-regulation period. A substantially higher number of issues are 
managed by reputed underwriters in the pre-regulation regime. Also, while reputation-
based syndication is higher in the pre-regulation regime, there is no significant 
difference between the pre- and post-regulation regimes. 
In the sample, average issue price and expected issue size have increased in the 
post-regulation period, but the difference is not significant. The difference in total 
subscription does not differ substantially by allocation mechanisms but is slightly 
higher in the pre-regulation period than in the post-regulation period. However, the 
subscription from institutional investors is less in the pre-regulation period than in the 
post-regulation period, but not at a significant level. It is worth noting that retail 
subscription in the post-regulation period decreased substantially, from 18.95 to 10 
times. Hence, regulatory intervention has not affected the participation of institutional 
investors but has negatively affected the participation of retail investors in IPOs.  
The mean value of underpricing and GMP underpricing for the pre-regulation 
period is substantially higher than in the post-regulation period by a margin of 12% 
and 15% respectively. The proportion of IPOs that have positive initial returns in the 
pre-regulation period is 79% compared to 65% in the post-regulation regime, and in 
the pre-regulation regime, 82% of the IPOs are priced at the upper band, compared to 
75% of IPOs in the post-regulation period.  
In summary, the differences in means provide strong evidence that IPO Market 
Risk and Total UW syndicate effort are quite different in the pre- and post-regulation 
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regimes. In addition, underpricing and GMP underpricing are also significantly different 
between the two regimes, but the participation of institutional investors is not 
affected by the change in regulation. 
5.6.3 Underwriter Syndication Matrix and Participation Characteristics 
Underwriter Syndication Matrix 
Table 5.5 gives an underwriters’ syndication matrix between the top thirteen 
underwriters in the sample, i.e. those that had cumulatively raised 80% of the total IPO 
proceeds. This table reports the capital raised and frequency of syndication between 
each of the thirteen underwriters with the other twelve underwriters, for the full 
sample. The numbers (in hundred million) in the table show the total amount raised by 
two underwriters when they work together in a syndicate to manage an IPO, while the 
numbers in brackets give the frequency of syndication among them. This matrix assists 
us to analyse underwriter relationships by examining how often specific pairs of 
underwriters work together and the proceeds they raise when they syndicate. 
For a better understanding of the matrix, we can use as an example of Kotak 
(third) column and Enam (second) row, where the table gives the number 1451 (29). 
This means that Enam and Kotak have syndicated 29 times and cumulatively raised INR 
145,100 million, which is around 9.3% of the total proceeds raised in the IPO sample.  
From the matrix, I infer that in the Indian IPO market syndication by top 
underwriters often occurs. It further shows that the strongest rivals in the 
underwriting industry syndicate more often. Underwriters that have a strong retail 
presence, such as Enam, Kotak, ICICI, DSP, SBI, and JM are present as a syndicate 
participant in a number of IPOs. This is because, in addition to the relationships which 
they maintain with institutional investors, they can reach out to more retail investors 
through their extensive marketing and distribution networks. This can result in 
improved IPO performance. 
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Table 5.5: Underwriter Syndication Matrix 
 
Table 5.5 presents the syndication matrix between the top 13 underwriters in the sample that have cumulatively raised 80% of the total IPO proceeds in the sample period. It lists the capital 
raised and frequency of syndication amongst two underwriters to manage an IPO for the full sample. The values (in hundred million) in the table shows the total amount raised by the two 
underwriters while the numbers in brackets give the frequency of syndication when the underwriters work together in an IPO syndicate.  
 
Name of 
Underwriter Enam Kotak ICICI DSP Citigroup SBI 
JM 
Morgan Deutsche 
Morgan 
Stanley 
JM 
Finance UBS 
J P 
Morgan HSBC 
Enam  1451(29) 573(18) 607(11) 728(8) 596(17) 356(13) 491(4) 355(5) 267(9) 249(4) 224(6) 224(3) 
Kotak 1451(29)  649(24) 825(17) 931(14) 750(16) 323(15) 569(5) 425(8) 287(10) 339(7) 303(6) 220(7) 
ICICI 573(18) 649(24)  522(14) 258(6) 566(13) 206(11) 361(5) 97(3) 385(9) 334(4) 176(3) 176(4) 
DSP 607(11) 825(17) 522(14)  697(10) 433(9) 450(12) 509(5) 321(3) 228(6) 298(5) 90(1) 215(4) 
Citigroup 728(8) 931(14) 258(6) 697(10)  213(3) 238(4) 494(4) 327(2) 90(3) 297(5) 0(0) 274(4) 
SBI 596(17) 750(16) 566(13) 433(9) 213(3)  215(3) 322(3) 97(3) 274(7) 333(4) 241(3) 99(2) 
JM Morgan 356(13) 323(15) 206(11) 450(12) 238(4) 215(3)  90(1) 0(0) 0(0) 139(2) 963(2) 195(3) 
Deutsche 491(4) 569(5) 361(5) 509(5) 494(4) 322(3) 90(1)  258(1) 117(1) 354(4) 117(1) 122(2) 
Morgan 
Stanley 
355(5) 425(8) 97(3) 321(3) 327(2) 97(3) 0(0) 258(1)  166(4) 22(1) 59(2) 69(1) 
JM Finance 267(9) 287(10) 385(9) 228(6) 90(3) 274(7) 0(0) 117(1) 166(4)  164(4) 151(2) 69(1) 
UBS 249(4) 339(7) 334(4) 298(5) 297(5) 333(4) 139(2) 354(4) 22(1) 164(4)  147(2) 122(2) 
J P Morgan  224(6) 303(6) 176(3) 90(1) 0(0) 241(3) 963(2) 117(1) 59(2) 151(2) 147(2)  0(0) 
HSBC 224(3) 220(7) 176(4) 215(4) 274(4) 99(2) 195(3) 122(2) 69(1) 69(1) 122(2) 0(0)  
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Underwriters that are supported by a foreign group or promoter (such as 
Citigroup, Deutsche, Morgan Stanley, UBS, JP Morgan and HSBC), are present in 
medium and large sized IPOs. With these connections, they have access to institutional 
investors in other countries which can, in turn, increase subscription from this category 
of investors. These well-connected underwriters prefer to work in syndicates as they 
have limited marketing and distribution networks in India to attract retail participants 
to an IPO by themselves. 
The matrix reveals that participation in a syndicate by foreign underwriters is 
less than that of local underwriters, but the amount raised per IPO by foreign 
underwriters is higher. These numbers confirm that foreign underwriters manage 
more medium to large sized IPOs.  
There were a few mergers in the underwriting industry over the sample period, 
but these were not amongst the top underwriters. Anticipating a potentially high 
future growth in the Indian market JM Finance and Morgan Stanley, that had a strong 
underwriting alliance, decided to break their partnership and operate independently. 
Independently both underwriters were amongst the top performing underwriters in 
the sample period. This shows that brand reputation in the Indian underwriting market 
is paramount in getting business from issuers, and also for maintaining continuous 
relationships with the institutional investors that are critical for IPO success. Thus, 
reputational capital is a key factor for underwriters to remain active and sustain 
themselves long-term in the IPO market.  
These results confirm the importance of inter-relationships between the top 
underwriters and that they syndicate quite often to manage IPOs. The continuing 
relationships amongst themselves to manage IPOs benefit the top underwriters to 
retain their market share, leading to higher income from the underwriting industry. 
Syndication amongst top underwriters also limits new entrants and their long-term 
survival in the industry. 
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Table 5.6 gives the concentration ratios and underwriter rank for each year for the top 10 underwriters who have participated in Indian IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and/or National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) between 
January 2000 and December 2010, excluding firms that have raised capital  through a follow-on issue. No. of IPOs is a count of all successful IPOs for that year that raised capital from the IPO market. Total Proceeds Raised is the total amount 
of capital raised by all IPOs in that year. No. of Active Underwriters is a count of all underwriters that have participated in at least one IPO in a given year, as the underwriter. CR4, CR8 and CR10 give the market share of the four, eight and ten 
largest underwriting firms in the industry. Top 10-Underwriters Ranking gives the rank of the top 10 underwriters as per proceeds raised in that year. The underwriters marked in red are amongst the top 13 underwriters in the sample period.  
Table 5.6:  Year-wise Concentration Ratios and Ranking of Top 10 Underwriters 
Year Number of IPOs 
Total 
Proceeds 
Raised 
No of Active 
Underwriters CR4 CR8 CR10 Top 10-Underwriters Ranking 
          Rank - 1 Rank - 2 Rank - 3 Rank - 4 Rank - 5 Rank - 6 Rank - 7 Rank - 8 Rank - 9 Rank - 10 
2000 8 8,601 10 84.17 99.69 100.00 Kotak 
Mahindra  
JM 
Morgan  
DSP Merrill  ICICI 
Securities 
IDBI 
Securities 
Khandwala 
Sec 
IL&FS 
Investsmart 
Triumph 
Finance 
Fortune 
Financial  
Karvy 
Investor  
2001 2 957 4 100.00 100.00 100.00 Triumph 
Finance 
Tata 
Finance  
IL&FS 
Investsmart 
Prebone 
Yamane 
            
2002 2 10,440 6 89.94 100.00 100.00 DSP 
Merrill  
JM 
Morgan  
ABN AMRO ICICI 
Securities 
Kotak 
Mahindra  
Solomon 
Smith 
        
2003 5 13,048 6 93.37 100.00 100.00 Kotak 
Mahindra  
JM 
Morgan  
ICICI 
Securities 
HSBC 
Securities 
Enam 
Finance 
IL&FS 
Investsmart 
        
2004 13 94,205 13 69.29 94.87 97.75 DSP 
Merrill  
JM 
Morgan  
J P Morgan  Kotak 
Mahindra  
Enam 
Finance 
ICICI 
Securities 
HSBC 
Securities 
CLSA India Citigroup  SBI Capital  
2005 38 97,983 23 48.46 71.39 79.58 Kotak 
Mahindra  
Enam 
Finance 
DSP Merrill  JM 
Morgan  
ICICI 
Securities 
SBI Capital  Citigroup  IL&FS 
Investsmart 
Yes Bank CLSA India 
2006 58 256,444 31 48.94 76.80 85.22 Enam 
Finance 
JM 
Morgan  
DSP Merrill  ICICI 
Securities 
Kotak 
Mahindra  
HSBC 
Securities 
Citigroup  SBI Capital  ABN 
AMRO 
Deutsche 
Equities 
2007 86 325,709 43 51.93 74.48 80.87 Kotak 
Mahindra  
Citigroup  Enam 
Finance 
ICICI 
Securities 
DSP 
Merrill  
UBS 
Securities  
SBI Capital  JM Finance Lehman 
Brothers  
Deutsche 
Equities 
2008 33 184,438 38 41.33 69.55 82.24 Kotak 
Mahindra  
ICICI 
Securities 
Deutsche 
Equities  
SBI Capital  JM 
Finance 
Enam 
Finance 
UBS 
Securities  
Macquarie 
Capital  
ABN 
AMRO 
J P 
Morgan  
2009 21 195,547 27 60.44 81.21 88.36 Morgan 
Stanley  
Kotak 
Mahindra  
SBI Capital  Enam 
Finance 
JM 
Finance 
Citigroup  ICICI 
Securities 
IDFC Capital HSBC 
Securities 
India 
Infoline 
2010 63 378,585 36 50.27 73.54 79.55 Kotak 
Mahindra  
Enam 
Finance 
Morgan 
Stanley 
Citigroup  DSP 
Merrill  
Deutsche 
Equities  
SBI Capital  JM Finance IDFC 
Capital 
J P 
Morgan  
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Figure 5.2: Year Wise Concentration Ratios 
Concentration Ratios and Ranking of top Underwriters 
Table 5.6 provides the concentration ratios (CR) for the top four, eight and ten 
underwriters for each sample year. Concentration ratio is a measure of the total 
output produced in an industry by a given number of firms in the industry. Here CR4, 
CR8 and CR10 gives the market share of the four, eight and ten largest firms in the 
industry and illustrates the degree to which industry is oligopolistic. I find that for all of 
the years in the sample period concentration ratios are quite high, which provides 
evidence of a highly concentrated market. In both the pre- and post-regulation period 
the market remains highly concentrated, but as shown in Figure 5.2 the concentration 
ratios are decreasing over time. For example, CR4 decreased from around 80% to 50% 
while CR10 has declined from 100% to around 80%, from the year 2000 to 2010.  
In addition, Table 5.6 gives the rank of the top 10 underwriters for each year as 
per proceeds raised in that year. The underwriters in red are the top underwriters in 
terms of the total proceeds raised for the full sample period. The table shows that for 
each year the top 10 underwriters mostly consist of highly reputed underwriters and it 
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is difficult for other underwriters to break into the top ranks. I find that underwriters 
such as Kotak, Enam, ICICI, SBI, DSP, JM Morgan and their split entity JM Finance and 
Morgan Stanley, are on average consistently amongst the top 10 underwriters in terms 
of proceeds raised each year. 
Table 5.7: List of most Active Underwriters 
No of Yrs. 
Underwriter 
Active 
No of Active 
Underwriters Name of Underwriters 
10 2 Kotak Mahindra and ICICI Securities 
8 3 Enam Finance, DSP Merrill and IL&FS Investsmart 
7 3 SBI Capital, JM Morgan and IDBI Capital 
6 3 Citigroup, Deutsche Equities and Anand Rathi 
5 10 
UBS Securities, J P Morgan, HSBC Securities, IDFC Capital, Edelweiss 
Capital, Axis Bank, Karvy Investor, Keynote Corporate, SREI Capital and 
Centrum Capital 
4 5 JM Financial, India Infoline, Almondz Global, Chartered Capital and Motilal Oswal  
3 10 
Morgan Stanley, ABN AMRO, CLSA India, YES Bank, UTI Securities, Allianz 
Securities, Saffron Capital, INGA, Canara Bank and Ashika Capital 
2 14 
Macquarie Capital, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Nomura Financial, 
SPA Merchant, Allbank Finance, BOB Capital, PL Capital, Microsec Capital, 
NEXGEN Capitals, Vivro Financial, Triumph International, Fortune 
Financial and Sobhagya Capital 
1 26 
Credit Suisse, Avendus Capital, Antique Capital, Comfort Securities, 
Religare Securities, RBS Equities, Intensive Fiscal, Batlivala & Karani, Elara 
Capital, Spark Capital, Aryaman Financial, Atherstone Capital, Khandwala 
Sec, Solomon Smith, VC Corporate, India Capital, Ambit Corporate, Bajaj 
Capital, KJMC Global, Indbank Merchant, RR Financial, Darashaw & 
Company, Tata Finance, Prebon Yamane, Punjab National Bank and A.K. 
Capital  
Table 5.7 shows the classification of underwriters by the number of years they are active in the IPO market for the sample period from 
Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2010. The underwriters in red are amongst the top ranked 13 underwriters who have cumulatively raised more than 
80% of the total proceeds raised in the sample period. 
Most Active Underwriters 
Table 5.7 shows the classification of underwriters by the number of years they 
are active in the sample period. The table reveals that around 50 out of 76, i.e. 65% of 
underwriters in the sample period fail to sustain a position in the IPO market for more 
than three years over the sample period. Furthermore, only 11 underwriters have 
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managed to remain active in the underwriting industry for a period of six years or 
more. The top underwriters (Kotak, ICICI, Enam, DSP, SBI and JM Morgan) have 
managed to survive for the longest time in the Indian underwriting industry. JM 
Finance and Morgan Stanley, individually, have been active each year managing IPOs 
after the two underwriters decided to operate independently in 2007. 
Number of IPOs Managed by Underwriters  
Table 5.8 shows the classification of underwriters by number of IPOs managed 
in the full sample period. The figures show that 33 out of 76 (43%) underwriters have 
managed less than two IPOs out of the 329 IPOs in the sample. Furthermore, a total of 
56 (74%) underwriters have managed less than 10 IPOs in the sample period, while 
only seven underwriters have been able to manage more than 30 IPOs. 
Table 5.8: No of IPOs managed by Underwriters 
IPOs Managed by Underwriters No. of Underwriters % Participation 
Managed less than 2  33 43.42 
Managed between 3 and 10  23 30.26 
Managed between 11and 30 s 13 17.11 
Managed greater than 30  7 9.21 
Total No. of Underwriters in the Sample 76 100 
In summary, from the underwriter syndication matrix and underwriter 
participation characteristics in IPOs, I infer that the Indian underwriting industry is 
dominated by a few underwriters who have been active for a longer period and 
smaller underwriters find it difficult to get business and survive long-term. Most of the 
large and prominent IPOs are managed by reputed underwriters who also syndicate 
amongst themselves frequently. This shows that the underwriting industry is highly 
concentrated and entry restrictions exist for new players. Thus, this suggests that it is 
difficult for new entrants to enter and sustain a position in the Indian IPO underwriting 
industry. High concentration in the industry, frequent syndication amongst 
underwriters and the presence of entry restrictions for new players can increase the 
likelihood of collusion amongst underwriters to exploit the market to attain higher 
benefits for themselves. 
 181 
 
5.7 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
5.7.1 Determinants of Underwriting Syndicate and Syndication Hypothesis 
In this section, I examine the hypothesis (H3) on the determinants of an IPO 
syndicate. I also investigate the hypothesis (H4) on what motivates underwriters to 
form a syndicate, based on risk mitigation or price manipulation arguments. Finally, I 
examine the effect of regulatory intervention on the formation of an underwriting 
syndicate (Hypothesis H2). Using OLS regression, I test this by regressing underwriter 
syndicate effort (Underwriter Syndicate Effort), which represents the number of 
underwriters in a syndicate, against the factors that affect underwriters’ syndication, 
namely IPO risk, underwriter reputation, total subscription, GMP underpricing and a 
set of control variables, as described in Equation 4. 
Equation 4 
Underwriter Syndicate Effort = β0 + β1 IPO Risk + β2 UW Reputation + β3 Total Subscription + 
β4 Log Expected Issue Size + β5 Book Value + β6 Log Age + β7 Pre 30 MR + β8 GMP Underpricing 
+ β9  Reg Dummy + β10  IPORiskD*RegDummy + ε 
The dependent variable is the underwriter syndicate effort (Underwriter 
Syndicate Effort) which is measured in terms of the ratio of the total underwriter 
syndicate effort to the total number of underwriters in a syndicate for a given IPO. The 
main explanatory variables are market risk of an IPO (IPO risk) which is measured by 
aftermarket standard deviation and is estimated using continuously compounded daily 
returns from day 21 through 125 after the IPO is listed on the stock exchange, 
underwriter reputation (UW Reputation) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for IPOs managed by reputed underwriters and 0 otherwise. I also include investors’ 
total subscription (Total Subscription) which is measured by the total number of shares 
subscribed to by investors as a proportion of the total number of shares offered to 
them, grey market price underpricing (GMP Underpricing) represents price 
manipulation in an IPO and is measured by the simple return calculated between the 
grey market price of an IPO and IPO offer price. The expected size of the issue (Log 
Expected Issue Size) is the natural logarithm of expected issue size and is the expected 
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proceeds of the offer measured in terms of the multiple of the midpoint of issue price 
band and the total number of shares offered to investors and regulation dummy (Reg 
Dummy), a proxy for the regulatory change that altered allocation power of 
underwriters from discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy has a value 
of 1 for the proportionate allocation regime (the post-regulation period) and 0 for the 
discretionary allocation regime (the pre-regulation period). Further, to examine how 
the relationship between underwriter syndicate effort and IPO risk is affected by the 
regulatory change, I extend the equation by including an interactive dummy 
(IPORisk*RegD) which is the multiple of high/low IPO risk dummy and regulation 
dummy. High/Low IPO risk dummy takes a value of 1 when the risk of an IPO is higher 
than the median, and 0 otherwise. 
I include a number of control variables: book value (Book Value) based on the 
most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO; the age of the IPO firm (Log Age) which 
is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm at the IPO and is measured by the 
difference between a firm's IPO year and its founding year. I also include recent market 
returns (Pre 30 MR), measured by the market return on the index for the 30 days 
preceding the IPO open date, as a control variable. The estimated parameters of the 
model are reported in Table 5.9 along with the t-statistics, which are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity.  
First, I examine what motivates underwriters to form an IPO syndicate. Is it due 
to risk mitigation or price manipulation (Hypothesis H4). This is investigated through a 
regression between underwriter syndicate effort, as the dependent variable, and 
external market specific risk, measured by IPO Risk variable, and price manipulation, as 
measured by the GMP Underpricing variable, as the independent variables. Based on 
my conceptual framework discussed in Section 5.4.3, underwriter syndicate effort will 
be positively related to the IPO risk if underwriters are working to minimise external 
risk.  
 
 183 
 
Table 5.9: Underwriting Syndicate Determinants and Syndication Hypothesis 
Variables Underwriter Syndicate Effort 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IPO Risk -0.051 0.539 1.533 
 
(-0.05) (0.52) (1.11) 
UW Reputation -0.317*** -0.362*** -0.362*** 
 
(-9.52) (-10.58) (-10.51) 
Total Subscription -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001* 
 (-2.90) (-1.86) (-1.86) 
Log Expected Issue Size 0.070*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 
 
(5.38) (6.12) (6.08) 
Book Value 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.86) (1.13) (1.22) 
Log Age -0.014 -0.004 -0.005 
 
(-0.86) (-0.23) (-0.27) 
Pre 30 MR 0.039 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.21) (-0.01) (0.01) 
GMP Underpricing 0.142 0.052 0.052 
 
(1.64) (0.62) (0.63) 
Reg Dummy  -0.164*** -0.146*** 
 
 (-4.97) (-4.02) 
IPORiskD*RegDummy    -0.042 
 
  (-0.96) 
Constant 0.023 0.078 0.051 
 
(0.19) (0.67) (0.44) 
Observations 299 299 299 
F-Statistic 19.35 20.45 18.51 
Adj R2 0.272 0.315 0.316 
 t statistics in parentheses   * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
In Table 5.9 the underwriter syndicate effort is regressed against a set of explanatory and control variable as noted in Eq(4), using an OLS regression 
framework. This table also gives White heteroskedasticity consistent t statistics in parentheses. It gives the number of observations, F-statistics and 
Adj R-square values of the models. The models are estimated from a sample of 299 Indian IPOs over the period of Jan 2000 to Dec 2010, excluding 
firms that have come to the market with follow-on issues. Underwriter syndicate effort is the ratio of total underwriter syndicate effort to the total 
number of underwriters in a syndicate for a given IPO. IPO Risk variable represents the risk of an IPO for underwriters and is measured by aftermarket 
standard deviation which is estimated using continuously compounded daily returns from day 21 through to 125 days after the IPO is listed on the 
stock exchange. UW Reputation refers to underwriter reputation and is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for IPOs managed by reputed 
underwriters and 0 otherwise. Total Subscription is a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by investors as a proportion to the total 
number of shares offered to them. Log Expected Issue Size is the natural logarithm of expected issue size which is the expected proceeds of the offer 
and is the multiple of the midpoint of issue price band and the total number of shares offered to investors. Book Value refers to the book value of the 
most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO (INR). Log Age is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm at IPO and is the difference between a 
firm's IPO year and its founding ear expressed in years. Pre 30 MR is the market return for the 30 days before the IPO open date (in percent). GMP 
Underpricing variable represents price manipulation in an IPO and is measured by the simple return calculated between the grey market price of an 
IPO and IPO offer price (in percent). Reg Dummy variable is a proxy for the regulatory change that shifted the allocation power of underwriters from 
discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy takes a value of 1 for the proportionate allocation regime and a value of 0 for the discretionary 
allocation regime. ***, *, and * denote the significance of the estimated parameters at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
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Similarly, if they pursue the objective of price manipulation, I again expect a positive 
relationship between underwriter syndicate effort and GMP underpricing. 
As shown in Model 1, I find that risk of an IPO (IPO Risk) has a negative 
relationship while grey market price underpricing (GMP Underpricing) has a positive 
relationship with underwriter syndicate effort (Underwriter Syndicate Effort). 
However, both variables are not significant in predicting the formation of an 
underwriting syndicate. Thus, my results do not find significant evidence to support the 
price manipulation motive for underwriters and challenge the risk sharing motive. 
The setting of the Indian market allows me to test the results more robustly by 
controlling for the change in institutional setting that affects underwriters’ behaviour 
in the IPO market. In Models 2 and 3, after controlling for the change in institutional 
setting, I find no significant relationship between IPO Risk, GMP Underpricing and 
Underwriter Syndicate Effort. These results support the earlier evidence from Model 1. 
Hence, I infer that the motivation for underwriters to form an IPO syndicate is neither 
risk sharing nor price manipulation. This evidence contradicts the traditional risk 
sharing theory on underwriting syndicates (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; Mandelker 
and Raviv, 1977) but supports the findings of the Corwin and Schultz (2005) study that 
finds underwriters do not syndicate for IPO risk sharing. My results also do not support 
the argument by Fu and Li (2007) that underwriters form a syndicate for price 
manipulation. Therefore, I find no support for hypothesis H4 that underwriters exert 
more effort by forming a large syndicate to handle riskier offers or for manipulating IPO 
price.  
Moreover, if underwriters syndicate for sharing external market-specific risk, 
then when an IPO is risky and is issued in the post-regulation period, the number of 
members in a syndicate will be higher. I measure the effect of regulatory change and 
IPO risk on underwriter syndicate effort, by interacting regulation change dummy (Reg 
Dummy) with the High/Low IPO risk dummy variable (IPO Risk Dummy). I expect that in 
the post-regulation period, when the risk of managing an IPO is high for underwriters, 
then underwriter syndicate effort will increase to mitigate this higher risk and, 
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therefore, the relationship between the interactive variable High/Low IPO risk dummy 
variable and regulation change dummy will be significant and positive. 
Model 3 shows that the interactive dummy variable of IPO risk dummy and the 
regulation dummy (IPORiskD*RegDummy). Contrary to expectations, it has a negative 
relationship with underwriter syndicate effort and is statistically insignificant. This 
shows that when an IPO is risky and issued in the post-regulation period, underwriters 
do not have any incentive to form a large syndicate. This evidence supports the earlier 
results that find no relationship between risk of an IPO and size of the underwriting 
syndicate. Hence, overall the findings support the Corwin and Schultz (2005) study that 
underwriters do not syndicate for risk sharing, but the findings contradict the 
traditional risk sharing theories on IPO syndication, which conclude that underwriters 
syndicate to mitigate IPO risk (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; Mandelker and Raviv, 
1977).  
Second, I investigate the determinants of the size of an underwriting syndicate 
(Hypothesis H3). Based on my conceptual framework, discussed in Section 5.4.2, IPO 
risk will be positively related to underwriter syndicate effort, if underwriters form a 
syndicate to minimise external market risk. Correspondingly, if underwriters form a 
syndicate to pursue the objective of mitigating underwriters’ specific internal 
inventory risk, I expect the relationship between underwriter syndicate effort to be 
negative with underwriter reputation and total subscription, while positive for issue 
size.  
From the models, I find that the coefficient of total subscription (Total 
Subscription) and underwriter reputation (UW Reputation) are negative and 
statistically significant in all the regression models at the 1% significance level, while 
issue size (Log Expected Issue Size) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. So, when a reputed underwriter manages an IPO, the average effort 
of the underwriter decreases by 0.317 to 0.362 units, compared to when an IPO is 
managed by a less successful underwriter. When the total subscription increases on 
average by a multiple of one, the average syndicate effort for each member decreases 
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between 0.002 and 0.001 units. Also, when the issue size is large, underwriter 
syndicate members have to put in on average 0.07 to 0.08 units of extra effort. 
Therefore, from the results, I infer that it is imperative to have a reputed underwriter 
managing an IPO as it results in a lower individual effort for each underwriter. Also, 
when investors show lower interest in an IPO and the IPO size is large, the syndicate 
members have to exert more effort for IPO success. However, as discussed while 
testing hypothesis H4, the variable IPO risk is statistically insignificant.  
Thus, my results indicate that underwriters need to put in more effort by 
forming a large underwriting syndicate when the issue size is large, participation from 
investors is weak and when they are not widely reputed. As underwriter reputation, 
issue size and participation from investors represent underwriter-specific risk, taken 
together these results indicate that underwriters syndicate while managing an IPO to 
reduce their inventory risk. 
In addition, the findings are as expected in the Indian market due to the 
institutional setting that does not have a firm commitment underwriting mechanism 
for the underwriters but follows the best effort mechanism55. Hence, in this situation, 
the main risk for the underwriters is whether they can successfully sell the shares to 
investors, being the inventory risk of an IPO. 
Finally, I test the syndication hypothesis by analysing the effect of the 
regulatory change on the formation of an underwriting syndicate (Hypothesis H2). In 
the absence of allocation discretion, underwriters have difficulty in maintaining 
information sharing relationships with institutional investors and therefore the overall 
risk for underwriters to manage an IPO is high. The expectation is that to survive in the 
IPO market, underwriters can combine and exert more effort, otherwise they may 
become inactive and leave the underwriting market because of the higher risk. 
Therefore, according to my conceptual framework, discussed in Section 5.4.1, in the 
absence of allocation discretion, syndication amongst underwriters will be high, and 
                                                     
55 As discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.4. 
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hence I expect a positive relationship between the regulation dummy variable and 
underwriter syndicate effort. 
I find that in Models 2 and 3, the regulation dummy variable (Reg Dummy) is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level, but contrary to expectation, the 
coefficient has a negative sign. This suggests that when the overall risk of managing an 
IPO is high, underwriters are not interested in forming large syndicates. Therefore, the 
evidence is that in the absence of allocation discretion, syndication amongst 
underwriters has decreased, which is in contradiction to the syndication hypothesis, H2. 
Among the control variables, I find that book value (Book Value), return on the 
market 30 days prior to the IPO opening day (Pre 30 MR) and age of firm (Log Age) are 
statistically insignificant in all models. Thus, I can conclude that the size of the firm 
does not affect the decision of underwriters to form a large or small syndicate, but the 
size of the offering does. Also, current market conditions and whether the firm new or 
an old does not influence the effort of syndicate members. 
As the results show that in the post-regulation regime, when the overall risk of 
managing an IPO is high, underwriters are reluctant to form underwriting syndicates, I 
was motivated to conduct further tests on how underwriters are able to manage the 
success of an IPO. To understand this issue, I investigate the relationship between 
institutional investor participation and syndication by top underwriters. This is 
important to examine as I find a relationship between underwriter syndicate effort and 
underwriter reputation. For underwriters to have a higher reputation, they have to 
invest a lot of time and money in building their social capital. On the other hand, if an 
underwriter is not prestigious, they have to syndicate with other underwriters that can 
help overcome the entry barrier for new and small underwriters.  
From the data presented in Tables 5 to 8, I find evidence that there are entry 
barriers for underwriters and it is difficult for many of underwriters to remain active 
for a long period in the Indian underwriting industry. Therefore, to survive in the IPO 
market, it is important for underwriters to have a high reputation, as this assists them 
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in developing a strong network with institutional investors that results in lowering the 
risk of managing an IPO. I also find that syndication amongst reputed underwriters is 
quite common. Hence, the question is what is the role of institutional investors and 
how does it affect the formation of underwriting syndicates by reputable 
underwriters?  
Therefore, in the next analysis, I explore the relationship between reputation-
based syndication and institutional investors’ participation, as these investors act as a 
catalyst for IPO success. 
5.7.2 Reputation-based Syndication and Institutional Participation 
In this section, I investigate the influence of reputation-based syndication by 
top underwriters on institutional investor participation and the effect of the regulation 
change on this relationship. Using an OLS regression framework, I test this by 
regressing institutional participation against top underwriter syndicate dummy and a 
set of control variables as described in Equation 5. 
Equation 5 
QIB Subscription=β0 + β1 IPO Risk + β2 Log Expected Issue Size + β3 Log Age + β4 IPO Upper 
Price Band Dummy + β5 Reg Dummy + β6 Top UW Syndicate Dummy + β7 
TopUWSyndicateD*RegD + ε 
The dependent variable is the participation of institutional investors (QIB 
Subscription) and is measured by the total number of shares subscribed by qualified 
institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for 
allocation. The main explanatory variable is the dummy for reputation-based 
syndication by top underwriter (Top UW Syndicate Dummy) which takes the value of 1 
if the underwriter is amongst the top underwriters who cumulatively raise more than 
80% of the total proceeds raised by all IPO firms in the sample period and forms a 
syndicate, and 0 otherwise. Further, to examine how this relationship is affected by the 
regulation change, I extend the equation to include an interactive dummy 
(TopUWSyndicateD*RegD) which is the multiple of reputation-based syndication by 
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top underwriters and the regulation dummy. The regulation dummy (Reg Dummy) is a 
proxy for the regulatory change that altered the allocation power of underwriters from 
discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy takes a value of 1 for the 
proportionate allocation regime (the post-regulation period) and 0 for the 
discretionary allocation regime (the pre-regulation period).  
I also include a number of control variables: the market risk of an IPO (IPO risk), 
which represents the risk of an IPO for underwriters and is measured by aftermarket 
standard deviation that is estimated using continuously compounded daily returns 
from day 21 through to day 125 after the IPO is listed on the stock exchange; the 
expected size of the issue (Log Expected Issue Size), which is the natural logarithm of 
expected issue size and is the expected proceeds of the offer which is measured in 
terms of the multiple of the midpoint of issue price band and the total number of 
shares offered to investors. Other variables include the age of the IPO firm (Log Age) 
which is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm at IPO and is measured by the 
difference between a firm's IPO year and its founding year, and a dummy variable for 
IPO being priced at upper price of the initial price band (IPO Upper Price Band 
Dummy), which takes a value of 1 if the issue is priced at the upper price of the initial 
price band, and 0 otherwise. The estimated parameters of the model are reported in 
Table 5.10, along with the t-statistics, which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
Model 1 investigates how reputation-based syndication affects institutional 
subscription. The expectation is that when an underwriter is highly reputable and 
forms a syndicate, it will lead to higher participation from institutional investors. This is 
because a reputable underwriter has a strong network of clients, having been active in 
the IPO market for a long period and having managed a number of IPOs. This adds to 
the network of different clients of other syndicate members, with the overall result of 
increased participation from institutional investors (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). 
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Table 5.10: Reputation-based Syndication and Institutional Subscription 
 
 
Variables QIB Subscription 
  Model 1 
IPO Risk 88.497 
 (0.58) 
Log Expected Issue Size 5.112*** 
 
(2.67) 
Log Age -3.042 
 
(-1.39) 
IPO Upper Price Band Dummy 30.993*** 
 (8.84) 
Reg Dummy -0.752 
 
(-0.19) 
Top UW Syndicate Dummy -4.911 
 (-0.91) 
TopUWSyndicateD*RegD 31.530*** 
 
(4.45) 
Constant -38.166** 
 
(-2.49) 
Observations 329 
F-Statistic 14.01 
Adj R2 0.274 
t statistics in parentheses   
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
In Table 5.10 the institutional subscription is regressed against a set of explanatory and control variables as noted in Eq(5), using an 
OLS regression framework. This table also gives White heteroskedasticity consistent t statistics in parentheses. It gives the number of 
observations, F-statistics and Adj R-square values of the models. The models are estimated from a sample of 329 Indian IPOs over the 
period of Jan 2000 to Dec 2010, excluding firms that have come to the market with follow-on issues. QIB Subscription, a measure of 
the total number of shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for 
allocation. The IPO Risk variable represents the risk of an IPO for underwriters and is measured by aftermarket standard deviation, 
estimated using continuously compounded daily returns from day 21 through to 125 days after the IPO is listed on the stock exchange. 
Log Expected Issue Size is the natural logarithm of expected issue size, which is the expected proceeds of the offer and the multiple of 
the midpoint of issue price band and the total number of shares offered to investors. Log Age is the natural logarithm of the age of the 
firm at IPO and is the difference between a firm's IPO year and its founding year expressed in years. IPO Upper Price Band Dummy 
takes a value of 1 if the issue is priced at the upper price of the initial price band, and 0 otherwise. Reg Dummy variable is a proxy for 
the regulatory change that shifted the allocation power of underwriters from discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy 
takes a value of 1 for the proportionate allocation regime and a value of 0 for the discretionary allocation regime. Top UW Syndicate 
Dummy is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the underwriter is amongst the top underwriters who cumulatively raise 
more than 80% of the total proceeds raised by all IPO firms in the sample period and forms a syndicate, and 0 otherwise. ***, *, and * 
denote the significance of the estimated parameters at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
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When a reputable underwriter forms a syndicate to manage an IPO, it acts as a 
certification tool by sending a strong signal to institutional investors about the IPO’s 
quality, thereby increasing participation from these investors. Therefore, I expect a 
positive relationship between reputation-based syndication and institutional 
subscription. From the results, I find that reputation-based syndication (Top UW 
Syndicate Dummy) results in a 4.91 times lower subscription from institutional 
investors, compared to when a single underwriter manages an IPO, or when a 
relatively unknown underwriter forms a syndicate. However, it is statistically 
insignificant. Thus, my results do not find evidence that reputation-based syndication 
leads to increased participation in an IPO from institutional investors.  
Model 1 also investigates the effect of the regulatory change that impacts the 
relationship of underwriters with institutional investors. The expectation is that when 
underwriters have allocation discretion, regular institutional investors’ participation 
will be higher. This is when underwriters have allocation discretion, and an IPO is 
overpriced, institutional investors would participate, demonstrating an artificial 
demand for an IPO, but would not get shares allocated as underwriters control the 
allocation of shares.  
On the other hand, I also argue that when underwriters have allocation 
discretion, only regular institutional investors will participate strongly as other 
institutional investors will not be favoured with a fair allocation strategy. However, 
when underwriters lack allocation discretion, all institutional investors have a fair 
chance of getting an allocation, and they will participate irrespective of their 
relationship with underwriters.  
The results from Model 1 show that the regulatory change dummy (Reg 
Dummy) is negative, but statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This indicates 
that the change in regulation does not affect the participation of institutional investors 
(QIB Subscription) in an IPO. Hence, I conclude that giving allocation discretion to 
underwriters, or withdrawing this power, does not affect the relationship of 
underwriters with institutional investors in an IPO.  
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To test the relationship between reputation-based syndication in the post-
regulation period and institutional subscription, I interact the Top UW syndicate 
dummy with the regulation dummy. Interestingly, the interactive term 
(TopUWSyndicateD*RegD) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance 
level. Hence, in the post-regulation period, when reputed underwriters form a 
syndicate it results in 31.53 times higher participation from institutional investors, 
compared to when a single underwriter manages an IPO, or when a less well-reputed 
underwriter forms a syndicate. So, when underwriters do not have allocation 
discretion, it is important for the IPO issuer to have a syndicate manage its IPO. More 
importantly, one of the underwriters should be amongst the top-rated underwriters in 
the industry, as this results in more interest by institutional investors. Therefore, this 
result suggests that when a well-reputed underwriter forms a syndicate in the regime 
without allocation discretion, it leads to higher participation from institutional 
investors, which is positive for the IPO market.  
Amongst the control variables, the results find no relationship between IPO risk 
(IPO Risk) and institutional investor participation. An interesting point is that when the 
issue size (log Expected Issue Size) increases, the institutional subscription should 
decrease, but the results show an increase by five times, and it is significant at the 1% 
significance level. This finding is similar to the results of Neupane and Poshakwale 
(2012) who also studied Indian IPOs. Hence, the inference is that institutional investors 
want to participate in issues that are large in size, as there would be higher liquidity in 
the secondary market on listing, which gives them an easy option to exit an IPO. Thus, I 
find that an institutional investor’s investment decision is dependent on the size of an 
IPO, but not on the risk of an IPO. 
Age of the firm (Log Age) at the time of its IPO does not affect participation 
from institutional investors. This finding is similar to the research results on Indian IPOs 
by Neupane et al. (2014). This indicates that higher information asymmetry between 
new and old firms does not influence the decision of institutional investors to 
participate in an IPO. This is because they have access to both public and private 
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information about an IPO firm and, more importantly, they possess the ability to 
analyse the fundamental quality of an IPO with the information available to them. 
I find a positive and a statistically significant relationship, at the 1% significance 
level, between the IPO being priced at the upper price of the IPO price band (IPO 
Upper Price Band Dummy) and institutional subscription. The results show that when 
the IPO is priced at the upper price band, institutional participation is 31 times more 
than when it is priced at a price lower than the upper price band. The evidence is that 
institutional subscription is a determining factor for underwriters to price an IPO at the 
upper level of the initial price band.  
The evidence from these results is that when underwriters do not have 
allocation discretion, reputation-based syndication results in higher participation from 
institutional investors. Therefore, in the next analysis, I examine whether the benefit of 
reputation-based syndication by top underwriters results in increased market welfare 
or is used by underwriters to benefit themselves for more self-benefit. I also investigate 
the information sharing hypothesis. 
5.7.3 Information Sharing, Underwriter Syndication and IPO Underpricing  
In this section, I examine the effect of reputation-based syndication by top-
ranked underwriters on underpricing in an IPO (Hypotheses H5 and H6). I also 
investigate the effect of regulatory change on IPO underpricing, thus testing the 
information sharing hypothesis (H1). Using OLS regression, I test this by regressing 
underpricing against reputation-based syndication dummy and a regulation dummy, 
and a set of control variables as described in Equation 6. 
Equation 6 
Underpricing = β0 + β1 IPO Risk + β2 Log Expected Issue Size + β3 Log Age + β4 Retail 
Subscription + β5 QIB Subscription + β6  Pre 30 MR  + β7 UW Reputation + β8  Reg Dummy + β9 
Top UW Syndicate Dummy + β10 TopUWSyndicateD *RegDummy + ε 
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The dependent variable is underpricing (Underpricing) and is measured by the 
simple return calculated between the closing price at the end of the first day of trading 
and the IPO issue price. The main explanatory variables are reputation-based 
syndication (Top UW Syndicate Dummy), a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 
if the underwriter is amongst the top underwriters who cumulatively raise more than 
80% of the total proceeds raised by all IPO firms in the sample period and form a 
syndicate, and 0 otherwise; and regulation dummy (Reg Dummy) which is a proxy for 
the regulatory change that altered the allocation power of underwriters from 
discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy takes a value of 1 for the 
proportionate allocation regime (the post-regulation period), and 0 for the 
discretionary allocation regime (the pre-regulation period). Further, to examine how 
the relationship between underpricing and reputation-based syndication is affected by 
the regulatory change, I extend the equation by including an interactive dummy 
(TopUWSyndicateD*RegD), which is the multiple of reputation-based syndication by 
top underwriter dummy and the regulation dummy. 
I also include a number of control variables:  the market risk of an IPO (IPO 
risk), measured by aftermarket standard deviation estimated using continuously 
compounded daily returns from 21 through 125 days after the IPO is listed on the stock 
exchange; the expected size of the issue (Log Expected Issue size), which is the natural 
logarithm of expected issue size, and is the expected proceeds of the offer measured 
in terms of the multiple of the midpoint of issue price band and the total number of 
shares offered to investors. Other variables include the age of the firm (Log Age) which 
is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm at IPO and is measured by the difference 
between a firm's IPO year and its founding year, subscription by retail investors (Retail 
Subscription), a measure of the total number of shares subscribed by retail investors as 
a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation; and subscription from 
institutional investors (QIB subscription) as a measure of the total number of shares 
subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares 
available to them for allocation. I also include recent market return (Pre 30 MR) which 
is the market return for the 30 days before the IPO open date, as well as underwriter 
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reputation (UW Reputation), a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs 
managed by reputed underwriters, and 0 otherwise. The estimated parameters of the 
model are reported in Table 5.11 along with the t-statistics adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity.  
In Models 2 and 4, I test the information sharing hypothesis, by investigating 
the effect of granting allocation discretion to underwriters and regulating it, on IPO 
underpricing (Hypothesis H1). Based on my conceptual framework, discussed in Section 
5.2.1, giving allocation discretion to underwriters will improve price discovery in an 
IPO, as underwriters can develop truthful information sharing relationships with 
informed institutional investors. Hence, there will be a positive relationship between 
the regulation dummy and IPO underpricing. I find that in Models 2 and 4 the 
regulation change dummy (Reg Dummy) is statistically insignificant. Therefore, the 
present finding provides no support for the information sharing hypothesis.  
Thus, the results do not support the evidence from the Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989) study that finds that when underwriters have discretion in allocation, there is a 
higher level of information sharing between the underwriters and institutional 
investors. Also, the outcome is in contrast to the findings on the Indian IPO market by 
Bubna and Prabhala (2011) who find that allocation power improves pre-market price 
discovery and results in lower underpricing. Thus, my results do not find significant 
evidence to support the information sharing hypothesis that discretion in allocation 
leads to more information sharing between underwriters and institutional investors.  
From the results, I can also infer that when underwriters have allocation 
discretion, there is no evidence of them supporting rent-seeking activity. Hence, the 
results of this research do not support the conclusion by Aggarwal et al. (2002), 
Jenkinson and Jones (2009) and Reuter (2006) that giving allocation discretion to 
underwriters allows them to pursue a rent-seeking activity for higher self-gain.  
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Table 5.11: Reputation-based Syndication and IPO Underpricing  
Variables Underpricing 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
IPO Risk 0.856 1.085 1.203 1.485 
 
(0.52) (0.64) (0.72) (0.88) 
Log Expected Issue Size -0.054** -0.051** -0.077*** -0.071** 
 
(-2.34) (-2.21) (-2.75) (-2.55) 
Log Age 0.019 0.024 0.021 0.026 
 (0.75) (0.92) (0.82) (0.99) 
Retail Subscription 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (3.37) (3.16) (3.34) (3.32) 
QIB Subscription 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (6.65) (7.10) (3.01) (3.34) 
Pre 30 MR -0.057 -0.076 -0.049 -0.078 
 (-0.19) (-0.25) (-0.17) (-0.26) 
UW Reputation -0.006 -0.023   
 (-0.12) (-0.49)   
Reg Dummy  -0.060  0.049 
  (-0.94)  (0.64) 
Top UW Syndicate Dummy   0.094* 0.279** 
   (1.67) (2.32) 
TopUWSyndicateD*RegD 
  
 -0.257** 
   
 (-2.23) 
Constant 0.359* 0.373* 0.476** 0.374 
 
(1.66) (1.71) (2.03) (1.58) 
N 329 329 329 329 
F-Statistic 15.706 14.823 15.512 14.162 
Adj R2 0.371 0.371 0.375 0.383 
t statistics in parentheses  
  
 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
   
 
In Table 5.11 underpricing is regressed against a set of explanatory and control variables as noted in Eq(6), using an OLS regression framework. This 
table also gives White heteroskedasticity consistent t statistics in parentheses. It gives the number of observations, F-statistics and Adj R-square 
values of the models. The models are estimated from a sample of 329 Indian IPOs over the period of Jan 2000 to Dec 2010, excluding firms that have 
come to the market with follow-on issues. Underpricing  is the simple return calculated between the closing price at the end of the first day of trading 
and IPO issue price (in percent). IPO Risk variable represents the risk of an IPO for underwriters and is measured by aftermarket standard deviation 
which is estimated using continuously compounded daily returns from days 21 through to 125 after the IPO is listed on the stock exchange. Log 
Expected Issue Size is the natural logarithm of expected issue size which is the expected proceeds of the offer and is the multiple of the midpoint of 
issue price band and the total number of shares offered to investors. Log Age is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm at IPO and is the 
difference between a firm's IPO year and its founding year expressed in years. Retail subscription is a measure of the total number of shares 
subscribed by retail investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. QIB Subscription is a measure of the total number of 
shares subscribed by qualified institutional investors as a proportion of the total shares available to them for allocation. Pre 30 MR is the market 
return for the 30 days before the IPO open date (in percent). UW Reputation refers to underwriter reputation and is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 for IPOs managed by reputed underwriters, and 0 otherwise. Reg Dummy variable is a proxy for the regulatory change that shifted the 
allocation power of underwriters from discretionary to proportionate. The regulation dummy takes a value of 1 for the proportionate allocation 
regime, and a value of 0 for the discretionary allocation regime. Top UW Syndicate Dummy is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
underwriter is amongst the top underwriters who cumulatively raise more than 80% of the total proceeds raised by all IPO firms in the sample period 
and forms a syndicate, and 0 otherwise. ***, *, and * denote the significance of the estimated parameters at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
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Further, I test hypotheses H5 and H6 which investigate the influence of 
reputation-based syndication by top underwriters on IPO underpricing and the effect 
of the regulatory change on this relationship. The expected outcome is that when a top 
ranked reputed underwriter forms a syndicate, more information can be extracted 
from institutional investors because of the strong network they have built over time 
with this category of investors. This extracted information is then exchanged amongst 
the syndicate members and results in the IPO being priced at the fair value, and 
thereby results in lower underpricing. Thus, based on my conceptual framework, 
discussed in Section 5.4.4, reputation-based syndication results in more information 
production and sharing and hence I expect the relationship between underpricing and 
reputation-based syndication to be negative. 
However, I find that in Models 3 and 4 there is a positive and a statistically 
significant relationship between reputation-based syndication (Top UW Syndicate 
Dummy) and underpricing in an IPO. I find that when a well-reputed underwriter forms 
an IPO syndicate, it results in an increased underpricing in the IPO, in the range of 9% 
to 28% (approximately). Thus, the inference is that when a top underwriter forms an 
IPO syndicate, it is not for higher information sharing but for price manipulation. 
The institutional setting in the Indian IPO market that affects underwriters’ 
behaviour in relationship to the risk-return tradeoff allows me to test the results more 
robustly. Intuitively one expects that when allocation discretion is regulated, the 
outcome is reduced information sharing between underwriters and informed 
institutional investors. However, when a reputed underwriter forms a syndicate, it can 
result in higher information production and sharing, which leads to the IPO being 
priced at the fair value, meaning lower underpricing.  
On the other hand, in the absence of allocation discretion, when the income of 
underwriters has become more uncertain because of higher overall risk, underwriters 
have to exert more effort for IPO success. The higher effort would then require higher 
income for underwriters as a return on effort. This is possible by way of colluding with 
other underwriters to form an IPO syndicate for manipulating the issue price. I 
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consider reputation-based syndication by top underwriters as a measure of collusion 
and price manipulation as only this category of underwriters can manipulate the IPO 
price and also sustain long-term involvement in the IPO market.  
In the Indian IPO market, this is possible as the underwriting market is highly 
concentrated and new issuers have limited options to choose underwriters, even when 
underpricing is high. Thus, based on my conceptual framework, discussed in Section 
5.4.5, underpricing will be negatively related to reputation-based syndication if the 
motive for syndication is information sharing. However, if the objective of reputation-
based syndication is price manipulation, I expect the relationship between 
underpricing and reputation-based syndication to be positive. 
In Model 4, I find that the interactive term of reputation-based syndication 
dummy and regulation dummy (TopUWSyndicateD*RegD) has a negative coefficient 
and is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Hence, my results find 
significant evidence that when allocation discretion is regulated, reputation-based 
syndication results in a higher level of information sharing and resulted in 25.7% less 
underpricing in an IPO, compared to when a single underwriter manages an IPO, or 
when a relatively unknown underwriter forms a syndicate. Thus, my results do not 
support the collusion and price manipulation motive of underwriters that suggests 
underwriters use syndicating to increase their own benefit by increasing underpricing 
in an IPO. Therefore, the evidence is that in the post-regulation regime, reputation-
based syndication is for information sharing that benefits the issuer with less 
underpricing and thus result in increased market welfare.  
Among the control variables, I find no relationship between IPO risk (IPO Risk) 
and underpricing. Hence, I can conclude that it is not necessary for risky IPOs to be 
underpriced more to attract investors. The expected issue proceeds (Log Expected 
Issue Size) variable is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. This 
shows that large issues are priced more accurately than smaller issues. This finding 
supports the research on the Indian IPO market by Marisetty and Subrahmanyam 
(2010) and Krishnamurti et al. (2011) that have similar results, but it does not support 
 199 
 
the evidence by Deb and Marisetty (2010) and Bubna and Prabhala (2011) that find no 
relationship between the size of an IPO and underpricing. Moreover, my research 
supports the past research in the American market by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) that 
concludes that large issues have lower underpricing. 
In Models 1 and 2, I find that underwriter reputation (UW Reputation) has a 
negative effect on IPO underpricing but is not significant at conventional levels. Thus, 
my study does not support the previous literature on underwriter reputation in the 
Indian IPO market that finds evidence of lower underpricing when reputed 
underwriters manage an IPO (Bubna and Prabhala, 2011; Neupane and Thapa, 2013). 
I find that retail subscription and institutional subscription have a statistically 
significant positive relationship with IPO underpricing. The results reveal that an 
increase in retail investor participation by one multiple increases underpricing by 1.1 % 
while for institutional investors it increases underpricing by 0.3 to 0.4%. This result 
supports the findings of Derrien (2005) and Ritter and Welch (2002) who find similar 
evidence. However, the evidence for retail subscription is not consistent with that of 
Neupane and Thapa (2013) on Indian IPOs. They find an insignificant relationship 
between retail investor participation and underpricing. Moreover, for institutional 
subscription, my results support the evidence of Neupane and Thapa (2013) who also 
find a positive relationship between institutional subscription and IPO underpricing.  
Moreover, the expectation is that mature firms have more information 
available in the marketplace for potential investors than younger firms do. Hence the 
expectation is that older firms will be associated with lower underpricing (Bubna and 
Prabhala, 2011). Also, in support of the literature that finds evidence of a positive 
relationship between overall market returns during the period before the IPO opens 
for subscription (Loughran and Ritter, 2003), the expectation is that market returns for 
the 30 days before the IPO open date will have a positive relationship with IPO 
underpricing. However, I find that age of the firm and return on the market 30 days 
prior to the IPO opening day are both insignificant at conventional levels and do not 
affect IPO underpricing. Hence, my findings do not support the theory that older firms 
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have less information asymmetry than new firms, and that current market conditions 
have an impact on IPO underpricing. 
Thus, one can conclude that giving allocation power to underwriters does not 
have an influence on the IPO being priced at the fair value and, moreover, when 
underwriters’ allocation power is regulated, reputation-based syndication results in 
lower underpricing.  
5.7.4 Discussion 
The evidence from the results is that granting allocation discretion to 
underwriters in bookbuilt IPOs does not result in a higher level of information 
production from informed institutional investors. I, therefore, can conclude that 
allocation discretion does not increase the efficiency of the IPO price discovery 
process. It is also worth noting that in the setting of the Indian market, with relatively 
high levels of underpricing, the evidence does not support the argument that 
underwriters abuse their allocation power by way of rent-seeking activity. As lower 
underpricing is beneficial to the issuer, and everyone participates in the IPO at the fair 
price, regulating allocation power of underwriters results in increased market welfare 
and address the purpose of the regulatory intervention.  
The results do not support the hypothesis that the motivation for forming an 
underwriter syndicate risk sharing or price manipulation. However, the results support 
the intuition that syndication by underwriters is to reduce the underwriter specific 
inventory risk. This is indirect risk mitigation as when the issue size is large, the 
underwriter managing the IPO is not reputed, and investor participation is unknown, 
so the underwriting syndicate will be large to mitigate this risk. Thus, risk mitigation 
holds but contradicts the traditional risk sharing theory that measures risk only from 
the perspective of market-specific IPO risk.  
One can conclude that the reason for underwriters to form an IPO syndicate is 
to gain certification status from investors and share inventory risk. This is new 
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evidence, as current literature argues that syndication is for mitigating external 
market-specific IPO risk. 
As discussed in the institutional features Chapter 2, when compared to the firm 
commitment underwriting mechanism in the US, in India, most underwriters use the 
best efforts underwriting method to sell shares. Therefore, the market-specific IPO risk 
is lower, but the inventory risk is higher for them. This is supported by the results. 
Thus, the conclusion is that underwriters form a large syndicate to mitigate internal 
underwriter-specific risk, rather than external market-specific risk and hence this 
syndication is purely for economic benefit. 
The evidence also suggests that in the post-regulation period underwriters do 
not form large syndicates because of excessive inventory risk. Therefore I conclude that 
when the risk for underwriters managing an IPO is high, they form an IPO syndicate 
and this may be due to the underwriting business not being lucrative for them when 
there are no added incentives to remain active. Further research is needed to examine 
and explain inactive behaviour of underwriters. 
When the allocation power of underwriters is regulated, and therefore results 
in a potentially higher overall risk for them, they are reluctant to operate in the market 
unless institutional investors play a significant role by actively participating in IPOs. 
This is because when the risk is high, institutional investors share risk with 
underwriters by acting as a mediating factor for underwriters to syndicate. Existing 
studies discuss syndication from the perspective of information sharing, risk 
mitigation, and price manipulation. However, the extant literature does not discuss 
how syndication amongst underwriters influences institutional investors’ participation. 
Thus, identifying that institutional investors act as a mediating factor for underwriters 
to syndicate is quite a significant contribution to the IPO literature.  
Hence, my finding is that when underwriters do not have allocation discretion, 
and therefore when the risk of managing an IPO is high, the participation of 
institutional investors is a major factor for underwriters to syndicate. Thus, the 
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evidence is that if institutional investors do not participate, the reputed underwriters 
do not prefer to form syndicates. This indicates that positive institutional response is 
like a signal to the top reputable underwriters to form an IPO syndicate.  
Thus, institutional investors act as a mediating factor for underwriters to 
syndicate by sharing risk with them, and hence play a significant role in risk mitigation 
for underwriters. In addition, in the absence of allocation discretion, reputation-based 
syndication is an important certification to institutional investors about IPO quality. 
This influences the success of an IPO and gives underwriters the ability to enhance their 
sustainability in the underwriting industry. 
However, when allocation discretion is regulated, only reputable underwriters 
can survive the higher risk. This can have a negative impact on the underwriting 
industry as it is difficult for small and less reputable underwriters to survive in the IPO 
market, which results in less competition in the underwriting industry. 
Thus overall, the conclusion is that when allocation discretion is regulated, and 
when a highly reputed underwriter forms a syndicate with other underwriters, the 
syndicated underwriters use the information they possess more fairly and in addition, 
certify the quality of the IPO firm. Gaining such quality endorsement is important in 
increasing the participation of institutional investors. Hence, in the absence of 
allocation discretion, reputation-based syndication results in an overall positive effect 
on market welfare due to higher participation from institutional investors and lower 
underpricing in an IPO. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Internationally most IPO markets are characterised by the presence of a 
significant number of underwriters who compete aggressively amongst themselves for 
underwriting business. In theory, this should work to eliminate underpricing. However, 
we know that even in highly competitive environments, IPOs generally remain 
underpriced. Moreover, even with high levels of underpricing, we observe that 
underwriters who have a good reputation do not lose underwriting business to other 
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underwriters. Academic research on IPOs has focussed mostly on an examination of 
IPO underpricing from the perspective of an individual underwriter. Nevertheless, 
most IPOs are managed by underwriters who come together to form an IPO syndicate. 
In this study, I contribute to the limited literature on IPO syndicates by examining 
underwriter syndication in the Indian IPO market and its effect on IPO underpricing. 
Using information from 329 IPOs issued in the Indian market, over a period 
subject to both discretionary and proportionate allocation regimes, I investigate the 
determinants of the size of an underwriting syndicate. I also explore the motivation of 
underwriters to form a syndicate by investigating whether it is motivated by risk 
sharing as opposed to price manipulation. Additionally, I examine whether regulating 
the allocation power of underwriters leads to less exchange of information between 
institutional investors and underwriters and thereby an increase in underpricing in an 
IPO. Further, I investigate the effectiveness of syndication as a substitute mechanism 
for allocation discretion by way of higher information and risk sharing, whereby 
regulators enforce constraints on the discretionary allocation power of underwriters. 
Finally, I examine the effect of reputation-based syndication on IPO underpricing and 
the effect of the regulatory intervention on this relationship.  
The following conclusions emerge.  
First, I find that the underwriting market in India is highly concentrated and is 
controlled by a few, large and reputable underwriters, who have long-standing 
relationships amongst themselves to manage IPOs.  
Second, I find that when underwriters lack a high reputation, they form large 
syndicates, as well as when the IPOs they manage are large in size and investor 
participation is weak.  
Third, the evidence does not support the argument that the motivation for 
underwriters to form an IPO syndicate is to achieve either risk sharing or price 
manipulation. Rather, the evidence is that underwriters syndicate to reduce their risk 
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as a consequence of an IPO failure by sharing inventory risk. This assists them to 
increase their reputational capital and remain active in the IPO market for longer. This 
is indirect risk mitigation, which challenges the traditional risk sharing theory that only 
measures risk from the perspective of market risk. These perspectives, therefore, 
make a significant contribution to the literature. 
Fourth, I find no support for the information sharing hypothesis that when 
underwriters have allocation discretion, it increases price discovery in the IPO 
mechanism. In the setting of IPO syndication, the results do not support the view that 
allocation on the basis of cronyism is used by underwriters for pursuing self-interest by 
way of rent-seeking activity.  
Fifth, when the discretionary allocation power of underwriters is regulated with 
a consequent increase in the risk of managing an IPO, underwriters are less likely to 
form a syndicate. Being active in the underwriting business becomes less lucrative 
from the economic perspective of a risk-return trade-off, with the outcome that 
underwriters are less likely to form a syndicate with their peers. 
Finally, I find no relationship between syndication by a reputable underwriter 
and the participation of institutional investors. However, when the allocation power of 
underwriters is regulated, reputation-based syndication positively influences 
participation from institutional investors. Thus, when allocation discretion is regulated, 
the inference is that reputed underwriters are reluctant to operate in the market if 
they do not have support from their institutional investors.  
When allocation discretion is regulated, institutional investors act as a 
mediating factor for reputable underwriters to syndicate by sharing higher risk. From 
the perspective of risk mitigation and price manipulation, I conclude that institutional 
participation in an IPO is a major factor that influences the decision of an underwriter 
to syndicate. This represents a significant contribution to the literature.  
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Overall, I conclude that the regulatory intervention changing the allocation 
power of underwriters has had a positive effect on market welfare in India as there is 
less underpricing, and that syndication by highly reputable underwriters acts as a 
substitution mechanism for more information and risk sharing by creating an indirect 
medium of discretion for underwriters. 
 
  
 206 
 
Appendix 2 
Table 5.12: List of Underwriters and Underwriter Reputation (Study 3) 
 
Name of Underwriter 
Proceeds 
Raised 
No. of 
Deals 
Average 
Proceeds 
Pre-issue 
No. of 
Years 
Active 
% of Total 
Sum 
Raised 
Underwriter 
Reputation 
Kotak Mahindra Capital Co. Ltd 225,436 75 3006 10 14.40 1 
Enam Financial Consultants Pvt Ltd 197,564 77 2566 8 12.62 1 
DSP Merrill Lynch Ltd 118,334 36 3287 8 7.56 1 
ICICI Securities Ltd 111,992 52 2154 10 7.15 1 
Citigroup Global Capital Markets India Pvt Ltd 103,830 21 4944 6 6.63 1 
SBI Capital Market Ltd 110,222 43 2563 7 7.04 1 
JM Morgan Stanley Ltd 71,571 35 2045 7 4.57 1 
Deutsche Equities (India) Private Limited 74,213 10 7421 6 4.74 1 
Morgan Stanley Company India Private Ltd 67,022 10 6702 3 4.28 1 
JM Financial Consultants Private Ltd 48,593 20 2430 4 3.10 1 
UBS Securities India Private Ltd 51,965 12 4330 5 3.32 1 
J P Morgan India Private Ltd 39,609 10 3961 5 2.53 1 
HSBC Securities and Capital Market 37,967 9 4219 5 2.42 1 
IDFC Capital Ltd 28,314 15 1888 5 1.81 1 
ABN AMRO Securities (India) Pvt Ltd 26,381 5 5276 3 1.68 1 
Edelweiss Capital Ltd 23,712 23 1031 5 1.51 1 
IL&FS Investsmart Ltd 21,557 31 695 8 1.38 1 
Macquarie Capital Advisers (India) Pvt Ltd 18,103 4 4526 2 1.16 1 
IDBI Capital Market Services Ltd 18,078 16 1130 7 1.15 1 
Lehman Brothers Sec. Pvt Ltd 15,175 3 5058 2 0.97 0 
Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Pvt Ltd 2,250 1 2250 2 0.14 0 
Axis Bank Ltd 11,691 13 899 5 0.75 0 
Anand Rathi Advisors Ltd 10,421 18 579 6 0.67 0 
CLSA India 18,983 4 4746 3 1.21 0 
India Infoline Ltd 8,434 5 1687 4 0.54 0 
Karvy Investor Services Ltd 7,336 23 319 5 0.47 0 
YES Bank Ltd 7,121 5 1424 3 0.45 0 
UTI Securities Ltd 6,518 17 383 3 0.42 0 
Keynote Corporate Service Ltd 6,051 14 432 5 0.39 0 
Almondz Global Securities Ltd 6,208 9 690 4 0.40 0 
Credit Suisse Securities (India) Pvt Ltd 5,513 1 5513 1 0.35 0 
Allianz Securities Ltd 5,319 9 591 3 0.34 0 
Chartered Capital and Investment Ltd 5,304 11 482 4 0.34 0 
Motilal Oswal Investment Advisors Pvt Ltd  5,257 7 751 4 0.34 0 
SREI Capital Markets Ltd 4,772 10 477 5 0.30 0 
Centrum Capital Ltd 4,684 11 426 5 0.30 0 
Saffron Capital Advisors Pvt Ltd 3,999 6 667 3 0.26 0 
Nomura Financial Advisory & Securities Pvt Ltd 3,505 2 1753 2 0.22 0 
SPA Merchant Bankers Ltd 3,098 4 774 2 0.20 0 
Collins Stewart Inga Pvt Ltd 2,970 6 495 3 0.19 0 
Canara Bank 2,829 7 404 3 0.18 0 
Avendus Capital Pvt Ltd 1,903 2 952 1 0.12 0 
Antique Capital Markets Pvt Ltd 1,822 1 1822 1 0.12 0 
Allbank Finance Ltd 1,525 4 381 2 0.10 0 
Comfort Securities Pvt Ltd 1,374 2 687 1 0.09 0 
BOB Capital Markets Ltd 1,245 2 623 2 0.08 0 
PL Capital Markets Pvt Ltd 1,235 4 309 2 0.08 0 
Microsec Capital Ltd 1,118 4 279 2 0.07 0 
Ashika Capital Ltd 1,078 4 269 3 0.07 0 
Religare Securities Ltd 962 2 481 1 0.06 0 
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RBS Equities (India) Ltd 875 1 875 1 0.06 0 
NEXGEN Capitals Ltd 735 2 368 2 0.05 0 
Vivro Financial Services Pvt Ltd 716 2 358 2 0.05 0 
Intensive Fiscal Services Pvt Ltd 698 1 698 1 0.04 0 
Batlivala & Karani Securities India Pvt Ltd 669 1 669 1 0.04 0 
Elara Capital (India) Pvt Ltd 637 2 318 1 0.04 0 
Spark Capital Advisors (India) Pvt Ltd 629 1 629 1 0.04 0 
Aryaman Financial Services Ltd 600 1 600 1 0.04 0 
Atherstone Capital Markets Ltd 599 1 599 1 0.04 0 
Khandwala Securities Ltd 546 1 546 1 0.03 0 
Solomon Smith Barney India Pvt Ltd 525 1 525 1 0.03 0 
Triumph International Finance 517 3 172 2 0.03 0 
VC Corporate Advisors Pvt Ltd 488 1 488 1 0.03 0 
India Capital Markets Pvt Ltd 380 1 380 1 0.02 0 
Fortune Financial Services 348 2 174 2 0.02 0 
Ambit Corporate Finance Pvt Ltd 346 1 346 1 0.02 0 
Bajaj Capital Ltd 341 2 170 1 0.02 0 
KJMC Global Market (India) Ltd 312 1 312 1 0.02 0 
Indbank Merchant Banking Services Ltd 307 1 307 1 0.02 0 
Sobhagya Capital Options Ltd 297 2 148 2 0.02 0 
RR Financial Consultants Ltd 295 1 295 1 0.02 0 
Darashaw & Company Pvt Ltd 254 1 254 1 0.02 0 
Tata Finance Merchant Bankers Ltd 228 1 228 1 0.01 0 
Prebon Yamane India) Ltd 167 1 167 1 0.01 0 
Punjab National Bank 143 1 143 1 0.01 0 
A.K. Capital Services Ltd 142 1 142 1 0.01 0 
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Chapter 6 Overall Conclusion 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
This thesis contributes to an active and ongoing debate in the literature on the 
benefits of granting discretionary power to underwriters to allocate shares to IPO 
investors in a bookbuilding mechanism. I conclude that by granting allocation 
discretion to underwriters, pricing efficiency in the IPO process is improved. This is 
because underwriters can obtain private information related to the IPO pricing from 
informed institutional investors. This assists underwriters to price an IPO at the fair 
price, and hence benefits the issuing firm through lower underpricing.  
However, the negative side of granting allocation discretion is that 
underwriters can use it to pursue self-interest, by engaging in rent-seeking activity. 
This is possible by favouring regular institutional investors with the allocation of a 
higher quantity of underpriced shares. These institutional investors are in turn willing 
to offer reciprocal benefits to the underwriters by sharing a percentage of the higher 
profits they receive. This can adversely affect market efficiency due to higher 
underpricing of IPOs. 
The regulation of the discretionary allocation power of underwriters in favour 
of proportionate allocation by a regulator can cause significant contrary consequences 
on the feedback expected from informed institutional investors related to IPO pricing. 
This is because underwriters experience difficulty in maintaining information sharing 
relationships with informed institutional investors. This can result in the IPO being 
either highly overpriced or underpriced and can negatively impact the efficiency of the 
IPO market mechanism.  
In addition, we find that regulating allocation discretion increases the 
uncertainty associated with the successful subscription of IPOs from regular 
institutional investors. For this reason, enforcing constraints on underwriter allocation 
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discretion can result in a negative impact on IPO success. Such restrictions 
consequently increase the overall risk for underwriters managing an IPO.  
For regulators, the question is whether to grant allocation discretion to 
underwriters or, alternatively, to enforce regulation. Prior research has investigated 
underwriters’ allocation discretion and its outcome on information sharing with 
informed institutional investors. Nevertheless, there remains the question of whether 
allocation discretion is used by underwriters to enhance the welfare of IPO market 
participants generally, or whether it works to benefit rent-seeking activities. Thus, the 
central theme of this doctoral thesis is an examination of granting allocation discretion 
to underwriters as opposed to regulating allocation. I concentrate on how different 
allocation mechanisms influence underwriters’ behaviour in the IPO market and their 
impact on their relationship with IPO investors. The aim is to contribute to a better 
understanding of the IPO market mechanism from the welfare perspective of market 
participants.  
The research project is in the form of seven research questions that are 
addressed in three individual studies. The first one is a conceptual study, and the other 
two are empirical studies.  
6.1.1 Study 1 Conceptual Framework 
In the first study, I introduce an integrated conceptual framework to 
understand the effect of two different allocation mechanisms, discretion and no 
discretion, on the information sharing relationship between underwriters and 
informed institutional investors. Based on an extensive literature review, I advance the 
information sharing literature by debating the benefits of each allocation mechanism 
on underwriters’ behaviour in the IPO market and investigating their relationship with 
IPO investors. I contribute to the literature by addressing the debate in the literature 
on regulating the allocation power of underwriters in relation to the efficacy of 
discretionary and proportionate policy regimes on the welfare of market participants.  
 210 
 
Further, in the presence of a grey market for IPOs, I apply signaling theory in an 
IPO market setting to understand the impact of information asymmetry on IPO 
investors. Moreover, I contribute to the academic literature about underwriting 
syndicates by discussing the determinants of an IPO syndicate. Finally, I conceptualise 
the usefulness of syndication as an indirect medium of discretion for underwriters 
when their discretionary allocation power is regulated. Thus, the focus of the 
conceptual framework is that it jointly links signaling and syndication theories with 
information sharing theory to develop associated hypotheses, which are empirically 
tested using data from the Indian IPO market. 
The institutional framework in the Indian IPO market has two unique features. 
First, when bookbuilding was introduced, the regulatory authority, the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI), granted discretionary power to underwriters to 
allocate shares to institutional investors. However, recently, regulatory intervention 
has curtailed the previously held discretionary allocation power of underwriters. In the 
new regime, allocation of shares to institutional investors is made on a proportionate 
basis. Second, and more importantly, there is the presence of an active grey market for 
IPOs. This particular market setting influences the behaviour of underwriters during 
the IPO process and has stimulated an environment that allows for an empirical testing 
of the hypotheses developed in the conceptual framework. 
6.1.2 Study 2 Underwriter Signaling 
In the second study, the main focus is the implications of signaling theory in the 
Indian IPO market setting, in the context of an active grey market for IPOs. I examine 
how underwriters can reduce the information asymmetry for uninformed retail 
investors by using the grey market as a signaling environment to signal IPO quality to 
them. Further, I examine the effect of allocation discretion on underwriters’ motives in 
the grey market and thus their choices in regard to sharing information with IPO 
investors. I also examine how the outcomes of retail investor participation and IPO 
underpricing can be different, depending on the signaling behaviour of underwriters in 
the grey market.  
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I find that granting allocation discretion to underwriters does not result in 
lower underpricing in an IPO. I also find that the grey market price signal has a positive 
effect on retail investors’ participation and results in a reduced level of information 
asymmetry. I conclude that the grey market price signal can be a dominant signal for 
retail investors to gain information about IPO quality, and hence influence them to 
actively participate in an offer, leading to IPO success.  
However, a significant finding that emerges is that the granting of allocation 
discretion to underwriters, combined with the presence of an unregulated grey 
market, motivates underwriters to manipulate the grey market by giving a false signal 
of IPO quality for their own benefit. The evidence is that regulating the allocation 
power of underwriters reduces their incentive to participate in the grey market, 
thereby restricting manipulation in the grey market. This represents a positive 
outcome for market welfare as the cost of the false signal in the grey market is borne 
by uninformed retail investors, whose investment decision is influenced by the grey 
market price signal.  
I find that greater retail investor participation results in higher underpricing. 
However, regulatory intervention makes this relationship insignificant. This represents 
a positive sign for IPO markets, allowing that underpricing in the period is not expected 
to be the outcome of overenthusiasm by retail investors. Further, contrary to existing 
research on the grey market, the evidence from this study finds no significant 
relationship between the grey market price and underpricing in an IPO. This evidence 
supports my earlier finding that there is a possibility that the grey market price does 
not represent the fundamental value of the IPO. 
6.1.3 Study 3 Underwriter Syndication 
In the third study, the main focus is the examination of underwriting 
syndicates. I examine the determinants of an underwriting syndicate and investigate 
the critical question of why underwriters form an IPO syndicate. I examine the 
effectiveness of syndication as an indirect mechanism of information and risk sharing 
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for underwriters when regulators enforce constraints on allocation discretion. Finally, I 
explore the motivation for syndication by highly reputed underwriters and investigate 
whether, in the absence of allocation discretion, reputation-based syndication results 
in either higher information sharing or, alternatively, price manipulation in an IPO.  
The evidence is that granting allocation discretion to underwriters does not 
result in higher information production from institutional investors. Further 
examination indicates that the underwriting market in India is highly concentrated and 
dominated by a few large underwriters who have established reputations and 
relationships amongst themselves to manage IPOs. For this reason, it is difficult for 
new and small underwriters to enter and survive in the IPO market. Moreover, I find 
that the underwriters who form large syndicates generally do not have a high 
reputation and that the IPOs they manage are large in size, and participation from 
investors is weak.  
I find no support for the argument that motivation of syndication is risk 
mitigation or price manipulation. However, I find that underwriters form syndicates to 
reduce the risk of IPO failure by sharing inventory risk, which, in effect, is indirect risk 
mitigation. 
When the discretionary allocation power of underwriters is regulated, with an 
attendant increase in the overall risk of managing the IPO, underwriters are less likely 
to form a syndicate. Finally, in the absence of allocation discretion, reputation-based 
syndication positively influences participation from institutional investors and also 
results in lower underpricing in an IPO. 
6.2 Overall Summary 
Overall, the results do not support the information sharing hypothesis that 
granting allocation discretion to underwriters results in better price discovery in the 
IPO process. The conclusion is that in a setting which has the presence of a grey 
market, and for which underwriters have allocation discretion, such a market 
encourages the underwriters to engage in rent-seeking activity for higher income. This 
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is made possible by manipulating the grey market price signal that positively influences 
the participation of uninformed retail investors, which in turn results in higher 
underpricing in the IPO. The inference is that when allocation discretion is regulated, 
all IPO investors have similar information about the quality of the IPO firm, which 
thereby works to lower underpricing and increase market welfare. The conclusion is 
that in the Indian IPO market, underwriters syndicate to reduce the risk of IPO failure 
by sharing inventory risk.  
In the absence of allocation discretion, reputable underwriters, if they do not 
have active participation from institutional investors, are reluctant to operate in the 
market because of higher risk. This allows institutional investors to act as a mediating 
factor for reputable underwriters to syndicate by sharing risk. Thus, I conclude that 
syndication by a reputable underwriter is an effective mechanism for higher 
information and risk sharing as it creates an indirect medium of discretion for 
underwriters when allocation discretion is regulated. 
Issuers benefit when a syndicate manages their IPO, when at least one of the 
syndicate members is an underwriter with a good reputation as this can maximise the 
amount raised for the same number of shares offered.  
The outcome is that regulating allocation discretion of underwriters is positive 
from the welfare perspective of market participants through lower underpricing. 
However, for regulatory intervention to be efficient, the grey market must also be 
regulated because the price signal in the grey market positively affects the 
participation of small retail investors.  
For regulatory authorities in other IPO markets, the evidence from this study is 
that when allocation discretion is regulated, underwriters can overcome the regulation 
hurdle by creating an indirect discretion through reputation-based syndication. Thus, 
the combination of findings supports regulatory intervention as it results in increased 
market welfare while allowing syndication to act as a substitution mechanism for IPO 
success. 
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6.3 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
Although the study makes an effort to address all important issues, it is subject 
to certain limitations. 
The first limitation relates to data. The unavailability of day-to-day grey market 
premium data obliges us to use weekly data for the grey market premium, although I 
do have data on the day-to-day participation in each individual investor category. 
Access to daily grey market price data during the period when the IPO opens for 
subscription would have allowed me to examine the effect of the change in grey 
market premium depending on the day-to-day subscription from each investor 
category. 
Care must be taken in applying the findings of this study to IPOs more 
generally. This is because I have only considered IPOs that had a positive grey market 
premium (which led to a few firms being eliminated). Nevertheless, the data period is 
the largest to date, compared with data samples of other published reports, since the 
introduction of the bookbuilding mechanism in the Indian IPO market. 
My analysis is also constrained by the unavailability of data on the number of 
shares applied in the subcategory of institutional investors. This data would have 
allowed me to understand which institutional investors are more informed and, more 
importantly, whether foreign institutional investors (with better skills and modelling 
techniques compared to local Indian institutions) are able to identify IPOs that give 
higher returns.  
Compared to syndication in the American IPO market, the syndicate size of an 
Indian IPO does not vary substantially. Controlling for the number of underwriters in a 
syndicate does not provide any significant findings. For this reason, I have used the 
calculated measure of underwriter syndicate effort as a proxy to represent the size of 
an underwriting syndicate in the Indian IPO setting.  
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The data for this research has been mostly hand-collected from publicly 
available sources such as websites or from prospectuses.  
Moreover, to understand the operations of the grey market, I interviewed 
participants active in the grey market in India (market operators, brokers, investors 
and a newspaper editor) over a period of 3 months. The interviews did not provide 
direct data for the thesis but contributed invaluably to a realistic recognition and 
understanding of the mechanism at work in the IPO market in India. 
The data on the grey market prices/premiums were available only from public 
announcements (No databanks exist). During my visit to India, I contacted six 
newspaper publishers to obtain data on the grey market but without success. 
Ultimately, the data for the period of my study (2000-2013) was made available by the 
financial newspaper Smart Investment that granted me access to their archives 
(permission to visit their storage of past issues and hand-collect the data). Smart 
Investment is published in a regional language, namely Gujrathi56, in Ahmedabad, 
Gujarat. It was, therefore, necessary to translate the data into English so that I could 
use the data for my research. Thus, I invested considerable time and effort in gathering 
the data necessary for my empirical analysis. Human error has, however, been 
eliminated as far as possible. 
The rich information available from the Indian IPO market presents a number 
of interesting directions for future research. Future research could explore more on 
the role of the grey market in influencing market participants and how regulators can 
deal with the potential welfare costs associated with grey market manipulation.  
Also, in the Indian market, many IPOs are backed by venture capital firms. 
When an investor is prepared to enter with prior commitment, this enhances the 
issuing firm's ability to sell the IPO and generate more confidence in the minds of other 
                                                     
56 http://www.smartinvestment.in/  
 This newspaper, more recently, is published in an English version and the publisher have 
developed an online portal. 
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investors. I plan to use a propensity score methodology to conduct a relative study of 
IPOs with and without venture capital backing to understand whether the participation 
of venture capital investors acts as a signaling tool for uninformed retail investors. 
When investors are prepared to enter with prior commitment, this enhances the issuer 
firm’s ability to sell the IPO and generate confidence in the minds of other investors. 
My results show that syndication has decreased when underwriters do not 
have allocation discretion. Thus, future research could explore IPO syndication 
depending on the risk-return trade-off for underwriters. Finally, future researchers 
should investigate the effect of syndication by reputed underwriters on long-term IPO 
performance.  
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